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This dissertation examines the acquisition of argument structure as a window
into the role of development in grammar learning. The way that children repre-
sent the data for language acquisition depends on the grammatical knowledge they
have at any given point in development. Children use their immature grammatical
knowledge, together with other non-linguistic conceptual, pragmatic, and cognitive
abilities, to parse and interpret their input. But until children have fully acquired
the target grammar, these input representations will be incomplete and potentially
inaccurate. Our learning theory must take into account how learning can operate
over input representations that change over the course of development. What allows
learners to acquire new knowledge from partial and noisy representations of their
data, one step at a time, and still converge on the right grammar?
The case study in this dissertation points towards one way to characterize the
role of development in grammar acquisition by probing more deeply into the re-
sources that learners bring to their learning task. I consider two types of resources.
The first is representational: learners need resources for representing their input in
useful ways, even early in development. In two behavioral studies, I ask what re-
sources infants in their second year of life use to represent their input for argument
structure acquisition. I show that English learners differentiate the grammatical
and thematic relations of clause arguments, and that they recognize local argument
relations before they recognize non-local predicate-argument dependencies. The sec-
ond type of resource includes mechanisms for learning from input representations
even when they are incomplete or inaccurate early in development. In two computa-
tional experiments, I investigate how learners could in principle use a combination of
domain-specific linguistic knowledge and domain-general cognitive abilities in order
to draw accurate inferences about verb argument structure from messy data, and
to identify the forms that argument movement can take in their language.
By investigating some of the earliest steps of syntax acquisition in infancy,
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an individual child at any single point in development, how the child perceives that
portion of the input given her current grammatical knowledge, and what internal
mechanisms enable the child to generalize beyond her input in inferring the gram-
mar of her language. This work has implications not only for theories of language
learning, but also for learning in general, by offering a new perspective on the use
of data in the acquisition of knowledge.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Input Representations and Grammar Learning in Development
Children acquire grammars for languages in their community. Each grammar
is abstract in relation to the child’s specific experiences, which are always consis-
tent with many possible grammars. Yet children in the same linguistic community
arrive at remarkably similar grammars. This is the problem of language acquisition
(Chomsky, 1965).
Linguistic theories since Chomsky (1965) and Wexler and Culicover (1980)
have traditionally studied this problem by modelling language acquisition along the
lines of Fig. 1.1. In this model, children start with a set of data: a corpus of pri-
marily linguistic input containing the sentences that they hear others utter around
them. They then apply their general cognitive abilities, plus knowledge of the types
of properties that grammars can have, in order to infer the specific properties of the
grammar they are acquiring. This model idealizes language acquisition as an instan-
taneous process that maps a corpus of input onto a grammar, abstracting away from
time and resource constraints. Some modern approaches make a similar idealization
in asking whether the data as a whole support grammar selection (Perfors, Tenen-
baum, & Regier, 2006; Yang, 2002). These approaches are not intended to model
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Figure 1.1: Traditional Model of Language Acquisition
learning over time; instead, they illuminate the problem of language learnability
from a global perspective, asking what combination of data, linguistic knowledge,
and other cognitive abilities enables grammar learning to converge in the limit. But
there is an important dimension that is missed in this abstraction: the role that
development plays in language acquisition.
Language learning, like other forms of learning, is incremental: what we can
learn depends on what we already know. Just as a child who can’t count cannot
learn arithmetic, a child who can’t segment words cannot learn whether her language
has verb raising. Learning in any domain depends on how the data for learning are
represented; as input representations change over the course of development, this
impacts how learners form categories and draw generalizations. Thus, the way that
learners perceive and use the input to grammar learning is not static— it changes
as they learn more about their language.
This means that language acquisition, as it unfolds over development, looks
more like the model in Fig. 1.2. In this model, children take in their linguistic input
and represent it using the knowledge of their language that they currently have
available— their developing grammar— together with their developing conceptual
and cognitive abilities. These input representations are immature and incomplete
at early stages of development, but they then become the data that children use to
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Figure 1.2: Developmental Model of Language Acquisition
gain new grammatical knowledge (Lidz & Gagliardi, 2015). Children apply their
general cognitive abilities, plus knowledge of the types of properties that grammars
can have, to draw new inferences about their grammar on the basis of these data.
And this process then iterates: children’s updated grammars will allow them to
represent their input more richly and completely, enabling further inferences about
the grammar they are acquiring, until they incrementally arrive at the target state.
In this dissertation, I ask how we might enrich the traditional model of lan-
guage acquisition in order to account for the role of development, and what we gain
from doing so. Moving to a developmental model means we must solve an appar-
ent paradox. At any given point in development, the way that children represent
their input depends on their current knowledge of their language, and these repre-
sentations determine what further inferences children can draw about their target
grammar. Learning cannot wait until children can completely and accurately rep-
resent their input, or there would be nothing further to learn (Fodor, 1998; Valian,
1990). But if children’s representations of their input are incomplete or inaccurate,
how do they avoid faulty inferences, or even learn from it at all? When we take
seriously the incremental nature of learning in development, we run into difficult
questions of how grammar learning gets started, and how it manages to converge.
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I propose that the answers to these questions will enrich our understanding of
the resources that children bring with them to the language learning task. First,
children need resources for representing their input in useful ways for further learn-
ing, even very early in grammatical development. For example, in order to learn
syntax, it might be helpful for a child to be able to represent her input in a format
that encodes some amount of syntactic structure, even if it is partial and immature,
rather than only encoding string properties. Second, children need resources for
learning from their input representations when they are partial and immature; they
need learning mechanisms that will allow them to draw accurate inferences about
their grammar on the basis of input that they cannot yet parse completely or veridi-
cally. How do learners extract signal from data that will contain a great degree of
noise early in the learning process?
As a case study, I examine these questions within the domain of argument
structure, one of the most basic syntactic properties to be acquired in infancy. In-
fants at very early stages of grammatical development draw inferences about syntax
and meaning on the basis of clause transitivity, by observing how verbs distribute
with subjects and objects in a clause (e.g Fisher, Gertner, Scott, & Yuan, 2010;
Lidz, White, & Baier, 2017; Gagliardi, Mease, & Lidz, 2016). Here, I ask how this
learning unfolds over development, focusing on a narrow timeslice within an infant’s
second year of life. I examine this developmental window from the two angles of
representation and learning.
First, what representational resources do young infants have for representing
transitivity when drawing inferences about verb meanings and syntax? Do they
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represent clause subjects and objects as a set of two noun phrases, or differentiate
the grammatical and thematic relations of these arguments in some further way?
Second, how do learners come to recognize the predicate-argument relations in so-
called “non-basic” clauses, in which transformations may displace clause arguments
from their canonical positions? If learners cannot yet recognize argument movement
when it has occurred, how do they cope with the messy data that non-basic clauses
contribute to their input, and avoid drawing faulty inferences from their incomplete
representations of these sentences? Through this case study, I show that language
acquisition theories can be enriched by taking into account the way that learners
represent and learn from their input at each stage of development, enabling a deeper
understanding of how and why learners generalize in the way that they do.
To motivate these research questions, it will be helpful to consider the role that
transitivity has played in bootstrapping theories of argument structure and clause
structure acquisition.
1.2 The Role of Transitivity in Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping (Gleitman, 1990; Grimshaw, 1981; Pinker, 1984) offers a way
to bridge the gap between learners’ input and the abstract grammatical represen-
tations they need to acquire. The data for grammar acquisition consist of both
immature representations of the sentences that learners hear, and representations
of the contexts in which those sentences are uttered. If the syntactic categories that
generated those sentences are related in a systematic way to the conceptual cate-
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gories under which learners represent their contexts of use, learners may be able to
exploit those correlations in order to gain an initial foothold into the grammatical
system of their language. Because transitivity is robustly correlated with clause
meaning cross-linguistically (Fisher et al., 2010; Gleitman, 1990; Hopper & Thomp-
son, 1980; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a; Naigles, 1990), it provides a particularly useful
cue for the first stages of bootstrapping into the target grammar. Learners might
be able to use clause meaning to identify subjects and objects in sentences they
hear (Pinker, 1984), or use a verb’s distribution with subjects and objects to draw
inferences about its meaning and argument structure (Fisher et al., 2010; Gleit-
man, 1990; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a; Naigles, 1990). A key question is how learners
represent transitivity in their input in order to enable these inferences, and what
inferences they draw on the basis of those representations.
1.2.1 Semantic and Syntactic Bootstrapping
Semantic and syntactic bootstrapping describe the two different directions in
which learners might draw inferences by relating syntactic and conceptual structure.
If the syntactic environments in which verbs distribute are related in a systematic
way to conceptual categories of events they describe, then learners can use evidence
about one of these properties (syntactic or conceptual) to draw inferences about the
other.
In semantic bootstrapping, a child who represents an event under a particular
conceptual description might be able to use these correspondence relations to draw
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inferences about the syntax of the clause describing that event (Grimshaw, 1981;
Pinker, 1989, 1984). For example, a child who perceives an event as involving an
agent and a patient, and furthermore knows that subjects of active transitive clauses
tend to name agents and objects tend to name patients, could then infer which
argument is the subject and which is the object in a clause describing that event.
This may lead to further inferences about how subjects and objects are realized
in the language: for instance, how subjects and objects tend to be ordered with
respect to the verb, and what surface forms indicate agreement relations between
a verb and these arguments. Conversely, in syntactic bootstrapping, a child who
represents a clause under a particular linguistic structure might be able to use these
correspondence relations in the opposite direction to draw inferences about which
event the clause describes (Fisher et al., 2010; Gleitman, 1990; Landau & Gleitman,
1985; Lasnik, 1989). For example, a child who hears an unknown verb in a clause
that she represents as transitive could then infer that this clause describes an event
she perceives as having an agent and a patient. This will allow her to narrow down
the range of events that the new verb might describe, restricting the conceptual
space she is considering for that verb’s meaning.
Experimental evidence shows that infants are able to use these meaning-
distribution correspondence relations in learning. In preferential looking tasks,
English-learning infants as young as 17 months can use the canonical subject-verb-
object word order of English to identify that the individual named by the subject of
a transitive clause is the agent of an event, and the individual named by the object
is the patient (Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 1996; Gertner, Fisher, & Eisengart, 2006).
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Learners also draw inferences about verb meanings by observing their distributions
across different clause structures. By the age of 19 months, infants reliably infer a
causative meaning for a novel verb in a transitive vs. an intransitive clause, and do
so under the right circumstances at 15 months as well (Arunachalam & Waxman,
2010; Arunachalam, Escovar, Hansen, & Waxman, 2013; Jin & Fisher, 2014; Mes-
senger, Yuan, & Fisher, 2015; Naigles, 1990; Yuan & Fisher, 2009; Yuan, Fisher, &
Snedeker, 2012).
Children draw even finer-grained inferences on the basis of hearing novel verbs
participate in particular transitive-intransitive alternations. The subject of an in-
transitive clause can name either an agent (e.g. John baked) or a patient (e.g. The
bread rose). How a verb distributes in intransitive clauses is related to its mean-
ing: intransitives whose subjects name agents tend to describe activities of those
agents, whereas intransitives whose subjects name patients tend to describe changes
undergone by those patients (Fillmore, 1968, 1970; Levin & Hovav, 2005; Williams,
2015). Another line of experimental work has found that two-year-olds are sensitive
to these distinctions (Bunger & Lidz, 2004, 2008; Naigles, 1996; Scott & Fisher,
2009).
In summary, bootstrapping allows young learners to narrow down the range
of meanings for new verbs by using information about how those verbs distribute
in transitive and intransitive clauses. Infants use subjects and objects in clauses
to identify whether a new verb labels a causative event, which participant roles
individuals bear in relation to that event, and whether that event involves a change
or an activity. But these results leave open a crucial question: how exactly do
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learners represent clause transitivity when drawing these inferences? Different clause
representations will enable different types of bootstrapping inferences, and hence
different generalizations about the target grammar.
1.2.2 Which Bootstrapping Inference?
The experimental results surveyed above do not show us how young verb-
learning infants represent transitivity: whether as some type of asymmetrical rela-
tion between a subject and an object, or as merely a set of two noun phrases. If
learners cannot yet reliably identify the subject and object of a clause, then they
must have a heuristic for inferring verb meanings from a flatter clause representa-
tion. One influential hypothesis proposes that infants use a heuristic based only
on the number of noun phrases in a clause, taking those to be the arguments and
assuming that they match one-to-one the number of participants in an event the
clause describes, as we naturally perceive it (Fisher et al., 2010; Lidz & Gleitman,
2004a; Naigles, 1990). Thus, a clause with two arguments should describe an event
perceived with exactly two participants, and a clause with one argument should
describe a one-participant event. This “Participant-to-Argument Matching”
strategy (PAM) is attractive because it provides constraints on verb learning on
the basis of very little linguistic knowledge. Because PAM is consistent with infants’
behavior in prior experimental work, those results have been taken to support PAM
as the primary bootstrapping strategy that infants use at the onset of verb learning
(Fisher et al., 2010).
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However, prior experimental results do not differentiate PAM from a more so-
phisticated bootstrapping strategy. If infants do differentiate subjects and objects in
a clause, their behavior in previous studies may be driven by finer-grained inferences
about the participant relations of those arguments, rather than argument number.
Following Pinker, we may call this strategy “Thematic Linking”: infants may
expect particular argument positions to link to particular thematic relations, e.g.
transitive subject to Agent and transitive object to Patient (Pinker, 1984; Williams,
2015; Lidz et al., 2017). The work reviewed above suggests that infants are sensi-
tive to many of these linking principles, at least by the age of two years (Bunger
& Lidz, 2004, 2008; Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 1996; Gertner et al., 2006; Naigles,
1996; Scott & Fisher, 2009). In order for infants to use this strategy to enable their
earliest verb-learning inferences, they must be able to identify subjects and objects
in their language with sufficient regularity. Their ability to do so at the relevant age
is an empirical question.
Conceptually, there are two primary reasons why Thematic Linking is an at-
tractive hypothesis. PAM does not generally characterize the relation between clause
structure and meaning in adult grammars, either within a language or across lan-
guages, and thus could only be an initial heuristic to be abandoned later in devel-
opment (Williams, 2015). But because many linking principles between grammati-
cal and thematic relations are robustly attested cross-linguistically, children would
not need to abandon them over the course of development (Baker, 1988; Dowty,
1991; Fillmore, 1968, 1970; Jackendoff, 1972; Levin & Hovav, 2005; Pinker, 1984;
Williams, 2015). Moreover, PAM raises a difficult developmental question: how
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do children learn to abandon a heuristic based on counting clause arguments, and
acquire a grammar that encodes structure rather than number? Thematic Linking
implies a simpler developmental story, in which children’s learning is informed by
generalizations that are consistent with the grammar they end up acquiring.
Thus, it is an open question whether infants at the onset of verb learning boot-
strap primarily from the number of clause arguments, as proposed under PAM, or
from the thematic content of those arguments, as proposed under Thematic Link-
ing. When the two strategies would lead to different bootstrapping inferences, which
strategy will infants use? In Chapter 2, I present new experimental evidence dif-
ferentiating these hypotheses with 19- to 22-month-old infants, the youngest age
range commonly tested in prior literature. Teasing apart these strategies has impli-
cations not only for our theories of the mechanisms that guide learning from input.
It also helps us understand the types of input representations that infants learn
from: specifically, whether infants initially represent clause arguments as a string of
noun phrases, or whether they differentiate the grammatical relations of those argu-
ments. If infants’ early verb-learning inferences are primarily driven by grammatical
and thematic relations rather than the number of arguments, it may be that their
clause representations privilege categories like ‘subject’ and ‘object,’ and argument
number may only be a proxy for recovering those categories in their input. This
invites further investigation into how richly those categories are represented— are
they represented qua subjects and objects, in an adult-like hierarchical constituent
structure? And if so, how do those representations arise in development? Although
I will not answer all of these questions here, this work provides a foundation for
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future research to do so.
1.3 Recognizing Transitivity in Non-Basic Clauses
In order to bootstrap verb meanings and argument structure from their distri-
butions in transitive and intransitive clauses, learners must reliably recognize clause
transitivity in their input. This is the case regardless of whether transitivity is
represented in terms of argument number or argument relations. But recognizing
transitivity is not trivial, as transitive and intransitive clauses can be realized in
highly variable ways within and across languages. Consider the following:
(1) Amy fixed her bicycle.
(2) *Amy fixed.
(3) What did Amy fix?
Recognizing that the wh-object question in (1) is underlyingly transitive de-
pends on knowing that what acts as the verb’s object, despite not being realized in
an argument position. An infant who does not yet know that what is a wh-word
might fail to represent it as an argument and treat the verb as intransitive. This
could lead to faulty inferences about the argument structure and meaning of fix :
a learner might think that this verb can freely occur without a direct object, with
consequences for what it means.
More generally, if learners do not know how particular transformations are
realized in their language, they might bootstrap from inaccurate sentence repre-
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sentations1. For this reason, clauses that we might call “non-basic” have been
recognized as problematic for both syntactic and semantic bootstrapping theories
(Gleitman, 1990; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a; Pinker, 1984). Following Keenan (1976),
Pinker (1984) notes that relations like “subjects tend to name agents” hold only in
“‘basic sentences’: roughly, those that are simple, active, affirmative, declarative,
pragmatically neutral, and minimally presuppositional. In nonbasic sentences, these
properties may not hold.” Consider the case of the wh-object question in (1), re-
peated here as (4), as well as other non-basic clause types such as relative clauses
(5) and passives (6):
(4) What did Amy fix?
(5) I like the bicycle that Amy fixed.
(6) The bicycle was fixed (by Amy).
In each of these examples, a syntactic transformation has applied such that
the argument acting as the object of the verb no longer surfaces in canonical object
position. If a child is not aware of these transformations, she may be misled when
she relates the linguistic structure she (mis-)perceives in these clauses with her
conceptual representations of events. For example, a semantic bootstrapper who
takes (6) to be a description of an event in which she perceives Amy to be the agent
and the bicycle to be the patient might construe Amy as the subject and the bicycle
1Note that this problem is not unique to transformation-based grammatical theories. Under
theories in which transitive clauses, wh-object questions, and passives are separate “constructions”
(Fillmore, Kay, & O’Connor, 1988; Goldberg, 1995; Langacker, 1999), the learner must still ulti-
mately recognize that only verbs that occur in transitives can also occur in wh-object questions
and passives. Whether this is encoded transformationally or via a construction hierarchy, the same
logical problem holds.
13
as the object, resulting in a parse that is not only erroneous but also implies that
English has object-verb-subject (OVS) word order. Likewise, the fronted arguments
(what and the bicycle) in (4) and (5), if recognized as arguments, might be taken
as evidence for optional OSV word order in English rather than as evidence for the
wh-movement that actually produced this non-canonical word order. And if these
phrases are not recognized as arguments of fix, a variety of other inaccurate parses
would be available for these sentences. These include ones in which fix takes a null
or implicit object, meaning either “Amy fixed stuff” or “Amy fixed the thing.”
Conversely, a syntactic bootstrapper who is not aware of the transformations
in these sentences may draw faulty inferences about which events in the world they
describe. Because direct objects are not realized in their canonical post-verbal po-
sition, a child may not recognize that these clauses are underlyingly transitive, and
thus may not infer that they describe causative events. In this case, an event in
which she perceives Amy to be the agent and the bicycle to be the patient may no
longer count for her as a possible “fixing.” The problem is not necessarily solved as
soon as she observes fix in a basic clause that she can recognize as transitive. In that
case, she may infer that fix belongs some class of verbs that can alternate between
transitive and intransitive uses, like eat or rise, leading to inaccurate inferences
about both its syntactic and semantic properties.
In summary, non-basic clauses are problematic for early grammar acquisition.
Infants who do not know which sentences have undergone particular transformations
might mis-perceive the structure of these sentences, disrupting their attempts to
put syntactic and conceptual categories into correspondence for grammar learning.
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In particular, if learners fail to recognize transitivity when arguments have been
moved, they may draw faulty inferences about verb syntax and meanings, as well
as the broader clause structure properties of their language. Understanding the
extent of this problem requires understanding the developmental trajectory of non-
basic clause acquisition. When and how do learners come to identify the ways that
movement is realized in their language? And how does this interact with their
acquisition of verb argument structure? I will now provide a brief overview of
what we currently know about these topics, and the open questions that I will be
addressing in this work.
1.3.1 Representing Wh-Dependencies
To examine the developmental trajectory of non-basic clause acquisition, I
focus on wh-dependencies, which are present in both both wh-questions and relative
clauses, repeated here as (7) and (8). These are among the most common non-
basic clause types that infants hear: wh-questions make up about 15% of the input
to English-learning children even before their second birthday, and the majority of
these questions contain non-canonical word orders (Newport, Gleitman, & Gleitman,
1977; Stromswold, 1995).
(7) What did Amy fix?
(8) I like the bicycle that Amy fixed.
These examples contain a particular type of non-local predicate-argument de-
pendency, which can hold across arbitrarily long distances but cannot cross cer-
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tain structures that are “islands” for dependency formation (Chomsky, 1977; Ross,
1967). This dependency can be realized in variable ways within and across lan-
guages, as evidenced by the different surface forms of (7) and (8). In “wh-in-situ”
languages like Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, wh-dependencies appear on the sur-
face to be quite local. The wh-phrase in (9) is pronounced in the argument position
where the predicate normally assigns its thematic relation, although under many
accounts it still moves covertly to the edge of the interrogative clause (e.g. Aoun,
Hornstein, & Sportiche, 1981; Huang, 1982).
(9) Hufei mai-le shenme (Mandarin Chinese; Cheng, 2003)
Hufei buy-PERF what
‘What did Hufei buy?’
Given the variety of forms that wh-dependencies can take, it is not a trivial
task for learners to recognize when they are present in sentences they hear. And
doing so has consequences for further learning. Recognizing that (7), (8), and (9)
contain dependencies of a particular type is necessary for learners to assign them
a correct parse, which they will use to make further generalizations about their
grammar— inferring, for instance, whether wh-phrases in their language undergo
overt displacement or are pronounced in their thematic positions. English-speaking
infants begin to produce their first wh-questions in their own speech around the age
of 20 months (Stromswold, 1995), so they may be acquiring the relevant grammatical
knowledge for parsing and comprehending them in the months leading up to this
age. This is moreover an age at which substantial verb learning has already taken
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place, motivating a deeper look into how argument structure and wh-dependency
acquisition interact.
Prior experimental results suggest that the acquisition of these two phenomena
is closely related. Based on a complex pattern of results in a preferential looking
task, Gagliardi et al. (2016) argue that infants do not represent the wh-dependencies
in wh-questions and relative clauses until the age of 20 months, around the same
age that they begin producing wh-questions themselves. Apparent comprehension
of these sentences by 15-month-old learners, also found for subject wh-questions in
earlier work (Seidl, Hollich, & Jusczyk, 2003), may be due to a “gap-driven” inter-
pretation heuristic driven by argument structure knowledge. For example, infants
who know that hug is transitive might detect that an expected object is missing
after the verb in a sentence like Which monkey is the frog hugging? They may then
infer that the missing argument is the desired answer to the question, allowing them
to succeed in a preferential looking task without representing a fronted phrase as
that missing argument. Thus, infants’ performance at 15 months may reflect their
developing knowledge of verb transitivity, rather than their ability to recognize and
parse wh-dependencies.
This account receives some support from the finding that 15-month-olds’ per-
formance in a similar preferential looking task depends on vocabulary, a likely indica-
tor of verb knowledge (Perkins & Lidz, under review). This account is also consistent
with independent evidence for verb transitivity knowledge emerging around this age.
Jin and Fisher (2014) found that 15-month-olds were able to draw inferences about
the meaning of a novel verb on the basis of hearing it in a transitive frame, and
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Lidz et al. (2017) found that high-vocabulary 16-month-olds predicted an upcoming
direct object for a known transitive verb during online sentence processing.
In summary, previous findings suggest the following developmental trajectory.
Infants may first acquire some knowledge of verb transitivity around the age of
15-16 months, which enables them to predict arguments of known verbs and de-
tect when they are unexpectedly missing in a wh-question or relative clause. This
ability may be developmentally prior to their ability to identify the full structure of
wh-dependencies, which by hypothesis emerges around 20 months. However, the ev-
idence from these preferential looking studies is highly indirect. These data demon-
strate whether infants can identify a particular image as an answer to a question,
but do not diagnose how infants represent the structure of that question in order to
arrive at their interpretation. Therefore, these results cannot directly demonstrate
that infants’ representations of wh-dependencies are immature at early stages of
learning, and develop over time.
In Chapter 3, I present a new behavioral experiment that more directly probes
infants’ syntactic representations of wh-dependencies. I measure whether 14-19-
month-olds detect ungrammaticality in wh-questions and declaratives with and
without object gaps, in the absence of referential context. This allows us to directly
test whether the ability to detect a local transitivity violation is developmentally
prior to the ability to recognize a fronted wh-phrase as an argument. In doing so,
I bring new empirical evidence to bear on the broader question of how learners
represent non-basic clauses in infancy, and what learning mechanisms enable those
representations to develop. I now turn to a discussion of those mechanisms.
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1.3.2 Filtering Non-Basic Clauses for Verb Learning
If children’s acquisition of non-basic clause syntax develops in tandem with
their acquisition of verb argument structure, this introduces a chicken-and-egg prob-
lem. By hypothesis, identifying the structure of non-basic clauses developmentally
follows the acquisition of some core argument structure properties of the language,
such as verb transitivity. But if learners cannot accurately identify the structure
of non-basic clauses in their language, these clause types will interfere with their
attempts to bootstrap into those argument structure properties. How do learners
avoid being misled by non-basic clauses in their input, and still arrive at some stable
knowledge of verb transitivity?
The solution proposed in the semantic and syntactic bootstrapping literature
is that learners’ input must be “filtered” in such a way as to boost the signal from
basic clauses, in which the correspondence relations between syntax and meaning
will hold more reliably (Gleitman, 1990; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a, 2004b; Pinker,
1984, 1989). In other words, non-basic clauses are somehow filtered out of the data
that children use in these bootstrapping inferences. Pinker (1984) proposes two
ways that this filtering might happen. The first is for parents to do the filtering
and avoid producing these sentences in their children’s presence. Parental filtering
doesn’t seem to occur, as shown by the high rate of wh-questions in the input to
young infants (Newport et al., 1977; Stromswold, 1995). The second option is for
children to internally filter out non-basic clauses themselves. This approach implic-
itly assumes that children know which sentences to filter out. But this re-introduces
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our chicken-and-egg problem: how do learners identify which clauses are non-basic,
if they cannot yet accurately represent the structure of those sentences— if they
are still in the process of bootstrapping the basic clause structure and argument
structure properties of their language?
In Chapter 4, I resolve this apparent paradox computationally. I present a
Bayesian model that learns to filter its input to infer verb transitivity, without
knowing what types of sentences it should filter out. Our model does so under the
assumption that it occasionally parses sentences erroneously, and it learns which
parses to treat as signal and which to treat as noise for the purposes of verb learning.
This allows the learner to avoid drawing faulty inferences from non-basic clauses,
without having to know which clauses are non-basic. Under this approach, children
might filter non-basic clauses from the data they use for verb learning without
knowing that they are non-basic clauses, and without needing to infer what the
features of non-basic clauses are.
This filtering mechanism fills in a necessary missing piece for understanding
how argument structure and non-basic clause acquisition develop in tandem. By
inferring a filter on their input, learners may be able to arrive at a stable percept of
verbs’ syntactic distributions, even though they do not know when those distribu-
tions are disrupted on the surface by argument-displacing transformations. Learners
can then use that percept for further bootstrapping inferences about the argument
structure and clause structure properties of their language, and avoid generalizing
in the wrong way from misleading data. More broadly, this mechanism provides a
new solution for the problem of learning from immature input representations in
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development. By inferring a filter on their input, learners may be able to avoid
drawing faulty inferences from input that they cannot yet represent veridically.
1.3.3 Modeling Non-Basic Clause Development
Filtering makes it possible in principle for infants to arrive at a stable repre-
sentation of verbs’ syntactic distributions, which they can then use to bootstrap into
other grammatical properties of their language. This puts us in the position to ask:
how do infants bootstrap into the properties of non-basic clauses in their language,
on the basis of their early syntactic representations? I pursue the hypothesis that
the “gap-driven” interpretation heuristic, proposed to characterize infants’ early be-
havior with wh-dependencies, may arise from a more general learning mechanism
for non-basic clause syntax (Gagliardi et al., 2016; Perkins & Lidz, under review).
On this “Gap-Driven Learning” Hypothesis, argument structure acquisition de-
velopmentally precedes non-basic clause acquisition in English because the two are
causally related. Infants use argument structure knowledge to identify forms of
(overt) argument displacement in their language: they use the signal from predicted
but unexpectedly missing arguments of verbs to identify when sentences contain
non-local predicate-argument dependencies, and to infer what those dependencies
are.
Consider again the case of wh-dependencies in English:
(10) What did Amy fix?
(11) I like the bicycle that Amy fixed.
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By hypothesis, learners who know that fix requires a direct object could de-
tect when it is unexpectedly missing after the verb in sentences like (1) and (2),
and infants as young as 15 months may use this ability to infer the intended an-
swer in a preferential looking experiment (Gagliardi et al., 2016; Perkins & Lidz,
under review). But as learners’ parsing abilities develop, they may be compelled to
examine the rest of the sentence to determine the cause of the missing argument,
eventually identifying that another expression in the sentence is satisfying the verb’s
transitivity requirement non-locally. This would allow them both to assign an ap-
propriate parse to the sentence, and to begin to learn how various types of non-local
dependencies are realized: e.g. identifying that what is a wh-word, which enters into
a non-local relation with a predicate by virtue of a wh-dependency.
In Chapter 5, I investigate the computational feasibility of Gap-Driven Learn-
ing and ask what specific learning mechanisms it would require. I propose that
this learning process follows three logically independent steps: (i) using verb argu-
ment structure knowledge to detect predicted but unexpectedly missing arguments
of known verbs (gaps); (ii) identifying what surface forms are correlated with argu-
ment gaps; and (iii) inferring what types of syntactic dependencies are responsible
for those correlations.
Input filtering provides a way for the first step of argument structure learning
to be possible in principle, even before learners have gained any further knowledge
about the features of non-basic clauses in their language. The second step of learn-
ing involves a type of informed distributional analysis: a learner tracks the surface
morpho-syntactic properties of sentences that violate her expectations of verb tran-
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sitivity, in order to identify clusters of properties that are correlated with those
transitivity violations. This would allow the learner to identify the surface features
that mark the realization of various types of non-basic clauses in the target lan-
guage. For example, English learners may identify that sentence-initial functional
expressions like what are correlated with questions and with argument gaps. Finally,
the third step of learning requires inference about the underlying syntactic depen-
dencies that are responsible for those surface feature distributions. For example,
English learners must identify which grammatical properties give rise to correla-
tions like those between what, questions, and argument gaps: these features mark
the realization of one form of argument displacement in English, wh-dependency
formation.
In this work, I provide a starting point for specifying this learning process.
I instantiate the first two steps of learning computationally, and outline possibili-
ties for the further processes involved in the third step of learning. And although
my case study is English, this work bears on broader questions about language
acquisition cross-linguistically. Given the highly variable ways in which different de-
pendencies are realized across languages, what mechanisms help learners recognize
those dependencies from their surface realizations? Are these mechanisms uniform
at some level of analysis, or must they develop ad-hoc in response to the data
learners are encountered with? For example, Gap-Driven Learning will only be
helpful for wh-dependency acquisition in languages with overt wh-movement; for
wh-in-situ languages, learning must proceed differently. At a very broad level, this
work demonstrates how two components of learning must work together in tandem.
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Learners must have the ability to identify regularities in their data via informed
distributional analysis. But the generalizations they draw from those regularities
must be guided by a prior over the types of dependencies that grammars make use
of, and the consequences they have on the surface forms of sentences.
1.4 Overview
In summary, the work I present here examines the role of transitivity in verb
learning as a window into the incremental nature of language acquisition in develop-
ment. I posit that the acquisition of verb argument structure and transformations
like wh-movement are tightly connected, and jointly inform our understanding of
how clause structure representations develop in infancy. Children may be able to
infer aspects of verb meanings on the basis of their syntactic distributions, but
these inferences rely on the ability to recognize the transitivity of a clause, and may
involve a sophisticated understanding of the relations between conceptual and lin-
guistic structure. Languages vary in how particular syntactic transformations are
realized, but detecting those properties depends on first identifying the language’s
argument structure profile.
The dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I investigate whether
verb-learning infants privilege the thematic content of clause arguments in their
bootstrapping inferences, over and above the number of clause arguments. In Chap-
ter 3, I ask when infants recognize transitivity in non-basic clauses, focusing on wh-
dependencies. Together, these behavioral experiments show that infants privilege
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the categories ‘subject’ and ‘object’ in their sentence representations when boot-
strapping verb meanings and syntax, yet do not reliably recognize these categories
when they are realized in non-argument positions.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I investigate the developmental trajectory of argument
structure and non-basic syntax. I propose a learning process by which these two phe-
nomena may be acquired in tandem: learners may initially treat non-basic clauses
as noise for the purposes of learning verb transitivity, but once confident about
those transitivity properties, they may use that knowledge to begin identifying the
ways that argument displacement is realized in their language. I show that the
first steps of this process are computationally feasible in a language like English.
This lays a foundation for further investigation into the ways that learners of any
language recover underlying grammatical dependencies from their variable surface
realizations.
This case study points towards one way to incorporate development into a
theory of grammar acquisition, speaking to two broad questions that such a theory
must address. First, what is the nature of learners’ earliest representations of their
input? Do infants from the onset of syntax acquisition attempt to represent sen-
tences in terms of abstract structure and dependencies over that structure? Second,
how do learners use their initially immature input representations to draw further
generalizations about their developing grammar, such that they can identify these
structures and dependencies more veridically? By investigating the first steps of
syntax acquisition in development, this work aims to provide a fuller picture of
what portion of the input is useful to an individual child at any single point in
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development, how the child perceives that portion of the input given her current
grammatical knowledge, and what internal mechanisms enable the child to general-
ize beyond her input in inferring the grammar of her language.
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Chapter 2: Bootstrapping from Transitivity
2.1 Background
Transitivity is robustly correlated with clause meaning cross-linguistically (Fisher
et al., 2010; Gleitman, 1990; Hopper & Thompson, 1980; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a;
Naigles, 1990), making it a particularly useful cue for bootstrapping verb argument
structure and clause structure properties. As discussed in Chapter 1, exploiting
these correlations could allow learners to use a verb’s distribution in transitive and
intransitive clauses to draw inferences about its meaning and argument-taking prop-
erties: this is syntactic bootstrapping (Fisher et al., 2010; Gleitman, 1990; Landau
& Gleitman, 1985; Lasnik, 1989). In this chapter, I examine the nature of these
early bootstrapping inferences, and ask what transitivity representations they rely
on.
A substantial literature shows that young learners are sensitive to the relation
between transitivity and clause meaning. In a seminal preferential looking study,
Naigles (1990) presented 25-month-olds with a novel verb in the context of two
scenes: one intended to be viewed as a causative event of a duck pushing a bunny
over, and one intended to be viewed as a non-causative event of a duck and a
bunny each wheeling their arms independently. Infants who heard the novel verb
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in a transitive clause (The duck is gorping the bunny) looked longer at the pushing
scene then infants who heard an intransitive clause (The duck and the bunny are
gorping). This shows that infants were sensitive to clause transitivity, inferring that
gorp in a transitive frame was more likely to label the causative scene than the non-
causative scene. This result has been borne out in extensive additional preferential
looking tasks, with infants as young as 19 months reliably showing a preference for a
causative scene when they hear a transitive clause (Arunachalam & Waxman, 2010;
Arunachalam et al., 2013; Messenger et al., 2015; Yuan & Fisher, 2009; Yuan et al.,
2012). 15-month-olds also show this same preference when tested with simplified
visual stimuli (Jin & Fisher, 2014).
However, these results do not tell us how infants represent clause transitivity
in order to draw these inferences, and what inferences they are drawing. In par-
ticular, they do not tell us whether infants who hear a transitive clause represent
merely a set of two noun phrases, or whether they differentiate the subject and
object of the clause in some manner. These different types of clause representations
would enable different bootstrapping inferences. Here, I contrast two main families
of proposed bootstrapping strategies. One account proposes a strategy based pri-
marily on the number of arguments in a clause, which are expected to match the
number of participants perceived in an event (Fisher et al., 2010; Lidz & Gleitman,
2004a; Naigles, 1990; Yuan et al., 2012). An alternative account proposes a strategy
linking particular grammatical and thematic relations, e.g. transitive subject to
agent and object to patient (Pinker, 1984; Williams, 2015; Lidz et al., 2017). These
accounts implicate different representational resources for the learner at this stage
28
of development. The number-based bootstrapping strategy only requires infants to
recognize and count the number of noun phrases in a clause, whereas the thematic
linking strategy requires infants to differentiate those arguments in some way that
would allow them to infer their thematic relations.
In this chapter, I introduce a new verb-learning task to differentiate these
accounts, asking which strategy an infant will use when they would lead to different
inferences about verb meaning. I show that infants at the age previously tested—
between 19 and 22 months— rely on the thematic content of clause arguments
above and beyond argument number. This provides evidence that learners at this
developmental stage do not merely count the arguments of transitive and intransitive
clauses, but privilege the grammatical relations of those arguments and the meanings
they express.
2.1.1 Bootstrapping from Argument Number
On one account, infants at the onset of verb learning might represent a tran-
sitive clause as having two noun phrase arguments, but cannot yet reliably identify
which is the subject and which is the object. If this is the case, learners need a way
to map from the number of noun phrases they have identified to some properties of
scenes in the world, as they perceive them. One influential hypothesis proposes that
infants expect the noun phrases in a clause to be arguments, and expect that these
will match one-to-one the number of participants in an event the clause describes,
as they perceive it (Fisher et al., 2010; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a; Naigles, 1990; Yuan
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et al., 2012):
We and others have proposed that syntactic bootstrapping originates in a
powerful bias toward one-to-one mapping between nouns in sentences and
participant-roles in events ... As a result of this bias, children treat the number
of nouns in the sentence as a cue to its semantic predicate-argument structure
(Fisher et al., 2010).
Or, stated another way:
Every participant in an event as it is mentally represented shows up as a
syntactic phrase in a sentence describing that event (Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a).
For purposes of the current discussion let us call this strategy “Participant-to-
Argument Matching” (PAM) (Williams, 2015) (He 2015). This hypothesis accounts
for previous experimental findings in the following way. Children who hear a tran-
sitive clause like The duck is gorping the bunny, and represent it as having two
noun phrase arguments, should expect it to describe an event that they perceive as
having two participants. If they perceive a pushing scene but not an arm-wheeling
scene under a two-participant event concept, then, given these two choices, they
should draw the inference that gorping most likely describes pushing rather than
arm-wheeling.
PAM is an attractive hypothesis because it provides strong constraints on
verb learning, yet is quite simple to implement. If children expect noun phrases to
correspond to arguments, then they need only count the number of noun phrases
in a sentence in order to infer the participant structure of the event described that
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sentence.1 A sentence with n noun-phrases-as-arguments will describe an event
with n participants. Children do not need to access any finer-grained syntactic or
semantic information: they do not need to parse the sentence, infer the thematic
roles of the arguments, or even know what the nouns mean. Thus, PAM has the
potential to be a powerful strategy for children at very early stages of syntactic
development and word learning.
PAM’s utility in the absence of finer-grained syntactic or semantic information
relies on two assumptions. The first assumption is stable perception of both the
number of arguments in sentences children hear and the number of participants in
events they see. PAM might lead children astray if they mis-identify the number
of arguments in a clause (Yuan et al., 2012; Gertner & Fisher, 2012), or if they
perceive scenes under event concepts different from those intended by the speaker
(Brandone, Addy, Pulverman, Golinkoff, & Hirsh-Pasek, 2006; Pozzan, Gleitman,
& Trueswell, 2015), so the hope is that these kinds of mismatches will be rare in
early learning.
Furthermore, if children can flexibly shift their representation of an event to a
concept with different numbers of participants but the same entailments, then PAM
will provide few constraints on which event out of many a speaker’s sentence labels
(Williams, 2015; Wellwood, He, Lidz, & Williams, 2015). For example, consider
what might happen if a child could see a particular ‘pushing’ scene as either a
1While the literature commonly refers to this strategy as ‘counting,’ it may be more accurately
understood as merely a process of identifying the NPs in a sentence and finding an event repre-
sentation in which those NPs can be put into one-to-one correspondence. That is, infants do not
actually need the ability to count; they only need the ability to hold clause arguments in memory
in order to pair them with an event representation.
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pushing with two participants, a pusher and a pushee, or as a pushing in which
the pusher was still entailed, but not explicitly represented as a participant. That is,
suppose a child could switch from representing this ‘pushing’ scene as pushing(x, y),
‘a pushing of x by y,’ to representing it as pushing(x), ‘a pushing of x.’ I mean these
two representations to be mutually entailing, true in all of the same circumstances:
they would both be made true by pushings, and differ only in whether something
that is necessarily involved in pushings (the pusher) is represented explicitly. If it
were possible to “down-shift” in this manner from a 2-place to a 1-place description
of an event, while maintaining all of the same entailments of the event concept,
then PAM’s advice would be much less helpful. A transitive clause might describe
the 2-participant representation of this pushing event, or any other event that can
be suitably down-shifted to a 2-participant representation. An intransitive clause
might describe the 1-participant representation of this pushing event, or any other
event that can be suitably down-shifted to a 1-participant representation. In order
for PAM to provide useful guidance about the mapping between verb meanings and
events, children’s event representations must be stable and similar to adults’, and
PAM must be an expectation that arguments will match participants in events as
we readily perceive them (Williams, 2015; Wellwood et al., 2015).
The second assumption is that PAM is a strong, bi-directional matching hy-
pothesis: arguments in a clause must match participants perceived in an event
one-to-one. Consider a much weaker version of this hypothesis: perhaps children
expect that clause arguments each name a participant, but do not need to match
one-to-one. Under this alternative “Arguments Name Participants” strategy (ANP)
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(Williams, 2015), a clause with n arguments should be able to label any event read-
ily perceived with n or more participants. This strategy would only be constraining
enough to guide verb learning under very specific circumstances. A learner who
hears a new verb in a transitive clause could infer that it does not describe an event
seen with only one participant. But a verb in an intransitive clause could describe an
event seen with one participant, or two, or three: argument number would provide
very little guidance in this case, and inferences about verb meaning would need to
be drawn from another source of information. In order for PAM to provide strong
enough constraints to guide verb learning in the general case, in the absence of
other information, it must be formulated as an expectation of one-to-one matching
between participants and arguments, for any number (Williams, 2015).
However, PAM faces some challenges on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
Although participants and arguments might frequently align in a language like En-
glish, grammars in general do not require one-to-one participant-argument matching
even in basic clauses (Williams, 2015). Even in the basic clauses of English, for ex-
ample, it is not obvious that every perceived event participant is always realized as
a clause argument. Imagine a scene in which a girl takes a toy truck from a boy.
It is plausible that this scene might be viewed under a 3-participant event concept,
one in which the girl, truck, and boy fill core participant roles. But it is also seems
entirely acceptable for a transitive clause– The girl took the truck– to describe this
3-participant concept, even though only two participants are realized as arguments.
But PAM would lead learners astray in this case. Using PAM, learners would er-
roneously conclude that The girl took the truck cannot describe a taking event
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concept in which a victim or source is also represented as a participant.2
Moreover, once we turn to languages other than English, the trend towards





‘Kwimçxen got beaned.’ (Davis, 2010)
In St’át’imcets, it is possible to state that someone got hit with a thrown object using
a simple intransitive clause, without realizing either the hitter or the thrown object
as arguments; this clause is not passive and does not have syntactic null arguments
(Davis, 1997; Davis & Demirdache, 2000; Davis, 2010). But if a particular beaning
event is perceived with a hitter, person hit, and thrown object as participants,
PAM would erroneously tell learners that a sentence like (1) cannot describe this
event. This would lead to incorrect inferences about the meaning of the verb in this
sentence. As nearly every verb in this language can occur in a simple intransitive
clause (Davis, 1997; Davis & Demirdache, 2000; Davis, 2010), PAM would provide
very unhelpful advice for St’át’imcets learners (Williams, 2015).
Thus, because PAM does not generally characterize the relation between clause
structure and meaning in adult grammars, its utility is only as an initial learning
heuristic, which would need to be abandoned later in development. This raises a
2One might think that this problem could be solved in the following way. Perhaps a learner
in this situation would assume that any clause arguments required by one-to-one matching, but
not realized in the sentence, are syntactically present but silent. However, this solution is circular
unless the learner has independent evidence to support this assumption: for instance, evidence that
her language has syntactic null arguments, and evidence from the discourse structure to believe
that one might be present in this particular sentence, independent of her event representations.
The evidence cannot come from knowledge about what event concept the sentence is describing,
because that is exactly the knowledge that the learner is trying to acquire.
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difficult developmental question: how do children learn to abandon a heuristic based
on counting arguments, and acquire a grammar that encodes structure rather than
number?
Furthermore, while PAM can account well for the empirical data on transitive
clauses, it faces challenges from children’s behavior with other clause types. Naigles’
(1990) seminal study found that infants who heard an intransitive clause preferred
the scene intended to be viewed with one participant (arm-wheeling). But beyond
this study, further work has found inconsistent behavior with intransitives. Infants
who hear novel verbs in intransitive frames do not show a reliably above-chance
preference for events intended to be viewed with one participant as opposed to
two (Arunachalam & Waxman, 2010; Noble, Rowland, & Pine, 2011; Yuan et al.,
2012). Because these results are not predicted under PAM, several methodological
explanations have been proposed. Infants may not perceive the presented sentence
as intransitive. To control the number of nouns across conditions, several studies
used intransitive sentences with conjoined subjects (e.g. The duck and the bunny are
gorping), which some have argued that infants might mistake for two separate clause
arguments (Yuan et al., 2012; Gertner & Fisher, 2012). If so, PAM would guide
infants towards the event intended to be viewed with two participants (henceforth
“2-participant event”). Alternatively, it is possible that infants do not reliably
perceive the presented scenes with the intended number of participants. A scene
intended to be viewed as one person pushing another might also be viewed as two
people playing (Arunachalam, Syrett, & Chen, 2016; Brandone et al., 2006; Pozzan
et al., 2015). If so, then PAM would tell them that this scene could be described by
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an intransitive clause.
But note that these results are equally compatible with the weaker number-
based strategy, Arguments Name Participants. ANP says that an intransitive clause
can describe either a 1-participant event or a 2-participant event, and all things oth-
erwise equal, predicts no preference in matching the sentence to one event over the
other. Thus, previous findings can be accounted for under PAM, but do not differen-
tiate it from even this much weaker number-based alternative. The possibility that
infants perceive a particular sentence or scene in a different way than experimenters
intended makes it challenging to determine which way they relate those sentence
and scene representations in bootstrapping.
2.1.2 Bootstrapping from Thematic Content
On another account, learners at this age might use information beyond the
number of arguments in a clause, and instead draw inferences by linking the partic-
ular grammatical and thematic relations of those arguments. Let us call this family
of inferences “Thematic Linking,” following Pinker (1984). Suppose that an infant
were not only able to identify that a transitive clause like The duck is gorping the
bunny has two noun phrase arguments, but could also differentiate the subject and
the object of that clause in some way. Suppose further that she were aware of the
cross-linguistically robust trend for subjects of transitive clauses to name agents
and objects to name patients of events (Baker, 1988; Dowty, 1991; Fillmore, 1968;
Jackendoff, 1972). This would allow her to infer that this sentence describes an
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event perceived with a duck as agent and a bunny as patient: more likely pushing
than arm-wheeling in Naigles’ (1990) task. Thus, Thematic Linking strategy pre-
dicts the same looking time preferences for transitive clauses as PAM, and is equally
compatible with prior preferential looking findings (Arunachalam & Waxman, 2010;
Arunachalam et al., 2013; Messenger et al., 2015; Naigles, 1990; Yuan & Fisher,
2009; Yuan et al., 2012).
Existing empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that infants at early stages
of verb learning may use finer-grained information about the thematic relations
of clause arguments in their bootstrapping inferences. Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff
(1996) found that 17-month-olds who heard Big Bird is washing Cookie Monster
preferred to look at a scene where Big Bird was the agent of washing and Cookie
Monster the patient, over a scene where the two characters played the opposite roles.
These infants differentiated the clause arguments of the known verb wash in some
way that allowed them to infer the thematic relations of those arguments, and map
the sentence to the appropriate event.
Further work shows that 21-month-olds can use the thematic relations of clause
arguments in order to infer the meaning of a novel verb. In another preferential
looking task, infants who heard The duck is gorping the bunny preferred a scene
in which a duck pushed a bunny, over a scene in which the bunny pulled the duck
(Gertner et al., 2006). Furthermore, infants preferred the duck-agent and bunny-
patient event even for sentences like He is gorping the bunny : here, they could only
rely on the referent of the object because the subject does not identify a unique
referent in the discourse. These infants appeared able to link the argument in
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subject position to the agent in an event, and the argument in object position to
the patient. In this case, it would be unhelpful to attend only to the number of clause
arguments. PAM predicts that these transitive clauses must describe 2-participant
events, but does not by itself predict which 2-participant events. In order to draw
appropriate inferences about the new transitive verbs in this task, children needed
to use information not about the number of arguments in a sentence, but about
the relationships between the grammatical relations (e.g. subject vs. object)3 and
thematic relations (e.g. agent vs. patient) of those arguments.
For intransitive verbs these relationships are more complicated: the subject
of an intransitive clause can label either an agent (e.g. John baked) or a patient
(e.g. The bread rose). These sub-classes of intransitives also display differences in
meaning. Intransitives whose subject is an agent tend to label actions of that agent,
whereas intransitives whose subject is a patient tend to label changes undergone by
that patient (e.g. Fillmore, 1970; Levin & Hovav, 2005; Williams, 2015). Another
line of work has asked whether children can draw these finer-grained inferences
about verb meanings on the basis of the thematic role of the intransitive subject
(Bunger & Lidz, 2004, 2008; Scott & Fisher, 2009). For example, Scott and Fisher
(2009) familiarized 28-month-olds with a dialogue in which a novel verb alternated
between transitive and intransitive uses. Infants either heard the intransitive with
an animate subject (e.g. Matt dacked the pillow. He dacked) or an inanimate subject
(e.g. Matt dacked the pillow. The pillow dacked). At test, infants heard the verb
3Note that these results do not tell us how infants differentiate these grammatical relations:
whether by using particular structural positions in a clause, or by using their linear order. I return
to this point below.
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in a transitive frame in the context of two causative scenes: a “caused-motion”
event in which a girl pushed a boy over, or a “contact-activity” event in which
the girl dusted the boy with a feather duster. Infants who were familiarized with
the animate-subject intransitive dialogue mapped this verb to the dusting event,
whereas infants who were familiarized with the inanimate-subject dialogue mapped
it to the pushing event. A solely number-based bootstrapping strategy would not
have provided the information needed to perform this inference. According to PAM,
a verb that alternates between a transitive and intransitive frame can label either
a 2-participant or a 1-participant event, but PAM does not by itself predict which
2-participant event out of two a child should prefer. Children could only succeed on
this task by using cues to the thematic relation of the intransitive subject: hearing
a novel verb in a sentence about a likely agent informed them that the verb labelled
an activity of that agent, and hearing a sentence about a likely patient informed
them that the verb labelled a result undergone by that patient.
Animacy is a cue that infants are sensitive to from a very young age, making
it particularly useful for inferring these thematic relations. Infants within their first
year of life are sensitive to animate entities’ behavioral characteristics (e.g. self-
propelled motion) and physical characteristics such (e.g. eyes, faces, hands), and
they expect animate entities to be able to engage in goal-directed action and serve
as agents rather than recipients of change (see Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001 for
a review). Because agents, which are typically animate, are usually labelled by
subjects of basic transitive clauses, subjects tend to be higher in animacy than
objects cross-linguistically (e.g. Comrie, 1989). Becker (2015) argues that children
39
might expect subjects of all clauses to be animate, and treat inanimate subjects
as a signal of displacement from a deep object position. Preschoolers appear able
to use subject animacy as a cue to the structure of a sentence: 3-year-olds learn
a novel tough-adjective more easily when it appears with only inanimate subjects
(Becker, Estigarribia, & Gylfadottir, 2012; Becker, 2015). The younger children in
Scott and Fisher (2009), as well as in other studies on intransitives (Bunger & Lidz,
2004, 2008), may have used animacy to infer whether an intransitive subject is a
likely agent or patient, and thus constrain their inferences about what type of event
the clause describes.
If children can exploit generalizations between clause positions and thematic
roles when the number of arguments in a sentence is uninformative, we might wonder
what information fed children’s sensitivity to transitivity in previous tests of PAM
(e.g Naigles, 1990; Fisher et al., 2010; Yuan et al., 2012). When 20-month-olds infer
that a transitive sentence labels a 2-participant event rather than a 1-participant
event, are they drawing this inference from the number of arguments in the transitive
sentence, or from the roles of the arguments in that sentence? A strategy relying on
argument role information appears to explain this behavior just as well as PAM. If
children at this age know that subjects of transitives name agents and objects name
patients, then they would infer that only the 2-participant event is compatible with
the sentence, because only the 2-participant scene shows an event of an agent acting
on a patient. Similarly, when infants show no preference for a 1- or 2-participant
event when hearing a novel intransitive clause, this may be because they do not
know whether the intransitive subject is intended to label an agent of an activity
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or a patient undergoing a change. Animacy has not been a useful cue in most
prior tests of PAM, where animate actors were used in all participant roles in order
to match salience of the 1- and 2-participant scenes. For example, in Yuan et al.
(2012), the subject of the intransitive He is gorping could be taken to refer to any
of the animate, male actors on the screen: either the agent or patient of the 2-
participant pushing event, or agent of the 1-participant arm-waving event. This
sentence would therefore be entirely ambiguous in context, predicting that infants
would show no preference for either event.
Thus, it is possible that infants’ inferences in prior tests of PAM may have
been fed by the thematic content of clause arguments, without counting the number
of arguments. Infants’ early sensitivity to transitivity in verb learning might be
explained without referencing argument number, appealing instead to the more
specific relationships between grammatical and thematic relations that children in
other studies appear able to use at the same age or several months later. And unlike
PAM, there are generalizations about these relationships that are cross-linguistically
robust (Baker, 1988; Dowty, 1991; Fillmore, 1968, 1970; Jackendoff, 1972; Levin &
Hovav, 2005). To recap our discussion above, here is one way of summarizing these
linking principles, adapted from Williams (2015):
(2) (a) The arguments of a clause name participants in its event.
(b) Subjects of basic transitive clauses tend to name agents and objects tend
to name patients.
(c) A clause describing a change tends to realize the patient undergoing
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change.
(d) A clause describing an action tends to realize the agent of that action.
If learners were aware of these linking principles, they would provide advice
that is more specific but also more flexible than PAM. The principle in (2a) is a
restatement of ANP, and only tells learners that they need to identify a participant
role for each argument in a clause: arguments are not likely to be expletive. A
learner using (2b) would infer that a transitive sentence must describe an event
with both an agent and a patient, but with no commitment that these be the only
participants that they represent. This would allow them to accept a transitive
description of a 3-participant taking (e.g. The girl took the truck), provided that
learners perceive that event with an agent named by the subject and a patient named
by the object. A third perceived participant, such as the source or victim, need not
be mentioned. And, a learner using (2c-d) would infer that an intransitive sentence
will either describe a change or an action, depending on the thematic role of its
subject: a clause whose sole argument is a patient more likely describes a change,
and a clause whose sole argument is an agent more likely describes an action. This
means that a bare intransitive could describe a 3-participant beaning, if that event
is seen as a change and the intransitive subject names the patient of that change.
Thematic Linking therefore allows learners to generalize to more cases within and
across languages. Because these principles are widely applicable to adult language,
children would not need to abandon them over the course of development as has
been suggested for PAM.
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It is possible that a strategy like Thematic Linking could co-exist with PAM,
and learners make use of either strategy when convenient (Fisher et al., 2010). It
is also possible that a number-based bootstrapping strategy like PAM is a heuristic
for learners at very early stages of syntactic development, and is eventually replaced
by more sophisticated bootstrapping strategies once infants have acquired richer
grammatical knowledge of their language (Fisher, 1996; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a).
That is, PAM might be a primary bias that guides young learners before they can
bootstrap the clause representations that are needed to use a strategy like Thematic
Linking. The linking principles in (2) are cross-linguistically robust because they
are stated in terms of the abstract high-level grammatical categories ‘subject’ and
‘object.’ To exploit these principles, a learner would need to know something about
how these categories are realized in their language.4 Note that this strategy does
not require that these categories be represented at the same level of richness as in
the adult grammar, or be recognized accurately in all cases. A learner may still be
able to employ these linking principles by using rougher and less accurate proxies
for these grammatical relations, such as linear word order: for example, an English
learner might infer that a pre-verbal noun phrase is a likely subject and a post-
verbal noun phrase is a likely object. However, this means that learners would
need to know the relevant cues that they can use to identify likely subjects or likely
objects in their language. If they have not acquired this knowledge by the time they
4It should be noted that these linking principles hold over ‘subject’ and ‘object’ as loose descrip-
tive categories, whether or not these exist as categorical primitives in the adult grammar. Exploit-
ing these principles only requires a learner to access the high-level abstractions under which the
principles are stated, whatever the specific syntactic relations are that variously exemplify them
in the adult grammar.
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are learning their first verbs, it might be that PAM is the only strategy available.
In summary, because prior results are compatible with both PAM and The-
matic Linking, they do not tell us whether a number-based strategy is primary or
co-exists with a thematic content-based strategy in early verb learning. To differenti-
ate these alternatives, we would need to know whether infants privilege the numbers
of arguments and participants in their bootstrapping inferences, and whether they
do so in the youngest age range at which they have been argued to use PAM. Be-
cause PAM and Thematic Linking can account for the same behavior in prior tasks,
our test case must be one in which these strategies would lead to different inferences
about verb meanings. One way to do this is to move beyond the case of 2-argument
sentences and 2-participant scenes, and test how infants behave with other numbers
of arguments and participants.
In the current study, I differentiate these alternatives with 19- to 22-month-old
infants, the youngest age that reliably succeeds in prior bootstrapping tasks. I ask
whether infants at this age will allow a 2-argument description of a taking event
that is perceived under a 3-participant concept. As previously discussed, transitive
take is acceptable in adult English. But an infant using PAM should not come to
this same conclusion. If she perceives a scene in which a girl takes a truck from
a boy under a concept in which the girl, truck, and boy are all participants, then
she would expect that scene to be described by a 3-argument clause. If she instead
hears a novel verb in a 2-argument clause— The girl pimmed the truck— then PAM
will tell her that this verb cannot describe the scene as she readily perceives it. It
must instead describe a nearby 2-participant concept: perhaps it describes the girl’s
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moving or grabbing of the truck, or another sub-event in this scene where the boy
is not a perceived participant. The learner should conclude that pimmings cannot
be takings, but instead are more likely movings or grabbings.
On the other hand, Thematic Linking predicts no difficulty taking The girl
pimmed the truck as a description of a 3-participant taking concept. If a learner
can identify the girl as a likely subject and the truck as a likely object, then she will
infer that this sentence can describe any event in which she perceives a girl as agent
and a truck as patient, regardless of participant number. If she views the stimulus
scene as a taking with those participant roles, she can then infer that this clause
describes that entire 3-participant event. It doesn’t matter that the perceived third
participant, the boy, isn’t mentioned. Under this account, pimmings can be tak-
ings, and this may be the most likely conclusion for a learner to draw if she readily
views this scene under that conceptual description. Thus, pitting a 2-argument
sentence against a 3-participant event concept will allow us to tell whether infants
privilege argument number above argument roles in their verb learning inferences
at this age.
2.1.3 Diagnosing Event Representations
The current test case requires an independent diagnostic for how infants readily
view the presented stimulus scene, in the absence of language. If we do not know
the number of participants that infants readily perceive in a particular scene, then
we cannot tell whether that conceptual representation matches or mismatches the
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number of arguments that infants hear in a particular sentence. This is one reason
why it is difficult to reason about infants’ behavior with intransitive clauses in prior
tests of PAM (Arunachalam et al., 2016; Brandone et al., 2006; Pozzan et al., 2015).
Thus, identifying infants’ bootstrapping strategies is only possible if we first fix the
conceptual representations under which infants perceive the scenes in our task.
Any particular event concept entails many relations. To describe an event as
a taking entails that it has an agent of taking, a patient that is taken, a victim
or source, some manner of transfer, a duration of transfer, a particular location of
taking, and so on. But surely not every relation entailed by a predicate corresponds
to an argument of that predicate. The same could be said about our psychological
representations of predicates. Not all entailed relations will be on par with each other
psychologically, because any particular psychological representation will foreground
some of those relations and background others (Williams, 2015). Thus, not all
of the relations that are entailed when we describe something as a taking will
be psychologically privileged to the same extent; only some will be explicit in the
conceptual structure under which we represent that taking event. We might call
the entailed relations that are psychologically privileged the participant relations
(Williams, 2015). Our question is, for any given stimulus scene, which relations are
privileged in the concept that infants view it under?
There are many possible ways of writing down the structure under which in-
fants could view a particular taking event. Here are just some of these possibilities:
(3) (a) taking(e) & agent(e, x) & patient(e, y) & source(e, z)
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(b) taking(e) & agent(e, x) & patient(e, y)
(c) taking(e) & agent(e, x)
Infants might view a particular taking event under a 3-place conceptual repre-
sentation that privileges the agent, patient, and source as participants, or under a
2-place representation that privileges e.g. only the agent and patient, or under a
1-place representation that privileges only the agent— and there are many other
options. These different possibilities for the structure of an event representation
exist independently of the entailments of the event concept. Infants may represent
a scene under a concept that entails a source, without necessarily representing the
source as a participant that is explicit in their conceptual structure. So, in order to
diagnose the number of participants that infants represent, we need to determine
which relations they view as not only entailments, but also as entailments that are
psychologically privileged.
Recent work has developed a new method for diagnosing the structure of
infants’ event representations (He, 2015; Knowlton, Perkins, Williams, & Lidz, 2018;
Perkins, Knowlton, Williams, & Lidz, 2018; Wellwood et al., 2015), building off
of a task introduced by Gordon (2003). In this study, 10-month-old infants were
habituated to a silent scene that could be plausibly seen as a giving event: a girl
gave a toy to a boy. At test, infants either saw another token of the same scene,
or they saw a scene in which the motion of the two actors was constant but the
toy was no longer present: the girl approached the boy with empty hands. In a
control condition, a separate group of infants were habituated to a silent scene in
47
which the girl hugged the boy while holding the toy. At test, the same manipulation
was performed. Infants either saw another token of the hugging-with-toy scene, or
they saw the girl hug the boy in the same way without holding the toy. This same
manipulation was found to affect infants’ attention differently in the two conditions.
Infants dishabituated (recovered attention) to the disappearance of the toy from the
giving scene, but not from the hugging scene.
These results may be explained in the following way. If infants in the ‘giving’
condition represented the stimulus scene as a giving that entails a gift, then the
change at test is a large conceptual change: there is no longer a toy filling that
entailed relation. But if infants in the ‘hugging’ condition represented the stimu-
lus scene as a hugging, the toy does not fill an entailed relation, and is merely
incidental. Every hugging has an agent of hugging and a patient being hugged,
but the agent need not be holding an object while hugging. The change at test is
therefore a smaller conceptual change: the hugging-without-toy scene can still be
described as a hugging with all of its entailed roles present. Infants’ dishabitua-
tion in the ‘giving’ condition but not the ‘hugging’ condition might be understood
as sensitivity to these different conceptual entailments. Because the same physical
manipulation— removing a toy— led to different patterns of dishabituation for the
two types of events, we might infer that infants considered this toy more central
to one of these events than to the other. All else being equal, and controlling for
other differences like physical salience, maybe this difference arose because infants
represented the giving scene as a giving and the hugging scene as a hugging, with
the toy filling an entailed relation in the one case and not in the other.
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Thus, when the design is controlled in the right way, infants’ patterns of at-
tention to a change in a stimulus scene can provide a window into the conceptual
representation under which they view that scene. However, the result from Gordon
(2003) doesn’t tell us whether infants in this study were responding merely to a
change in conceptual entailments, or moreover to a change in participant structure.
It is possible that infants viewed this scene under a 3-place representation in which
the toy fills a participant role, along with the girl and the boy. But it is also possible
that they viewed this scene under a concept that entails something given, without
explicitly representing that relation as a participant. There are many other entail-
ments of givings that might not be explicitly represented as participants, such as
their locations, times, and manners. To tell whether the toy is filling a participant
relation, we need to know whether the relation is not only entailed, but is also
psychologically privileged.
Wellwood et al. (2015) and He (2015) adapted the habituation-switch task in
order to address this question. In one experiment, infants were habituated to a silent
scene in which a girl opened a box using a lever: we might see this as a jimmying
event. At test, infants saw one of two types of change. In one condition, infants saw
the girl now open the box with her hand; the lever was still present and visible, but
no longer used as an instrument of opening. In a second condition, infants saw the
girl still open the box using the lever, but from the right instead of from the left.
All jimmyings have a direction of opening, so this also represents a change to one
of the entailed relations of the event concept. This change was larger perceptually,
if measured by differences in pixels. However, infants dishabituated only when the
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lever was no longer used as an instrument, and not to the perceptually more salient
change in direction. This pattern was also observed when the lever was added as
an instrument at test: infants dishabituated when the girl switched from opening
the box with her hand to opening it with the lever, but not when she opened the
box with her hand from the opposite direction. Infants’ differential response to
these two types of changes suggests that they viewed the lever as filling a more
psychologically potent relation than the direction of opening— that the instrument
relation was privileged in their event representation.
In Knowlton et al. (2018) and Perkins et al. (2018), we extended this paradigm
to norm infants’ representations of a taking scene. 9- to 12-month-old infants were
habituated to several tokens of a silent video in which a girl picked up a toy truck
and moved it towards herself, while a boy looked on. By hypothesis, this event is
viewed as a 2-participant picking-up. At test, infants in one condition saw the
girl move the truck towards herself in a different manner: she slid the truck across
the table instead of picking it up. This different motion changes an entailment of
the event concept; perhaps this is now seen as a sliding rather than a picking-
up. However, despite this different motion, the participant structure should remain
constant. Infants in the second condition saw the girl still pick up the truck, but
with the boy now gripping it. By hypothesis, this should be seen as a 3-participant
taking: the girl is now taking the truck from the boy. Infants dishabituated to
both changes, but showed greater dishabituation when the boy was added as the
possessor of the truck than when the manner of motion was changed. Despite the
fact that the motion change is highly salient perceptually, infants cared more about
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the change to the boy’s role in the event. This suggests that infants viewed the
taking scene under a concept with the boy filling a privileged relation, one that
was more psychologically potent than the manner of motion.
This result gives us evidence for the conceptual structure under which infants
view this particular taking scene, independent of language. Among the possibilities
laid out in (3), it is now more likely that infants readily view this scene under a
concept privileging the victim or source of taking. Under the assumption that infants
also privilege the agent of taking and the patient being taken, this means that they
view this scene under a 3-participant conceptual structure:
(4) taking(e) & agent(e, girl) & patient(e, truck) & source(e, boy)
Additional work might take further steps to confirm this event representa-
tion. But given this initial evidence, we are now now in a position to ask what
principles verb-learning infants use for mapping a sentence to this stimulus scene.
Do infants expect that the number of arguments in a clause must match one-to-
one the participants they perceive in this taking event (PAM), or do they deploy
a more flexible strategy linking particular grammatical and participant relations
(Thematic Linking)? In Study 1, I show that 19- to 22-month-old infants think that
this 3-participant event concept can be described by a 2-argument sentence. In a
control experiment (Study 2), I show that infants do not think that this event can
be described by a particular 1-argument sentence. These results demonstrate that
infants do not expect participants to match arguments in number, arguing against a
strict number-based bootstrapping strategy. But they do draw different inferences
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from transitive and intransitive clauses, demonstrating that they are sensitive to
the meanings that can be expressed by these different clause types. Taken together,
these results support Thematic Linking over PAM: infants at this age privilege the
grammatical and thematic relations of arguments above argument number in their
verb learning inferences.
2.2 Experiment 1: Transitive Frame
2.2.1 Method
Experiment 1 tested whether 19- to 22-month-old English learners allow a
2-argument clause to describe our taking scene perceived under a 3-participant
concept. A novel verb learning task was adapted from the Verb Extension paradigm
(Waxman, Lidz, Braun, & Lavin, 2009). Infants were familiarized to the taking
stimulus scene: a girl takes a toy truck from the boy. This scene was described by a
transitive clause containing a novel verb: The girl pimmed the truck. On the basis
of these familiarization trials, infants should make an inference about what concept
pimming describes. We can then test which inference they made by asking what
else will count as an instance of pimming for them.
At test, infants were prompted to find pimming in the context of two candidate
videos. One showed the girl still taking the truck from the boy (another token of the
taking scene). The second showed the girl moving the truck towards herself in the
same way, but without the boy present (a moving/grabbing scene). By measuring
infants’ looking preference towards taking, we can determine whether they inferred
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that pimming in a transitive frame could describe the entire 3-participant event
concept under which they readily view that scene, or whether they inferred that it
must describe a 2-participant sub-event involving only the girl and the truck.
Participants. Participants included 24 typically-developing infants (12 males)
between the ages of 19;0 and 21;28 (mean = 20;8). Participants were recruited from
the greater Washington, D.C. area with the criteria that they heard English during
at least 80% of their waking hours. An additional 4 infants were tested but not
included in the final sample due to inattentiveness (2), equipment malfunction (1),
or less than 80% English exposure (1). Participants’ total productive vocabulary
was collected by parental report using the Words and Sentence MacArthur-Bates
Communicative Development Inventory (MCDI) (Fenson et al., 1993). Mean total
words produced were 160.5, with a median of 99.
Materials. Visual stimuli were created by filming two live actors, a girl and a
boy, performing actions with inanimate objects. Different tokens of each event were
filmed and edited in Adobe Premiere to create the trial structure in Table 2.1. Six
tokens of each main event were presented: four during familiarization, one during
the contrast phase, and one at test. Event tokens were edited to be 7.5 seconds in
duration during the familiarization and contrast phase, and 5.5 seconds during the
test phase. The different tokens of taking used in the critical trial were created
to be almost identical to the taking scene normed in prior work (Knowlton et al.,
2018; Perkins et al., 2018), with one difference: in the current study, the girl takes
the truck from the boy by sliding it across the table. Adult piloting found this to





Look, the girl is gonna pim the truck! She
just pimmed the truck! Girl takes truck
from boy x 4Wow, she’s gonna pim it again! She just
pimmed it again!
Ooh, she’s gonna pim the truck! She just
pimmed the truck!





Negative Uh-oh, she’s not gonna pim that. She
didn’t pim that.
Girl pokes ring
tower held by boy








Baseline Now look, they’re different! Girl takes truck
from boy /
Girl moves truck
without boy x 3
Response Find the one where she’s pimming the
truck. Where is she pimming the truck?
Table 2.1: Structure of Experimental Trial, Experiment 1
Audio stimuli were recorded by a female native speaker of American English
using child-directed speech. Stimuli were edited in Adobe Audition and Praat, and
synchronized with the video stimuli using Adobe Premiere. Because prior work finds
mixed results in verb extension tasks depending on whether infants hear pronominal
arguments or full lexical NPs (Arunachalam & Waxman, 2011, 2015). During fa-
miliarization, audio was timed to frame the main action in the video: a future-tense
sentence (The girl is going to pim the truck! ) ended as the action began, and a
past-tense sentence (The girl just pimmed the truck! ) began as soon as the action
ended. At test, sentence onset was timed to coincide with the beginning of each
looped video.
Procedure. Infants sat on a parent’s lap or a high chair positioned 6 feet
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away from a 51” widescreen television. Parents were instructed not to talk to their
children or direct their attention, and they either looked away from the screen or
wore a visor to block their view. Stimuli were presented using QuickTime. A camera
located above the television was used to video-record the experiment at a capture
rate of 29.97 frames per second. The camera’s pan and zoom were controlled by an
experimenter watching a video monitor in a separate room to ensure that an infant’s
face remained in the frame during the experiment.
Each experiment lasted 5.6 minutes. The structure of the experiment is as
follows. Infants were first introduced to the two actors: the girl and the boy. Each
actor appeared on a different side of a black screen for 7 seconds, waving and smiling.
In order to familiarize infants with the descriptions for these actors, they were named
by a full lexical NP and two pronouns (e.g. Look, it’s a girl! Do you see her? There
she is! ). Next, the actors appeared for 15 seconds in split-screen. Infants were
prompted to first find the girl, and then find the boy.
After actor introductions, infants saw 4 trials, each consisting of a familiar-
ization phase, a contrast phase, and a test phase (Table 2.1), following Waxman
et al. (2009). During the familiarization phase, infants saw four 7.5-second video
tokens of a scene appearing on different sides of the screen. Screen side presentation
was pseudo-randomized in two lists, and counterbalanced across participants. Each
video was described by two sentences containing a verb in a particular syntactic
frame (e.g. Look, the girl is gonna pim the truck! She just pimmed the truck! ).
During the contrast phase, infants saw a new 7.5-second video labelled as a
negative example of the verb, followed by another token of the familiarization scene
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labelled as a positive example. This phase was included following Waxman et al.
(2009), who found that it facilitated infants’ recognition that the novel verb has a
specific meaning. So as not to bias infants’ attention towards any particular aspect
of the familiarization scene, the negative contrast video involved the same human
actors but was otherwise different across many dimensions: it introduced a new
action, with a different manner of motion, being performed on a new object (e.g.
the girl pokes a ring tower that the boy is holding, causing it to rock slightly). This
scene was described as not involving the verb of interest, using negative, downcast
intonation (e.g. Uh-oh, she’s not gonna pim that.). The positive contrast video was
another token of the familiarization scene, described by the same verb using positive,
upbeat delivery (e.g. Yay, she’s gonna pim the truck! ). Each of the contrast videos
was played on a different side of the screen, with screen side counterbalanced across
participants.
During the test phase, two 5.5-second videos were presented concurrently,
on loop, on different sides of the screen: another shortened video token of the
familiarization scene (e.g. the girl takes the truck from the boy) and a new scene
(e.g. the girl moves the truck, without the boy). The timing of the motions in the
two videos was edited to be consistent. The screen side of the familiar vs. new video
was counterbalanced across participants, and further counterbalancing controlled for
whether it matched or mismatched the side on which the last contrast video had
appeared. The two test videos were first accompanied by uninformative audio (Now
look, they’re different! ). This allowed infants to examine both videos before the test
sentence, and was intended to reveal any baseline preferences for one of the two
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Figure 2.1: Image of Experimental Test Videos, taking (right) vs. moving (left)
videos that may have been driven by differences in salience. The videos then played
on loop twice more, accompanied by two prompts to find the verb of interest (e.g.
Find the one where she’s pimming the truck. Where is she pimming the truck? ).
The videos then disappeared to a black screen, and a new trial began. Fig. 2.1
shows sample still images from the test videos in the experimental trial. In each
video, the truck moves away from the center of the screen.
Of the 4 trials, the first 3 consisted of training trials with known verbs, and the
last was the experimental trial with the novel verb pim. This type of single-trial verb
learning design is common in other prior bootstrapping tasks (e.g. Yuan & Fisher,
2009; Scott & Fisher, 2009), and training with with known verbs has been found to
facilitate infants’ familiarity with the experimental procedure before the novel verb
is introduced. So as not to bias infants to one particular argument structure during
training, these three trials used a ditransitive, transitive, and intransitive frame.
The verbs give, shake, and open were chosen because they ranked high in familiarity
norming for 20-month-olds in the web-based WordBank database (Frank, Braginsky,
Yurovsky, & Marchman, 2016). Each training trial had the same structure as the
experimental trial in Table 2.1. A sample sentence and the events for these trials
are provided in Table 2.2. Infants were assigned to one of two lists in order to
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Sample Audio Familiarization Contrast Test
The girl is gonna




Girl throws ball, boy
watches
Girl gives owl to boy /
Girl hugs boy, holding
owl




Girl spins toy rattle Girl shakes bottle / Girl
taps lid of bottle
The box is gonna
open!
Girl opens box Girl lifts toy house Girl opens box / Girl
tilts box over
Table 2.2: Training Trials, Experiments 1 and 2
counterbalance the order of training trials across participants; in one list, the order
of training trials was reversed. However, the experimental trial was always last in
the experiment. To focus infants’ attention, trials were interleaved with either a
4-second still image of a baby face with audio of a baby giggling, or a 14-second
video of moving toys accompanied by music.
Predictions. The two bootstrapping strategies predict that infants will draw
difference inferences about the meaning of the novel verb during the familiarization
phase of the experimental trial, leading to different looking preferences at test. If
infants at this age are primarily using a number-based bootstrapping strategy that
requires one-to-one matching between clause arguments and perceived event partic-
ipants (PAM), we make the following predictions. During the familiarization phase,
infants who hear pim in a 2-argument clause— The girl pimmed the truck— will infer
that it describes an event that they perceive with exactly 2 participants. But given
prior evidence that infants perceive the taking scene under a 3-participant concept
(Knowlton et al., 2018; Perkins et al., 2018), this means that there is a mismatch.
This sentence cannot describe the entire taking event, as infants readily perceive
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it. Instead, PAM will lead them to infer that the sentence describes a sub-event
that they represent with only 2 participants, such as the girl’s moving or grabbing
of the truck. Thus, pimmings are not takings, they are movings or grabbings.
On the basis of this inference during familiarization, infants are predicted to accept
both of the test videos as possible instances of pimming. Both the taking and the
moving video show the girl moving the truck towards herself in the same way, so
if pimmings are movings or grabbings, we predict no above-baseline preference for
one test video over the other.
The alternative hypothesis is that infants are using a more flexible bootstrap-
ping strategy linking particular grammatical and participant relations (Thematic
Linking), e.g. transitive subject to agent and object to patient, with no expectation
of one-to-one matching. This hypothesis makes the following predictions. During
the familiarization phase, infants who hear The girl pimmed the truck will infer
that it describes an event that they perceive with the girl as agent and the truck
as patient. This sentence can therefore describe the 3-participant taking concept
under which they view the familiarization scene, provided that they view the girl
and the truck as filling those respective participant relations. Given that infants
most readily perceive this scene as a taking, and the clause arguments can link
appropriately to the participant relations that they represent in this event, we pre-
dict that they will infer that pimmings are takings; the sentence gives them no
reason to conclude otherwise. On the basis of this inference during familiarization,
infants are predicted to only accept a taking event as an instance of pimming at
test. This means that they should show an above-baseline preference for the taking
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video over the moving video.
2.2.2 Results
Data Preparation. The videotaped recordings of the test phase for each
experimental trial were coded offline by an experimenter with the audio turned
off. EyeCoder software was used (Fernald, Zangl, Portillo, & Marchman, 2008) in
order to advance each muted video frame-by-frame and code whether infants were
looking at the left or right side of the screen, or neither. Data were coded by
two experimenters, with intercoder reliability established to be above 90% (Cohen’s
Kappa > 0.90).
Analysis. Frame-by-frame analysis calculated whether each infant was look-
ing at the taking video, the moving video, or neither. These looking preferences
were then averaged across participants to create a timecourse of the proportion of
looks towards the taking video at each frame, out of looks towards either video.
To determine whether looking patterns were conditioned on the test prompt, two
window of analysis were selected within this timecourse. The Response window
spans the 3 seconds after the offset of the first presentation of the novel verb pim,
allowing us to measure infants’ preferences after they were asked to find pimming.
The Baseline window spans the 3 seconds prior to this point, allowing us to measure
any baseline preferences before infants were asked to find pimming.
The looking timecourse is plotted in Fig. 2.2. The offset of the novel verb is
marked by a vertical line. The shaded gray region represents the selected windows of
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Figure 2.2: Timecourse of Proportion Looks to taking Video, Exp. 1
analysis. Visual inspection reveals no sustained preferences for either video during
the Baseline window before the novel verb offset, but a strong and sustained prefer-
ence for the taking video that emerges during the Response window immediately
after the offset of the novel verb.
Looking times during the Baseline and Response windows were averaged for
analysis. Infants’ mean proportion of looking time towards the taking video during
the Response window (M = 0.71, SE = 0.06) was found to be significantly higher
than during the Baseline window (M = 0.54, SE = 0.04) in a two-tailed paired-
sample t-test (t(23) = 2.27, p < 0.03). To examine whether looking times were
affected by age or vocabulary, a simple linear regression was conducted to predict
each infant’s baseline-corrected looking preferences (mean Response looking time -
mean Baseline looking time) by age in days and log-transformed total vocabulary, as
reported on the MCDI. No significant relationship to age or vocabulary was found.
Thus, infants on average showed a significantly above-baseline preference for the
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taking video during the 3-second window after being asked to find pimming, and
this preference was independent of age or vocabulary level.
While it is standard in the literature to analyze pre-selected windows con-
ditioned on the linguistic stimulus, it is also known that this practice may ob-
scure effects that emerge on an earlier or later timescale than originally expected
(Delle Luche, Durrant, Poltrock, & Floccia, 2015). To control for this possibility, a
second analysis was conducted over the entire trial to independently search for the
time window(s) in which infants’ proportion of looks to the taking video differed
significantly from chance, defined here as 50%. The type of analysis used is called
cluster-based permutation (Dautriche, Swingley, & Christophe, 2015; De Carvalho,
Dautriche, & Christophe, 2016; De Carvalho, Dautriche, Lin, & Christophe, 2017;
Maris & Oostenveld, 2007; Von Holzen & Mani, 2012). In this analysis, a one-sample
t-test is first conducted at each timeframe in order to identify clusters of adjacent
frames with t-values greater than a pre-determined threshold value (here, t = 2.01).
The sum of the t-values within each cluster yield the size of the cluster. In order
to control for multiple comparisons, the probability of observing a cluster of a par-
ticular size is calculated by comparing against a null distribution. This distribution
is bootstrapped from the largest clusters observed in 1,000 random permutations of
the data. Looking times during a time cluster are considered significantly different
than chance (p < 0.05) if a cluster of that size is larger than 95% of the clusters in
the bootstrapped null distribution.
The cluster-based permutation analysis was conducted over the length of the
entire trial using the eyetrackingR package (Dink & Ferguson, 2015). A significant
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time window was found between 8.90 and 10.98 seconds from trial onset (1.63 and
3.71 seconds from novel word offset) in which infants’ proportion looking towards
the taking video was significantly above chance (p < 0.001). No other significant
time windows were found, including in the time before novel word offset. This is
consistent with the results found in the standard analysis. Infants showed no baseline
preference for either the taking or the moving video before the test prompt, but
they showed a significant preference for taking within the approximately 3 seconds
after being asked to find pimming.
2.2.3 Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 are inconsistent with the hypothesis that 19-
to 22-month-olds expect the number of arguments in a clause to match one-to-
one the number of participants they perceive in an event (PAM) (Fisher et al.,
2010; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a; Naigles, 1990; Yuan et al., 2012). Infants in this
experiment did not seem affected by the mismatch between a 2-argument clause
(The girl pimmed the truck) describing a taking event that they readily perceive
with 3 participants (a girl took a toy truck from a boy). When asked to find
pimming at test, infants showed above-baseline looking preferences for another token
of the 3-participant taking event. They dispreferred a 2-participant moving event,
in which the girl moved the truck towards herself in the same way, but without
the boy present. It seems that this event was a less likely instance of pimming
for these infants, given their inference about this verb’s meaning on the basis of
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familiarization. Instead, these infants appeared to consider another taking event
to be a much better instance of pimming : they appeared to infer that the transitive
clause described the entire 3-participant taking concept under which they readily
viewed the familiarization scene.
This behavior is counter to the predictions of PAM. Infants using PAM should
conclude that the transitive clause describes a 2-participant sub-event in the tak-
ing scene, like moving or grabbing, in which event participants match clause
arguments in number. This prediction was not confirmed, suggesting that infants
were not relying on number-matching in this task.
These results are more consistent with the hypothesis that infants at this
age are able to link particular grammatical and thematic relations in verb learning
(Thematic Linking) (Pinker, 1984; Williams, 2015; Lidz et al., 2017). Under this
hypothesis, infants are predicted to allow a transitive description of a 3-participant
event concept, provided that the grammatical relations they represent in the clause
can link to appropriate thematic relations in their event representation; arguments
and participants need not match one-to-one. Infants’ behavior in this task is con-
sistent with the possibility that they used a strategy like Thematic Linking in their
inference about the meaning of pim. When hearing The girl pimmed the truck,
they may have linked the transitive subject to an agent relation and the object to
a patient relation in their representation of the taking event. Because these re-
lations align in the right way, this would enable them to infer that the transitive
clause describes the entire 3-participant concept under which they readily viewed
this event, with no need to shift to a 2-participant concept instead. Using this boot-
64
strapping strategy, infants would infer that pimmings can be takings, and most
likely are. Thus, Thematic Linking can provide an explanation for why infants in
this experiment preferred the taking scene at test.
However, these results are also consistent with alternative explanations. Per-
haps infants in this task did draw inferences from argument number rather than the-
matic content, but used a weaker number-based bootstrapping strategy than PAM.
These results would be consistent with the weakest such strategy that I discussed
above: Arguments Name Participants (ANP). Infants may have merely expected
every argument in the transitive clause to name a participant in their representa-
tion of the taking scene. With no expectation of one-to-one matching, this would
allow them to infer that pimmings can be takings. Alternatively, an even weaker
possible strategy would be one that does not involve syntactic bootstrapping at
all. These results are consistent with the possibility that infants ignored the syntax
of the familiarization sentence altogether, and relied entirely on their conceptual
representation— the taking concept under which they readily viewed the familiar-
ization scene— to draw inferences about the novel verb. That is, perhaps infants in
this task expected that any novel verb presented in the context of this scene must
describe taking, regardless of the verb’s syntactic frame.
A control experiment is therefore needed to determine which alternative to
PAM was guiding infants in this task: whether they are using a thematic content-
based strategy like Thematic Linking, as compared to a weaker number-based strat-
egy like ANP or no syntactic bootstrapping at all. We can differentiate these pos-
sibilities by testing how infants behave when they are familiarized to the taking
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scene described by a different syntactic frame, one that Thematic Linking predicts
will not be a good fit for a 3-participant taking event concept. One such case is
an unaccusative intransitive frame: The truck pimmed. If infants can use the inani-
macy of this intransitive subject to draw the inference that it is a likely patient, and
furthermore know the types of meanings that intransitives with patient subjects are
likely to express, this will lead them to draw different inferences about the likely
meaning of pim than infants in Experiment 1. Recall the linking principles in (2c-d),
repeated here as (5):
(5) (a) A clause describing a change tends to realize the patient undergoing
change.
(b) A clause describing an action tends to realize the agent of that action.
A learner aware of these linking principles would expect that a clause whose
sole argument is a patient is more likely to describe a change undergone by that
patient, and less likely to describe some other action by an unmentioned agent.
By this reasoning, The truck pimmed in the context of the familiarization scene
is more likely to describe some aspect of the truck’s motion, and less likely to
describe the girl’s taking of the truck from the boy. In other words, because we do
not naturally see takings as changes spontaneously undergone by the thing being
taken, verbs describing takings are unlikely to distribute in unaccusative frames.
Thus, if infants can use a strategy like Thematic Linking to constrain their inferences
about the meaning that this type of intransitive clause can express, they should infer
that intransitive pimmings are not takings but are more likely movings in the
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context of this scene.
By contrast, the two weaker alternative hypotheses predict that infants will
still infer that intransitive pimmings are takings. If infants are bootstrapping
primarily from argument number using the weaker ANP strategy, then they should
infer that The truck pimmed can describe any event in which they perceive a truck
as a participant. Given that they perceive the truck as a participant in the taking
event, this clause should be able to describe the entire 3-participant taking concept
under which they view this event. Thus, ANP predicts that infants will infer that
intransitive pimmings, like transitive pimmings, are most likely takings. The no-
syntax strategy makes the same prediction. If infants are ignoring the syntax of the
clause altogether, and relying only on their conceptual representation of this scene
as a taking, then they should also infer that intransitive pimmings are takings.
Thus, we can differentiate Thematic Linking from these two weaker alternative
accounts by determining whether infants who hear pim in an intransitive frame
continue to infer that it describes a 3-participant taking event.
2.3 Experiment 2: Intransitive Frame
Experiment 2 tested a second sample of 19- to 22-month-old English learners
to determine whether infants will allow a 1-argument clause to describe our tak-
ing scene perceived under a 3-participant concept. Using the same design as in
Experiment 1, infants were familiarized to the taking scene now described by an
intransitive clause: The truck pimmed. At test, infants were prompted to find pim-
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ming in the context of the same two candidate videos, taking and moving. I ask
whether infants continue to prefer the taking video after intransitive familiariza-
tion, or whether they now think that the moving video is a possible instance of
pimming. This will illuminate whether infants in this task are using the syntactic
context of the novel verb, and are moreover sensitive to the different meanings that
can be expressed by intransitive vs. transitive frames.
Participants. Participants were 24 typically-developing infants (13 males)
between the ages of 19;1 and 21;25 (mean = 20;3). Participants were recruited
from the greater Washington, D.C. area and heard English during at least 80%
of their waking hours. An additional 4 infants were tested but not included in
the final sample due to inattentiveness (3) or less than 80% English exposure (1).
Participants’ mean total productive vocabulary was 107 words, with a median of
68.5, from parental report on the MCDI (Fenson et al., 1993). Although the mean
total vocabulary in this sample appears qualitatively lower than the mean of the
sample in Experiment 1, this difference was not found to be statistically significant
(Welch’s t(39.11) = 1.31, p < 0.20).
Materials and Procedure. The same procedure and task design was used
as in Experiment 1, but with different audio stimuli during the critical trial. In-
fants in Experiment 2 heard the novel verb pim in an intransitive frame during the
experimental trial (see Table 2.3). Audio stimuli were recorded by a female native
speaker of American English using child-directed speech, and were edited in Adobe
Audition and Praat and combined with the video stimuli in Adobe Premiere. The
experimental trial followed the same structure as in Experiment 1, using identical
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visual stimuli. This trial was preceded by the same character introductions and 3




Look, the truck is gonna pim! The truck
just pimmed! Girl takes truck
from boy x 4Wow, it’s gonna pim again! It just
pimmed again!
Ooh, the truck is gonna pim! The truck
just pimmed!





Negative Uh-oh, that’s not gonna pim. That didn’t
pim.
Girl pokes ring
tower held by boy








Baseline Now look, they’re different! Girl takes truck
from boy /
Girl moves truck
without boy x 3
Response Find the one where the truck is pimming.
Where is the truck pimming?
Table 2.3: Structure of Experimental Trial, Experiment 2
Predictions. If infants at this age are using a bootstrapping strategy like
Thematic Linking, and can draw inferences from the thematic content of an intran-
sitive subject, then we make the following predictions. During the familiarization
phase, infants who hear pim in an intransitive clause with an inanimate subject—
The truck pimmed— should infer that the intransitive subject is likely to be a
patient, and that the clause is likely to describe some change undergone by that
patient. But given that infants readily see the familiarization scene as a taking of a
truck by a girl from a boy, and not primarily as a change undergone by the truck,
this means that the sentence is unlikely to describe the entire 3-participant taking
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event as they readily perceive it. Instead, it is more likely to describe the motion of
the truck, a sub-event in this scene. Intransitive pimmings are therefore not likely
to be takings, but more likely movings. On the basis of this inference during
familiarization, infants are predicted to accept both the taking and the moving
video as possible instances of pimming at test, because both show the truck moving
in the same way. Thematic Linking thus predicts no above-baseline preference for
one video over the other.
Under the two alternative hypotheses that infants are using a less sophisticated
verb-learning strategy, we make different predictions. One alternative hypothesis
is that infants expect that every argument in a clause should name a participant
they perceive in an event (Arguments Name Participants, ANP), with no one-to-
one matching or further inferences about the thematic content of those arguments.
Under ANP, infants who hear The truck pimmed during familiarization should infer
that this sentence describes any event in which they perceive a truck as a participant.
This sentence can therefore describe the 3-participant taking concept under which
they view the familiarization scene. Given that this is how they readily view the
scene, we predict that they will infer that intransitive pimmings are takings, and
will show an above-baseline preference for the taking video at test.
The same prediction is made by the even weaker alternative hypothesis that
infants ignore the familiarization syntax altogether, and infer verb meaning from
their conceptual representations alone. Under this no-syntax hypothesis, infants
will infer that any sentence paired with the familiarization scene describes the 3-
participant taking concept under which they readily view this scene. This should
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also lead them to conclude that intransitive pimmings are takings, and to prefer
the taking video at test. Thus, this control experiment does not differentiate
between the two alternative accounts for infants’ behavior in Experiment 1, but will
tell apart a strategy based on thematic content from these two alternatives.
2.3.1 Results
Data Preparation. The videotaped recordings of the test phase for each
experimental trial were coded frame-by-frame in the same way as in Experiment 1.
Data were again coded by two experimenters, with intercoder reliablity established
to be above 90% (Cohen’s Kappa > 0.90).
Analysis. Infants’ average proportions of looks towards the taking video
at each frame, out of looks to either video, were calculated in the same way as
in Experiment 1. The looking timecourse is plotted in Fig 2.3. The shaded gray
region marks the same two windows of analysis as in Experiment 1: the Baseline
window spanning the 3 seconds prior to the offset of the novel word (marked by
a vertical line) and the Response window spanning the 3 seconds after novel word
offset. Visual inspection reveals no sustained preferences for either video during
either of these test windows. There appears to be a short-lived increase in looks to
the taking video that begins in last second of the Response window; however, this
apparent uptick is delayed and much more modest than was seen in Experiment 1,
where infants oriented strongly towards taking immediately after novel word offset.
Looking times during the Baseline and Response windows were averaged for
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Figure 2.3: Timecourse of Proportion Looks to taking Video, Exp. 2
analysis. Infants’ mean proportion of looking time towards the taking video during
the Response window (M = 0.60, SE = 0.06) and during the the Baseline window
(M = 0.53, SE = 0.06) were not significantly different from each other (t(23) =
0.93, p < 0.36). Additionally, the infants’ differences in looking preferences from
Baseline to Response were not found to be significantly predicted by their age in
days or their log-transformed total vocabulary. Thus, infants on average did not
show a significantly above-baseline preference for the taking video in the 3-second
window after being asked find pimming, regardless of age or vocabulary.
One might be concerned that these predetermined 3-second test windows could
obscure effects that emerge on a different timescale than predicted; in particular,
these windows may not capture the short increase in looking towards taking that
visually appears to emerge about 2 seconds after novel word offset in the timecourse
in Fig. 2.3. To control for this possibility, a cluster-based permutation analysis
was again conducted over the entire trial length to identify the time windows in
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which proportion looks to taking were significantly different from chance (50%).
This analysis was conducted in the same manner as described for Experiment 1.
No significant time windows were found, either before or after novel word offset.
The apparent short increase in looks towards taking at the end of the Response
window did not reach the significance threshold (p < 0.21). Thus, infants’ looking
preferences appeared to fluctuate throughout the trial, but did not significantly differ
from chance in any time window before or after they were asked to find pimming.
2.3.2 Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 are consistent with the hypothesis that infants
in our task are drawing inferences from the thematic content of clause arguments
(Thematic Linking) (Pinker, 1984; Williams, 2015; Lidz et al., 2017). When familiar-
ized with an intransitive clause (The truck pimmed) paired with our taking scene,
infants did not appear to infer that this clause described the entire 3-participant
concept under which they view that event. When asked to find pimming at test,
infants showed no above-baseline looking preferences for another token of the 3-
participant taking event. Instead, they looked to the same extent at this event
and at a 2-participant moving event. It seems that these two events were equally
likely instances of pimming for them. This behavior is consistent with a strategy like
Thematic Linking. If infants can use the likely thematic relation of the intransitive
subject to constrain their inferences about what type of event the clause describes,
then they will infer that The truck pimmed more likely describes some aspect of the
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truck’s motion than the girl’s taking of the truck from the boy. The truck’s motion
is the same in both the taking and moving scenes, so infants who have inferred
that pimmings are movings are predicted to show no preference for either of the
two test videos. The current results confirm this prediction.
Taken together with the results of Experiment 1, this control experiment also
helps differentiate a bootstrapping strategy based on thematic content from a weaker
alternative. If infants in this task drew inferences about verb meaning solely based
on their conceptual representation of the familiarization scene as a 3-participant
taking, without using the syntactic context of the novel verb, then they would
infer that any novel verb presented in the context of this scene describes taking.
This account predicts that infants will always show an above-baseline preference
for the taking scene at test, regardless of whether they heard transitive or intran-
sitive familiarization. However, infants only showed this preference for transitive
pimming in Experiment 1, and not for intransitive pimming in Experiment 2. This
demonstrates that infants attended to the syntactic context of the novel verb in our
task.
These results are also inconsistent with the possibility that infants used a
weaker number-based strategy to bootstrap from that syntactic context. If infants
merely expected that each argument in a clause should name a participant in the
clause’s event (ANP), then they would allow either a 2-argument or a 1-argument
clause as a description of an event seen with 3 participants, provided each clause
argument names one of those participants. This account thus predicts the same
behavior by infants who hear either The girl pimmed the truck or The truck pimmed
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as a description of an event viewed as a taking with both the girl and the truck
as participants: infants should infer that pimmings are takings in both cases, and
show above-baseline preferences for the taking scene at test. This prediction was
not confirmed by the results of Experiment 2. This shows that it did not suffice for
these infants that the arguments of a transitive or intransitive clause named some of
the participants in their taking event representation. Instead, it mattered which
types of arguments were present: infants drew different inferences about clause
meaning when the truck was a transitive object, compared to when it was the sole
argument of an intransitive.
Thus, Experiments 1 and 2 together show that infants use the syntactic context
of the novel verb in our task, and did so in a way that was not predicted by a strictly
number-based bootstrapping account: infants took a transitive clause but not an
intransitive clause to describe an event seen with 3 participants. These results are
inconsistent with the hypothesis that infants expect clause arguments to match one-
to-one the perceived event participants, and are also inconsistent with the weaker
hypothesis that this matching is not one-to-one, but that it suffices for each clause
argument to name a perceived event participant. These results are predicted by
Thematic Linking, under which infants may have used information about the likely
thematic relations of the arguments in a clause to draw fine-grained inferences about
the types of events that the clause was likely to describe: whether it primarily
described a change undergone by a patient, or an action of an agent.
However, I note that infants’ lack of preference in Experiment 2 leaves open
other possibilities for characterizing their sensitivity to the differences between tran-
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sitive and intransitive clauses. For example, perhaps infants at this age merely know
that intransitives cannot describe a taking event seen with 3 participants, with-
out knowing what other types of events they can describe. If infants in our task
identified that intransitive pimmings were not likely to be takings, but did not
know what other type of events they could be, this confusion might also result in
chance behavior at test. This possibility may be less likely given prior evidence that
slightly older infants can draw fine-grained inferences about the meanings of verbs
in different intransitive frames (Scott & Fisher, 2009; Bunger & Lidz, 2004, 2008),
but further investigation would be needed to show that infants are able to perform
these types of inferences at the age currently tested, and indeed do so in our task.
Nonetheless, the current experiments show that infants’ bootstrapping strategies
at this age go beyond an expectation of one-to-one correspondence between clause
arguments and event participants, or even merely an expectation that clause argu-
ments name event participants. Instead, infants in our task appeared to use some
form of more sophisticated information about the different meanings that transitive
and intransitive clauses can express.
2.4 General Discussion
In this chapter, I investigate the way that infants at early stages of grammar
learning use clause transitivity to draw inferences about verb meanings. Prior work
has proposed that young infants are guided by a bias towards one-to-one matching
between the number of arguments they hear in a clause and the number of partici-
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pants they represent in an event (PAM) (Fisher et al., 2010; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a;
Naigles, 1990, 1996). This strategy would provide strong constraints on verb learn-
ing from only the number of arguments in a clause, without requiring learners to
differentiate the grammatical and thematic relations of those arguments. However,
previous results taken in support of number-based bootstrapping (Arunachalam &
Waxman, 2010; Arunachalam et al., 2013; Messenger et al., 2015; Naigles, 1990;
Yuan & Fisher, 2009; Yuan et al., 2012) are also compatible with a finer-grained
bootstrapping strategy. Perhaps infants even at early stages of verb learning can
differentiate subjects and objects of clauses in some manner, and are sensitive to
the cross-linguistically robust links between those grammatical relations and the the-
matic relations they express (Thematic Linking) (Pinker, 1984; Williams, 2015; Lidz
et al., 2017). Here, I aim to address the following open question: when bootstrap-
ping from argument number vs. thematic content would lead to different inferences
about verb meaning, which strategy will infants fall back on?
The two experiments presented above show that verb-learning infants at the
age previously tested— between 19 and 22 months— do not fall back on one-to-one
number matching. Infants in Experiment 1 did not behave as if they expected clause
arguments to match event participants in number: they inferred that a novel verb
in a transitive clause described an event that they viewed under a 3-participant
concept. Moreover, infants in Experiment 2 drew different inferences when that
novel verb appeared in an intransitive frame. These infants inferred that the verb
was unlikely to describe that same 3-participant event concept, even though the
subject of the intransitive clause (The truck pimmed) named the same participant
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as the object of the transitive clause in Experiment 1 (The girl pimmed the truck).
Thus, infants’ bootstrapping in this task did not appear to be driven primarily
by the numbers of clause arguments and perceived event participants. Instead,
infants appeared to differentiate the arguments of transitive and intransitive clauses
in a manner that allowed them to draw finer-grained inferences about the types of
meanings that those clauses could express.
These results can be explained by appealing to the same sensitivities to the-
matic content that have been attested in prior experimental findings (Gertner et al.,
2006; Bunger & Lidz, 2004, 2008; Scott & Fisher, 2009). If infants expected that
subjects of transitive clauses name agents and objects name patients, as shown in
other work with 21-month-olds (Gertner et al., 2006), this would allow them to link
the grammatical relations of the arguments in the transitive clause to the partici-
pant relations that they perceived in the taking event. But if they inferred that
the subject of the intransitive clause is likely to be a patient, and knew that a clause
whose sole argument is a patient is likely to describe a change undergone by that
patient, then they would conclude that this clause is an unlikely description of an
event seen as a taking. This is not the only possible way that infants may have
arrived at a different meaning for the intransitive clause in the current study, but
it is consistent with prior evidence that 22- to 28-month-old infants can perform
this type of inference (Bunger & Lidz, 2004, 2008; Scott & Fisher, 2009). Thus,
the current results are consistent with other findings that infants at this age or a
little later can bootstrap verb meanings from finer-grained information about the
grammatical and thematic relations of clause arguments.
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Moreover, this work contributes a novel finding: infants at this age rely on this
finer-grained information above and beyond the information gained solely from the
number of clause arguments. Both PAM and the more flexible Thematic Linking
strategy were in principle available to infants in this task, but would lead to different
inferences about verb meaning. By showing that infants did not prefer to use PAM,
this work argues against the claim that a bias towards one-to-one matching between
participants and arguments is the primary or privileged bootstrapping strategy at
this age (Fisher, 1996; Fisher et al., 2010; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a). Because infants
in this task instead drew more sophisticated inferences from the types of arguments
in a clause, it may be that prior verb learning results from the same age range
were driven by a similarly sophisticated bootstrapping strategy, rather than PAM
(Arunachalam & Waxman, 2010; Arunachalam et al., 2013; Messenger et al., 2015;
Naigles, 1990; Yuan & Fisher, 2009; Yuan et al., 2012). It is still possible that PAM
is a primary guide for verb learning in even earlier stages of development; further
investigation with infants younger than 19 months is needed to determine whether
this is the case. However, at least by the age at which infants most reliably succeed
at novel verb-learning tasks, it appears that they do not adhere tightly to PAM in
their verb-learning inferences, and instead use information about argument relations
in a more flexible way than number-matching would allow.
Further investigation is needed to determine the exact information about ar-
gument relations that infants were using in this task, particularly in the case of
intransitive clauses. In order to more precisely characterize infants’ inference about
intransitive pimming, it would be necessary to differentiate whether they only infer
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that pimmings are unlikely to be takings, or whether they also infer that this verb
describes some aspect of the truck’s motion by virtue of having the truck as subject.
Future work may address this issue by testing whether infants will consider other
events with the same motion as possible pimmings, but reject events in which the
truck is affected in a different way. This will allow for a more precise understand-
ing of how infants at this age map between their representations of events and the
argument relations in an intransitive vs. transitive clause.
More broadly, the results in this chapter illuminate the sophisticated ways
that infants relate linguistic and conceptual representations in early grammar learn-
ing. To bootstrap verb meanings in the current experiment, infants needed to map
between two structures: the structure under which they perceived the sentences in
our task, and the structure under which they viewed the stimulus scene. By using
a stimulus scene whose conceptual representation had been normed in prior work
(Knowlton et al., 2018; Perkins et al., 2018), we were able able to fix the conceptual
side of the equation in order to diagnose this mapping process. This step has not
explicitly been taken in previous work, in which uncertainty over infants’ concep-
tual representations has left open questions about which bootstrapping strategy was
being used (Arunachalam et al., 2016; Brandone et al., 2006; Pozzan et al., 2015).
Having first diagnosed the conceptual structure under which infants readily view the
scene in our task, we are able to show the circumstances under which infants map a
sentence to this readily available conceptual representation, and the circumstances
under which they shift to a different concept. Infants were able to link the argument
relations in a transitive clause in to appropriate participant relations in this event
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representation, and preferred to do so even despite the mismatch between argument
and participant number. But infants did not allow an intransitive description of
this event concept, and instead shifted away from their initial scene representation.
This provides further evidence for the independent contribution of both conceptual
and linguistic structure in bootstrapping. Infants attempt to relate a sentence to
the conceptual representations under which they readily perceive the world around
them, but simultaneously take the linguistic form of the sentence as evidence for
which conceptual representation is being tokened (Gleitman, 1990).
Finally, this work has implications for how infants represent the arguments
in a clause when drawing inferences about verb meaning. If infants’ bootstrapping
inferences at this age are primarily driven by the grammatical and thematic relations
of clause arguments rather than argument number, this implies that those relations
are somehow privileged in their clause representations. That is, infants at this age
do not merely track the number of noun phrase arguments they hear; instead, they
differentiate those arguments in some fashion in order to draw inferences about their
likely thematic relations, and thus draw further inferences about clause meaning.
Infants in this task drew different inferences about transitive subjects and objects
than they did about intransitive subjects, and these inferences were strikingly similar
to those that adults would draw on the basis of the robust links between grammatical
and thematic relations that exist cross-linguistically (Williams, 2015). This would
be explained if infants’ clause representations privilege categories like ‘subject’ and
‘object’— the high-level abstractions under which these linking principles are stated.
Thus, it is possible that infants even at early stages of verb learning may be at-
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tempting to recover these syntactic categories in their input, with argument number
serving only as a proxy for doing so. The current work does not tell us how richly
these categories might be represented: whether they are represented qua subjects
and objects, in an adult-like hierarchical clause structure, or whether they are rep-
resented in a rougher and less accurate way. It is also an open question how infants
learn to recognize these categories in their language, a question I will continue to
return to in the following chapters. But by pointing towards clause representations
in which subjects and objects are asymmetrically differentiated in some manner,
the current work bring us one step closer to understanding the representational re-
sources that infants bring to the task of bootstrapping into the grammar of their
language.
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Chapter 3: Representing Transitivity in Non-Basic Clauses
3.1 Background
Chapter 2 focused on the basic resources that infants bring to the task of
representing arguments in a clause, in order to draw inferences about the meanings
and argument structure of new verbs. I provided new evidence that by the age of
20 months, infants are bootstrapping from clause representations that differentiate
the grammatical and thematic relations of clause arguments, and privilege these
relations over and above the number of noun phrase arguments in sentences they
hear.
But this does not mean that infants always succeed at identifying these re-
lations when they are present. Infants do not only hear basic, active, declarative
sentences like those in (1) and (2); they also have to contend with so-called “non-
basic” clauses like the wh-questions in (1), in which arguments have been displaced
from their canonical positions.
(1) John ate a sandwich. Amy fixed her bicycle.
(2) John ate. (*Amy fixed.)
(3) What did John eat? What did Amy fix?
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The subject and object of a clause might be harder to recognize in sentences
like (1), in which an argument of the verb is not pronounced in an argument position.
Adult English speakers know that what acts as the verb’s object by virtue of a
particular type of non-local dependency. But in order to understand that these
sentences have objects, learners need to identify that this dependency is present. If
a child doesn’t yet know the form of wh-dependencies in her language, she might
think that these sentences are intransitive. This would be very misleading for verb
learning: she might think that fix can freely occur in an intransitive clause, like eat,
with consequences for what she thinks it means.
The case of wh-questions serves to illustrate a much broader problem for boot-
strapping in early grammar learning. Bootstrapping allows young learners to draw
inferences about grammar and meaning by relating syntactic representations of sub-
jects and objects in sentences to conceptual representations of events. But these in-
ference depend on learners recognizing subjects and objects when they are present,
and may fail if other linguistic properties interfere with learners’ abilities to recog-
nize those core clause arguments (Gleitman, 1990; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a, 2004b;
Pinker, 1984, 1989). This problem was first noted by Pinker in his earliest work on
semantic bootstrapping, following Keenan (1976):
One must place an important proviso, however, on the use of semantic in-
formation to infer the presence of syntactic symbols, especially grammatical
relations. Keenan argues that the semantic properties of subjecthood hold
only in what he calls “basic sentences”: roughly, those that are simple, ac-
tive, affirmative, declarative, pragmatically neutral, and minimally presuppo-
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sitional. In nonbasic sentences, these properties may not hold. In English
passives, for example, agents can be oblique objects and patients subjects,
and in stylistically varied or contextually dependent sentences the agent can
be found in nonsubject positions (e.g., eats a lot of pizza, that guy). Thus one
must have the child not draw conclusions about grammatical relations from
nonbasic sentences (Pinker, 1984).
In summary, the meaning-distribution relations that learners rely on for boot-
strapping may be disrupted in sentences with argument displacement. Examples
include not only wh-questions, but also relative clauses (5) and passives (6):
(4) What did Amy fix?
(5) I like the bicycle that Amy fixed.
(6) The bicycle was fixed (by Amy).
In each of these examples, an expression acting as the verb’s object is be-
ing realized in a non-canonical object position, rather than after the verb. Adult
English speakers know that these are all instances of particular dependencies that
hold non-locally between a predicate and an argument, and they know that these
dependencies have particular locality properties: some of them, like wh-objects and
relative clauses, contain the same types of dependencies (wh- or A-bar dependencies)
and others, like passives, are fundamentally different (A-movement).
Children, however, must learn the shapes that these various dependencies take
in their language. Until they have learned this, non-basic clause types will provide
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misleading data for bootstrapping, whether syntactic or semantic. A child who does
not know that what and the bicycle are displaced objects in the sentences above will
relate these sentences improperly to her perceptions of events in the world, resulting
in faulty inferences about grammar and/or meaning. A semantic bootstrapper who
takes these sentences to be descriptions of causative events might conclude that these
sentences are evidence for base object-initial word order in English, rather than
evidence for the transformations that actually produced this non-canonical word
order. Or if these phrases are not even recognized as arguments, these sentences
might be erroneously taken as evidence that fix can take an implicit object, or that
English has syntactic null objects. Conversely, a syntactic bootstrapper who fails
to perceive the transformations in these sentences might draw erroneous inferences
about verb properties: she might conclude that fix does not take a direct object and
therefore “fixings” are not likely to be causative events, or she might conclude that
fix belongs to a class of verbs that can alternate between transitive and intransitive
uses, like eat or rise.
In summary, non-basic clauses introduce a chicken-and-egg problem for early
grammar acquisition. If learners had a way of identifying the structure of these sen-
tences, and in particular to recognize transitivity when it is present, then they could
avoid drawing faulty inferences about clause structure and verb argument structure
on the basis of these data. On the other hand, if learners knew the argument struc-
ture of verbs in these sentences— that a verb like fix requires an object, and does
not allow object-drop— then they could use that information to identify when that
object has been displaced from its canonical position. Which comes first, non-basic
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clause acquisition or argument structure learning? And how do learners find their
way out of this chicken-and-egg problem? In this chapter, I focus on the first of these
questions, the ‘which’ question. Using a novel method to probe the wh-dependency
representations of English-learning infants, I show that the answer appears to be
argument structure: infants’ ability to detect local verb transitivity violations is
developmentally prior to their ability to recognize a displaced argument in a wh-
object question. This new evidence for the developmental trajectory of non-basic
clause acquisition lays the empirical groundwork for examining the second learning
question, the ‘how’ question, in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.1.1 Acquiring Wh-Dependencies
My case study is wh-dependencies, which are among the most common non-
basic clause types in child-directed speech. English-learning children hear a large
number of wh-questions even before their second birthday (around 15% of their total
input), the majority of which contain non-canonical word orders (Newport et al.,
1977; Stromswold, 1995). These dependencies are also present in relative clauses,
which are rarer in the speech to young children but share similar structural proper-
ties (Chomsky, 1977). Both cases involve a particular type of non-local dependency
between a fronted argument and the thematic position where the argument is inter-
preted. The length of this dependency can hold across arbitrarily long distances, as
in (7), but cannot cross certain structures that are islands for dependency formation
(8) (Chomsky, 1977; Ross, 1967).
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(7) (a) What did Jake believe that Susan claimed that John ate?
(b) I made the sandwich that Jake believed that Susan claimed that John
ate.
(8) (a) *What did Jake believe Susan’s claim that John ate?
(b) *I made the sandwich that Jake believed Susan’s claim that John ate.
Unlike in English, in some languages wh-dependencies do not on the surface
appear to involve displacement. In “wh-in-situ” languages like Chinese, Japanese,
and Korean, wh-phrases are pronounced in their thematic position, although on
many accounts they still take scope in a higher clausal position by undergoing covert
movement that happens to be inaudible (e.g. Aoun et al., 1981; Huang, 1982)1:
(9) Hufei mai-le shenme (Mandarin Chinese; Cheng, 2003)
Hufei buy-PERF what
‘What did Hufei buy?’
Given the variety of forms that wh-dependencies can take, there are several
problems that children must solve in order to be able to recognize them in their input.
Children need to learn whether their language has overt or covert wh-movement,
which surface forms in their language signal that movement has taken place, and
(for languages with overt movement) how to identify the thematic position from
which movement occurred. In English, surface signals for wh-movement include
1Some have also argued for non-movement accounts of wh-in-situ, such as binding by a covert
operator (Reinhart, 1998), or for different wh-in-situ representations across different languages
(Cole & Hermon, 1994). See Cheng (2003) for an overview.
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wh-forms (e.g. what), subject-auxiliary inversion, do-support, and relativizers (e.g.
that). Adult speakers make use of these signals efficiently in sentence processing to
identify a displaced argument (a “filler”) and predict upcoming gaps, or thematic
positions where it could be interpreted (“active gap filling”) (Aoshima, Phillips, &
Weinberg, 2004; Crain & Fodor, 1985; Frazier & d’Arcais, 1989; Frazier & Clifton,
1989; Sussman & Sedivy, 2003; Traxler & Pickering, 1996). But because these
signals are language-specific, children must learn them. And in order to arrive at
the correct interpretation of wh-dependencies, children furthermore must identify
the particular relation that holds between the moved argument and a non-local
predicate— to identify the thematic position where the moved argument originated.
This is not a trivial task, as wh-movement gaps are phonologically null in languages
like English.
3.1.2 Hypothesis: Gap-driven Learning
On one proposal, children begin to identify wh-dependencies by detecting when
a phrase stands in relation to a verb that is locally missing a predicted argument
(Gagliardi et al., 2016). In other words, although mature parsing of these depen-
dencies is filler-driven, the acquisition of these dependencies may be gap-driven. For
example, a child who knows that fix requires a direct object might detect that it
is missing after the verb in a sentence like What did Amy fix ? She may then
be driven to examine the sentence for cues to what happened to this unexpectedly
missing argument, and start learning the signals of the wh-dependency that is re-
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sponsible: for example, that what is an argument wh-word and that do-support can
occur in wh-object questions. The detection of a direct object gap will also allow
the child to correctly interpret this particular wh-dependency, interpreting what as
questioning some unknown patient of fixing by relating it to the position where fix
assigns that thematic role.
If correct, this proposal has implications for verb learning. Learners need to
know which verbs require direct objects, in order to notice when those arguments
are needed and missing. In other words, learners need to detect that sentences like
What did Amy fix ? contain direct object gaps, rather than intransitive uses of
these verbs— but in order to do so, they must know which verbs are transitive.
This account therefore posits that learners use verb argument structure knowledge
to drive wh-dependency acquisition, rather than the other way around.
This proposal stands in contrast to another logical alternative: that wh-
dependency acquisition is actually filler-driven. Under this alternative, the first
step for the learner is to cluster the wh-words in her language into an equivalence
class, by tracking function words that appear at clause boundaries in questions.
The second step is to label this cluster as the set of wh-words in her language,
and to identify that these words stand in particular non-local relationships with a
predicate. Having done so, the learner might then use the presence of a wh-word to
facilitate argument structure acquisition: an argument wh-word signals an upcom-
ing argument gap, and therefore enables the learner to differentiate direct object
gaps from intransitive uses of verbs. This proposal therefore posits that verb tran-
sitivity acquisition occurs after learners identify at least some of wh-dependencies
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in their language.
This alternative account may be feasible, but is not straightfoward. Despite
their orthography, wh-words do not have a signature morphology. The forms [hu]
‘who’ and [w2t] ‘what’ do not have a single phoneme in common. Distributional
analysis may be more informative for identifying these words: Mintz, Newport, and
Bever (2002) found that an algorithm that clustered words based on their imme-
diately preceding and following sentence environments in child-directed speech was
able to cluster the set of English wh-words when tested on the Nina corpus (Suppes,
1974), although it did not appear to identify such a cluster for the Peter corpus
(Bloom, 1970) in CHILDES (MacWhinney, 2000)2. But even if learners can iden-
tify a cluster of sentence-initial question words in the language, it is not trivial to
identify these as wh-words. Many languages have question particles that aren’t wh-
words, but can appear at sentence boundaries in both wh- and polar questions. An
example is the particle la in Tz’utujil Mayan (10). A Tz’utujil learner needs a way
to tell that la is a question particle and not a wh-word, and conversely an English
learner needs a way to tell that what is a wh-word and not a question particle.
(10) La xwari ja ch’uuch’? (Tz’utujil Mayan; Dayley, 1981
Q slept the baby
‘Did the baby sleep?’
Furthermore, supposing a learner can identify the set of wh-words in her lan-
guage, it is less clear how she would identify the particular non-local relationships
2Note that the goal of this computational model was not to identify closed-class categories like
wh-words, but rather to use closed-class items to help identify lexical categories like nouns and
verbs.
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that they participate in without using verb transitivity information. Because ad-
junct wh-words (like when and where) do not predict upcoming argument gaps, a
learner cannot use the mere presence of a wh-word to infer that a verb is occurring
with a displaced argument, rather than intransitively. Instead, the learner would
need to rely on the semantics of particular wh-words to determine which of them
are questioning unknown arguments of predicates, and which are questioning times,
locations, manners, and reasons. This introduces a new puzzle, which is how a child
identifies the semantics of these words— particularly, how a child determines which
are the argument wh-words, without first knowing whether they stand in relation
to an argument gap.
The gap-driven and filler-driven learning hypotheses make different empir-
ical predictions. Under gap-driven learning, because wh-dependency acquisition
depends on learning verb transitivity, it should come developmentally later. Under
filler-driven learning, the reverse is true: wh-dependency acquisition facilitates verb
transitivity learning, so it should come at the same time or developmentally earlier.
3.1.3 Prior Experimental Results
Previous preferential looking studies suggest that infants’ abilities to iden-
tify wh-dependencies in English develops in tandem with basic argument structure
knowledge. English-learning infants as young as 15 and 16 months old show sen-
sitivity to verb transitivity: Jin and Fisher (2014) found that 15-month-olds are
able to draw inferences about the meaning of a novel verb on the basis of hearing it
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in a transitive frame, and Lidz et al. (2017) found that high-vocabulary 16-month-
olds predicted an upcoming direct object for a known transitive verb during online
sentence processing. However, wh-dependency knowledge at this same age seems
somewhat fragile. One early preferential looking study found that 15-month-olds
were able to comprehend subject but not object wh-questions (Seidl et al., 2003).
In two additional studies that found apparent success with object questions at this
age (Gagliardi et al., 2016; Perkins & Lidz, under review), the authors argued that
15-month-olds’ performance was not due to an adult-like representation of the wh-
dependencies in these sentences, but rather to a “gap-driven” interpretation heuristic
based on verb knowledge. Infants who knew that bump is transitive may have no-
ticed that a predicted argument was unexpectedly missing in a question like Which
dog did the cat bump ? They may then have inferred that the missing argument
was the intended answer in the experimental task, and searched the display for the
animal that got bumped. Identifying the answer would thus be possible without
representing the wh-phrase which dog as that missing argument.
In support of this account, Gagliardi et al. (2016) found that 15-month-olds
were not merely able to identify the right answer for wh-object questions, but also
performed better than their 20-month-old peers on relative clauses with the same
transitive verbs (e.g. Find the dog that the cat bumped ). In a similar task, Perkins
and Lidz (under review) found that 15-month-olds’ performance was predicted by
vocabulary, a likely correlate of verb knowledge. These experiments do not demon-
strate directly when children represent the full structure of wh-dependencies, but
several results suggest that this may occur around the age of 20 months. Infants at
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this age are beginning to produce wh-questions in their own speech (Rowland, Pine,
Lieven, & Theakston, 2003; Stromswold, 1995) and reliably comprehend them re-
gardless of vocabulary level (Gagliardi et al., 2016; Seidl et al., 2003). Their poorer
performance on relative clauses may be explained by difficulty processing these de-
pendencies in sentences where the cues to argument displacement are less apparent
(Gagliardi et al., 2016)3.
In summary, the current experimental evidence suggests the following devel-
opmental trajectory. Basic verb transitivity knowledge may develop jointly with
infants’ ability to recognize wh-dependencies between the ages of 15 and 20 months,
and may emerge before infants can reliably recognize a fronted phrase as an argu-
ment in a wh-question. If correct, this account supports the hypothesis that the
acquisition of these dependencies, and other non-basic clause types, is gap-driven.
Infants’ ability to detect a predicted but unexpectedly missing argument of a verb
may not only enable them to infer the right answer in an experimental task at 15
months, but may also drive their identification of wh-dependencies over the next
several months. As they attempt to integrate more of the linguistic material in
these sentence into a complete parse, they may identify that a displaced argument
stands in relation to that gap, and infer the type of dependency responsible.
However, the evidence from these previous studies is still highly indirect. These
3For example, relative clauses lack subject-auxiliary inversion and do-support, and the rela-
tivizer that is homophonous with other words in the language (such as demonstrative that). These
weaker cues may make it challenging for learners to encode the filler or retrieve it in memory dur-
ing online sentence processing, resulting in comprehension difficulty. This account predicts that
20-month-olds should improve on relative clauses if they contain stronger cues to displacement,
and Gagliardi et al. (2016) confirmed this prediction: 20-month-olds were successful at responding
to wh-relatives like Find the dog who the cat bumped , where the wh-word who more strongly
signals the presence of a wh-dependency.
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data demonstrate whether infants can identify the correct image as an answer to a
question, but do not diagnose how infants represent the structure of that question
in order to arrive at their interpretation. Therefore, these results cannot directly
demonstrate that younger infants’ representations of wh-dependencies are imma-
ture. Doing requires more direct evidence of infants’ syntactic representations: in
particular, evidence that 15-month-olds recognize when an argument of a known
transitive verb is missing, but do not yet represent the fronted wh-phrase as an
argument of the verb.
Here, I introduce a listening-time task that probes infants’ syntactic repre-
sentations in more directly. My test case is whether infants distinguish auditorily
presented filled-gap wh-object questions (e.g. *Which dog should the cat bump him?)
from questions with gaps (Which dog should the cat bump ?). I contrast these
sentences with simple declaratives with and without direct objects (The cat should
bump him and *The cat should bump ). Sentences are presented in the absence
of referential context: we no longer measure whether infants can identify an event
that matches the sentence, but merely whether infants listen longer to a grammat-
ical or to an ungrammatical sentence. This allows us to determine whether infants
represent a fronted wh-phrase as an argument in a wh-question, or whether they
only notice when a verb is locally missing an argument.
Under the gap-driven hypothesis, if 15-month-olds know the argument struc-
ture requirements of these transitive verbs and do not yet represent the wh-phrase
as an object of the verb, they should process a wh-question the same way they would
process a simple transitive clause with no wh-phrase. In both cases, the absence of
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a direct object should be more surprising than an overt direct object. However, if
older infants represent the wh-phrase as an argument, they should process a filled-
gap question differently from a simple transitive clause: they should notice that the
filled-gap question has too many arguments.4 In two experiments, I test and confirm
these predictions. I find that 15-month-olds respond similarly to overt direct objects
and object gaps in both declaratives and wh-questions, whereas 18-month-olds dif-
ferentiate between these sentence types. This provides the first direct evidence that
infants’ wh-dependency representations develop in during the second year of life.
Moreover, this development is consistent with the gap-driven learning hypothesis:
infants show sensitivity to local argument structure violations prior to the point at
which they represent a wh-phrase as an argument.
3.2 Experiment 1: 14- and 15-month-olds
3.2.1 Method
Experiment 1 tested a sample of 14- and 15-month-old English learners using
a listening time task based on the Sequential Listening Preference Procedure (Maye,
Werker, & Gerken, 2002; Shi, Werker, & Cutler, 2006). In this task, infants hear
blocks of sentences accompanied by an abstract, unrelated video. Each trial is
infant-controlled: both the video and audio stop after infants look away for more
than 2 seconds. This allows us to use looking time towards the visual stimuli as a
4Some languages allow pronominal elements, called resumptive pronouns, in the thematic posi-
tion of a wh-question (see McCloskey, 2017 for an overview). English is not one of these languages:
in general, the base position of wh-movement in English must be phonologically null. I set aside
for now the interesting question of how a learner might identify this property of her language.
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Sentence Type Overt Object Object Gap
Declarative Wow, a tiger! The lion should
hug him.
*Wow, a tiger! The lion
should hug .
Wh-question *Wow, which tiger should the
lion hug him?
Wow, which tiger should the
lion hug ?
Table 3.1: Sample Test Sentences, Experiments 1 and 2
measure of infants’ attention to the auditory stimuli.
Infants heard sentences with familiar transitive verbs in alternating trials,
with and without overt direct objects following the verb. Infants in one condition
heard these verbs in wh-object questions, and infants in the other condition heard
these verbs in basic declarative clauses. Table 3.1 presents the fully crossed design:
sentence type is manipulated between subjects, and object vs. object gap is ma-
nipulated within subjects. The dependent measure is looking time for each trial
type. This allows us to determine whether infants differentiate between trials with
and without direct objects, and whether they show different listening preferences
for declaratives and wh-questions.
Participants. Participants in the current sample included 63 typically-developing
infants (35 males), 32 between the ages of 14;0 and 14;29, and 31 between the ages
of 15;0 and 15;29. The target sample size is n = 64, with data collection ongoing.
In the current sample, the mean age of the 14-month-olds was 14;14, and the mean
age of the 15-month-olds was 15;13. Participants were recruited from the greater
Washington, D.C. area with the criteria that they heard English during at least
80% of their waking hours. An additional 28 infants were tested but not included in
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the sample due to failing to complete the full familiarization phase as described be-
low (3), failing to complete the full test phase (8), fussiness or inattentiveness (13),
parental interference during the study (2), age below 14;0 on day of test (1), or
coder error (1). Participants’ total productive vocabulary was collected by parental
report using the Words and Sentences MacArthur-Bates Communicative Develop-
ment Inventory (MCDI) (Fenson et al., 1993). Mean total words produced by the
14-month-olds were 14.9, and mean total words produced by the 15-month-olds were
31.7.
Materials. Each 25-second trial presented six sentences, one for each of
six familiar, transitive verbs (kiss, hug, tickle, bump, hit, and cover). Verbs were
presented in a pseudo-random order with different animals as NP arguments. These
particular verbs were selected because they are highly transitive and ranked high
in familiarity norming for 16-month-old infants, the youngest age represented in
the web-based WordBank database (Frank et al., 2016). The animals used as NP
arguments were likewise selected for familiarity in the same age group. Pronominal
objects (him and her, in equal numbers) were used in order to control for the number
of full lexical NPs across sentence types.
All sentences were recorded by a female native speaker of American English
using child-directed speech. In order to maintain natural-sounding prosody, all
ungrammatical conditions were created by splicing together two grammatical sen-
tences. Ungrammatical wh-questions were created by splicing a grammatical wh-
question with a causative sentence (Which tiger should the lion hug + I made the
lion hug him = Which tiger should the lion hug him). Ungrammatical declaratives
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were created by splicing a grammatical declarative with an embedded question (The
lion should hug him + I know who the lion should hug = The lion should hug). The
modal should was used in order to avoid differences in verbal morphology across
sentence types.
Audio stimuli were edited using Adobe Audition and Praat, and concatenated
with variable 750-1000 ms of silence between sentences. Audio for each trial was
combined with one of two videos of animated, slowly rotating shapes in Adobe
Premiere. One of these videos was used during the familiarization phase of the
experiment, and one during the test phase. A silent video of a butterfly on a leaf
was separately edited for use as an attention-getter stimulus.
Procedure. Infants sat on a parent’s lap or a high chair positioned 6 feet
away from a 51” widescreen television. Parents listened to music played over noise-
cancelling headphones, and were instructed not to talk to their children or direct
their attention. Stimuli were played using the Habit program (Cohen, Atkinson, &
Chaput, 2004). A camera located above the television was used to video-record the
experiment. The camera feed was connected to a video monitor in a separate room
to allow an experimenter in a separate room to live-code infants’ eye fixations. The
experimenter was not able to hear the audio for the experiment, and therefore was
blind to the particular trial type that the infant was hearing.
Each experiment began by displaying the attention-getter stimulus. Once
the infant fixated on the attention-getter, the experimenter initiated the first trial.
During each trial, the experimenter pressed a key on the computer to record when
the infant was looking at the screen, and released the key as soon as the infant looked
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away. A trial ended after the full 25-second duration of the audio stimulus, or after
the computer program registered that the infant looked away from the screen for
more than 2 seconds continuously. At the end of a trial, the attention-getter stimulus
was displayed. The next trial was initiated as soon as the infant re-oriented back
towards the screen.
The experiment had two phases. During the familiarization phase, infants were
familiarized to at least 72 seconds of the six test verbs in basic transitive clauses with
direct objects. Because 14- and 15-month-olds may have variable prior experience
with the experimental verbs, this phase was intended to aid their lexical processing
by facilitating retrieval of these lexical items and their argument structure from
memory. The 72-second familiarization duration was informed by prior work that
used dialogues of similar length to familiarize infants with novel verbs (Arunachalam
et al., 2013; Scott & Fisher, 2009; Yuan & Fisher, 2009), and pilot testing confirmed
that this duration of training would not result in substantial loss of attention before
the test phase began. Familiarization sentences had the same structure as the overt
object sentences presented in the declarative test condition (e.g. Wow, a giraffe!
The bird should hug him.), but did not include any of the same sentences presented
at test. In order to ensure that infants in the declarative condition were exposed to
sufficiently novel stimuli at test, different videos of rotating shapes were used for the
familiarization and test phases of the experiment. However, the differences in stimuli
between familiarization and test were still smaller for the declarative condition than
for the wh-question condition, a point I return to in the discussion section.
Four 25-second familiarization trials were prepared, each containing six sen-
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tence with the test verbs presented in a pseudo-random order. The order of familiar-
ization trials was randomized across participants. The familiarization phase ended
after the trial during which an infant reached the 72-second threshold of looking
time. If this threshold was not reached during the first presentation of the famil-
iarization trials, they repeated in a random order, for up to 12 trials total. Infants
who did not reach 72 seconds of looking time over the course of 12 familiarization
trials were excluded from analysis.
After the familiarization phase, the experiment proceeded to the test phase.
At test, infants heard 12 trials of declarative sentences or wh-object questions, alter-
nating between trials with overt objects and trials with object gaps. Infants in each
condition were randomly assigned to one of four lists, counterbalancing two factors
across participants. Grammaticality of the first test trial was counterbalanced by
presenting half of participants with a grammatical first test trial and half with an
ungrammatical test trial in their condition, and test trial order was counterbalanced
by reversing the order of trial presentation for half of the participants. If an infant
became fussy over the course of the test phase, the experiment was stopped and the
infant was excluded from analysis.
Predictions. If 14- and 15-month-old infants are learning the transitivity of
frequent verbs in their input but do not yet represent wh-phrases as arguments in wh-
questions, this makes two predictions. The first is that infants at this age should be
able to detect when the transitivity requirements of a verb are locally violated: they
should differentiate sentences with overt direct objects from sentences with object
gaps. The second is that their behavior should be the same for both declaratives
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and wh-questions. In both cases, an infant should expect a known transitive verb
to have a following direct object, and should be surprised by an object gap. This
should result in similar looking time preferences for either overt objects or object
gaps in each condition. Note that in this method we cannot predict the direction
of infants’ preferences in advance. It is possible that infants will prefer to listen
to sentence types they find surprising or unfamiliar; conversely, they may prefer to
listen to sentence types they find unsurprising or familiar. Many interacting factors
have been found to affect when infants display a novelty or a familiarity preference in
a listening-time task (see DePaolis, Keren-Portnoy, & Vihman, 2016 and Houston-
Price & Nakai, 2004 for reviews). Because age is known to be one of these factors,
I examine infants’ preferences as a function of their age in months.
Under the alternative hypothesis that infants at this age do represent wh-
phrases as arguments, this makes a different prediction. Infants should still be
surprised to hear an object gap following a transitive verb in a declarative sentence,
but they should be unsurprised in a wh-object question, because they have recog-
nized that the wh-phrase is acting as that object. Conversely, infants should be
unsurprised to hear an overt object in a declarative, but they should be surprised
in a wh-object question, because they should notice that the question has too many
arguments. Thus, this alternative hypothesis predicts that infants should show op-
posite patterns of preference across the two conditions: whichever direction infants
show a preference for overt objects vs. object gap trials in declarative sentences,
their preferences should be flipped for wh-questions.
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3.2.2 Results
Total looking time during overt object and object gap trials was calculated
for each infant. Fig. 3.1 plots the mean total looking times across infants for each
trial type, as a function of condition and age in months. A visual scan of these plots
reveals that infants in the 14-month-old and 15-month-old age groups appear to show
opposite patterns of preference for object gap vs. overt object trials. 14-month-olds
as a whole appear to listen longer to overt object trials, whereas 15-month-olds as
whole appear to listen longer to object gap trials. However, these preferences did
not seem to differ by condition: neither age group appears to show different patterns
of preference for declarative sentences vs. wh-questions.
Figure 3.1: Looking Time by Trial Type, Condition, and Age, Exp. 1
To normalize for individual differences in participants’ overall looking times
during the experiment, a preference score was calculated for each participant fol-
lowing Shi et al. (2006): total looking time during object gap trials divided by total
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looking time during overt object trials, minus 1. This yields a percent advantage
for object gap vs. overt object trials for each participant. These individual pref-
erence scores are plotted in Fig. 3.2 as a function of condition and age in months,
revealing a pattern consistent with that in Fig. 3.1. Although there is variability
in each group, 14-month-olds in both conditions tend towards a slight preference
for overt object trials, and 15-month-olds in both conditions tend towards a slight
preference for object gap trials. This visual trend was confirmed by a 2x2 ANOVA
(condition x age in months), with mean preference for object gap trials as the de-
pendent measure. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of age in months
(F (1, 59) = 4.05, p < 0.05), but no main effects or interactions by condition. In-
fants’ preferences for overt objects vs. object gaps changed between the ages of
14 and 15 months, but these preferences were consistent for both declaratives and
wh-questions.
Figure 3.2: Preference for Object Gap Trials by Condition and Age, Exp. 1
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Because no significant effects of condition were found, looking times for both
conditions were analyzed together in follow-up analyses. 14-month-olds’ overall look-
ing preferences were not found to significantly differ from zero (t(31) = −0.38, p <
0.70): the apparent numerical preference for overt objects in this age group did not
reach statistical significance. However, 15-month-olds as a group showed a signif-
icant preference for object gap trials (t(30) = 2.26, p < 0.03). These results show
that infants at 15 months differentiated between sentences with and without direct
objects following the transitive test verbs, and listened longer when these sentences
did not have direct objects.
3.2.3 Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that infants
by the age of 15 months show sensitivity to verb transitivity, but do not yet represent
wh-phrases as arguments in wh-questions. The 15-month-olds in the sample listened
longer to sentences in which transitive verbs did not have following direct objects,
compared to sentences where direct objects were present after the verb. The ability
to differentiate between these sentence types appears to develop between the ages
of 14 and 15 months. Unlike the 15-month-olds, the 14-month-olds in the sample
did not differentiate between overt object and object gap sentences. These results
are consistent with previous findings that basic argument structure knowledge— in
particular, the ability to encode verb transitivity properties, and use these properties
to predict an upcoming direct object — emerges around the age of 15-16 months
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(Jin & Fisher, 2014; Lidz et al., 2017).
Moreover, the 15-month-olds showed the same pattern of preference for both
basic declarative sentences and wh-object questions. For both sentence types, they
listened longer when the sentence had an object gap than when it had an overt
object after the verb. This is despite the fact that these sentence types have oppo-
site patterns of grammaticality. Object gaps are ungrammatical in declaratives with
transitive verbs but grammatical in wh-object questions; overt objects are grammat-
ical in declaratives with transitive verbs but ungrammatical in wh-object questions.
These differences in grammaticality arise because wh-object questions have a fronted
argument acting as the verb’s object, and that argument should not be pronounced
in canonical object position after the verb. By responding in the same way to overt
objects vs. object gaps in both sentence types, the 15-month-olds did not appear
to detect this non-local predicate-argument dependency in wh-questions. Instead,
they appeared to process these sentences in the same way as they processed basic
declarative clauses: by listening longer to object-gap sentences in both conditions,
they appeared to notice only when the verb’s requirement for an object was locally
violated. This supports the hypothesis from previous literature that 15-month-olds
respond to local verb transitivity violations in wh-questions, but do not yet repre-
sent fronted wh-phrases as arguments of the verb (Gagliardi et al., 2016; Perkins &
Lidz, under review).
15-month-olds’ preferences for sentences with object gaps could be interpreted
as a type of novelty preference. After familiarization to declarative sentences with
overt objects following transitive verbs, 15-month-olds then preferred to listen to
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sentences in which those objects were missing. I note that these results do not
differentiate between two alternative explanations for 15-month-olds’ behavior. On
the one hand, infants at this age may have developed knowledge of the transitiv-
ity requirements of these verbs prior to entering the lab, and their responses at test
reflected that prior knowledge rather than any new information gained during famil-
iarization. On this account, the familiarization phase may have only helped infants
deploy their prior knowledge of verb transitivity more efficiently during sentence
processing, by facilitating lexical access. On the other hand, these infants may have
had no prior knowledge of the transitivity of these verbs prior to our experiment, but
were able to efficiently encode this information over the course of the familiarization
phase. The first account is consistent with earlier work showing transitivity knowl-
edge around this age (Lidz et al., 2017), but further work is needed to differentiate
these accounts by testing infants without a familiarization phase.
In summary, the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the gap-driven
learning hypothesis. These results point towards a developmental stage in which
infants show sensitivity to verb argument structure, and respond to local argument
structure violations, but do not yet represent wh-phrases as arguments. However,
these results do not show that this task can detect when infants do represent wh-
phrases as arguments. By hypothesis, this ability develops between the ages of 15
and 20 months. In Experiment 2, I test this hypothesis by examining the behavior
of 17- and 18-month-old infants in the middle of this developmental window. If wh-
dependency representations indeed develop over this age range, and our measure
is sensitive to this development, then we should find that older infants are able to
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differentiate between declarative sentences and wh-questions.
3.3 Experiment 2: 17- and 18-month-olds
3.3.1 Method
Experiment 2 tested a sample of 17- and 18-month-old English learners using
the same listening time task as in Experiment 1. This age range was chosen in order
to determine the first point in development at which infants begin representing
wh-dependencies in wh-object questions. Because children begin producing their
first argument wh-questions around the age of 20 months (Rowland et al., 2003;
Stromswold, 1995) and reliably show comprehension of these questions at the same
age (Gagliardi et al., 2016; Seidl et al., 2003), it is likely that knowledge of these
dependencies may be emerging a couple of months earlier.
Participants. Participants in the current sample were 58 typically-developing
infants (32 males), 29 between the ages of 17;0 and 17;29 and 29 between the ages
of 18;0 and 18;29. Data collection is ongoing with a target n = 64. In the current
sample, mean participant age of the 17-month-olds was 17;13 and mean age of the
18-month-olds was 18;11. Participants were recruited from the greater Washington,
D.C. area and heard English during at least 80% of their waking hours. An addi-
tional 25 infants were tested but not included in the sample due to failing to complete
the full familiarization phase (5), failing to complete the full test phase (9), fussiness
or inattentiveness (5), parental interference during the study (3), or less than 80%
English exposure (3). Mean total productive vocabulary of the 17-month-olds was
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43.0 words and mean total productive vocabulary of the 18-month-olds was 90.5
words, as reported by parents on the the Words and Sentences MacArthur-Bates
Communicative Development Inventory (MCDI) (Fenson et al., 1993).
Materials and Procedure. The materials and procedure for Experiment
2 were identical to those in Experiment 1. Just as in Experiment 1, infants were
tested in two between-subjects conditions differing by sentence type (declaratives
and wh-questions), with trial type (overt object vs. object gap) manipulated within-
subjects.
Predictions. Under the hypothesis that infants in the 17- to 18-month age
range are beginning to represent wh-phrases as arguments in wh-questions, infants
should show different patterns of responses for wh-questions as compared to basic
declarative clauses. Infants should still differentiate between overt objects and object
gaps in declaratives, finding object gaps more surprising than overt objects following
transitive verbs. We still cannot predict the direction of infants’ listening time
preferences: infants at this age may prefer to listen to sentences they find surprising,
or to sentences they find unsurprising. But whichever direction their preference goes,
this preference should be reversed for wh-questions. If infants at this age know that
the wh-phrase is acting as the verb’s object, they should find overt objects more
surprising than object gaps in these questions, because the overt-object questions
have too many arguments. This predicts that an analysis of infants’ looking times
will find an interaction of trial type by condition.
Under the alternative hypothesis that 17- to 18-month-olds do not yet repre-
sent wh-phrases as arguments, they should show the same pattern of preference for
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both wh-questions and declarative clauses, like the 15-month-olds in Experiment 1.
This predicts that we will again find no effect of condition at this age.
3.3.2 Results
Fig. 3.3 plots infants’ mean total looking times during overt object and object
gap trials, as a function of condition and age in months. Visually, these plots
reveal that 17 and 18-month-olds behaved differently on our task. 17-month-olds do
not appear to differentiate between overt object and object gap trials regardless of
sentence type, whereas 18-month-olds appear to show a preference for overt objects
in declarative sentences and a preference for object gaps in wh-questions.
Figure 3.3: Looking Time by Trial Type, Condition, and Age, Exp. 2
Just as in Experiment 1, a preference score was calculated for each participant
by dividing total looking time during object gap trials by total looking time during
overt object trials and subtracting 1. Individual preference scores for Experiment
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Figure 3.4: Preference for Object Gap Trials by Condition and Age, Exp. 2
2 are plotted in Fig. 3.4 as a function of condition and age in months. A 2x2
ANOVA (condition x age in months) found a significant main effect of condition
(F (1, 54) = 5.15, p < 0.03) and a significant interaction of condition by age in
months (F (1, 54) = 5.28, p < 0.03). The main effect of condition appears to be
carried by 18-month-olds’ behavior, as supported by the interaction with age. Thus,
follow-up analyses examined each age group separately.
Follow-up analyses in each age group found that 18-month-olds showed sig-
nificantly different looking preferences in the two conditions (Welch’s t(27.0) =
3.45, p < 0.002), but 17-month-olds did not (Welch’s t(24.6) = 0.02, p < 0.98). 18-
month-olds’ preference scores in the declarative condition were significantly lower
than zero (t(13) = −2.42, p < 0.03), indicating a significant preference for overt ob-
ject trials. Conversely, 18-month-olds’ preference scores in the wh-question condition
were significantly greater than zero (t(14) = 2.47, p < 0.03), indicating a significant
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preference for object gap trials. These results show that 18-month-olds not only
differentiated between overt object and object gap trials, but also differentiated be-
tween declaratives and wh-questions: they had opposite trial type preferences for
these different sentence types.
3.3.3 Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 are consistent with the hypothesis that infants
by the age of 18 months not only show sensitivity to verb transitivity, but also begin
to represent wh-phrases as arguments in wh-questions. The 18-month-olds in the
sample showed different listening preferences for direct objects in basic declarative
clauses compared to wh-object questions. They listened longer to declarative sen-
tences in which transitive verbs had following direct objects, compared to when those
verbs were missing direct objects. Conversely, they listened longer to wh-object
questions in which transitive verbs did not have following direct objects, compared
to when an object was present after the verb. Their listening time therefore pat-
terns together with the differences in grammaticality between these sentence types:
18-month-olds listened longer to grammatical than to ungrammatical sentences.
These results indicate that the 18-month-olds had acquired more mature knowl-
edge about the grammar of wh-questions in English, compared to the 15-month-olds
in Experiment 1. Specifically, the 18-month-olds no longer responded in the same
way when a transitive verb is locally missing its object in a wh-object question,
compared to in a declarative clause. Instead, they acted as if they knew that an
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object gap is grammatical in a wh-object question, and a locally present overt ob-
ject is ungrammatical. This suggests that these infants had learned that the fronted
wh-phrase is acting as that object, satisfying the verb’s transitivity requirement
non-locally.
This ability appears to develop within the age range I tested. Only the 18-
month-olds in the sample appeared to differentiate between declaratives and wh-
questions; the 17-month-olds in the sample did not show this same ability. Indeed, I
did not find that the 17-month-olds, in aggregate, discriminated between object gap
and overt object trials for either sentence type. It is possible that this age range cap-
tures an intermediate window of development, in which some infants have acquired
more mature knowledge of these sentence types and some are still in the process of
acquiring that knowledge. 17-month-olds show larger variability than 18-month-olds
in their preference scores in Fig. 3.4, with few infants showing a preference of zero;
instead, these preferences seem to span a wide range above and below chance. If
these data were due to a heterogenous population at this age, aggregating across
preference scores would lead to the appearance of at-chance behavior. However,
because sentence type was manipulated between-subjects, it is not possible to tell
in the current design whether some of these infants would show the same patterns
of preference for both sentence types, and others would differentiate between them.
Future work testing sentence type within-subjects would help address this issue and
illuminate the development occurring between 15 and 18 months.
Interestingly, where the 15-month-olds in Experiment 1 showed a novelty pref-
erence for object gaps in declarative clauses, the 18-month-olds showed a familiarity
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preference: they listened longer to overt objects in declarative clauses. It is not
immediately apparent why this difference arose, but I note that it is not very well-
understood when infants will display a novelty or a familiarity preference in a looking
or listening-time task (DePaolis et al., 2016; Houston-Price & Nakai, 2004). Stimu-
lus complexity, age of participant, and type and length of familiarization phase are
all factors known to affect these preference types, but do so in complex interacting
ways (e.g. Colombo & Bundy, 1983; Hunter & Ames, 1988; Wagner & Sakovits,
1986). In the current task, there are many possibilities for why these two age groups
may have shown different preference types. For instance, 18-month-olds may have
processed not only the wh-questions but also the declarative sentences in a qualita-
tively different manner than the 15-month-olds, or may have responded differently
to the type and amount of familiarization that was provided. Further investigation
without a familiarization phase may help eliminate one of these potential factors.
Nonetheless, what is important in this design is not what type of preference infants
display, but whether they show different patterns of preference for declaratives and
wh-questions. The finding that 15-month-olds prefer object gaps to the same extent
in both sentence types, whereas 18-month-olds show different patterns of preference
depending on sentence type, suggests that grammatical development has occurred
between these two ages.
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3.4 General Discussion
This chapter investigates a chicken-and-egg problem in early grammar acqui-
sition. Learners rely on argument relations like ‘subject’ and ‘object’ to bootstrap
into the core argument structure and clause structure properties of their language.
But it is not trivial to identify these relations in non-basic clauses, in which trans-
formations have applied to displace arguments from their canonical positions. If
learners could identify argument displacement in these sentences, then they could
avoid being misled when drawing bootstrapping inferences about verbs and clause
structure. Or, if infants could identify the basic argument structure of some fre-
quent verbs in their language, then they might be able to detect when arguments
have been displaced. Here, I aim to answer the chicken-and-egg question: which
comes first, argument structure or non-basic clause syntax?
The experiments in this chapter provide new empirical evidence that argument
structure acquisition comes first. 15-month-olds were sensitive to the argument
structure requirements of common transitive verbs: they discriminated sentences
in which the verb’s object appeared in canonical object position from sentences in
which it was missing in that position. However, they did not respond differently to
sentences where that object appeared in a non-canonical position as a fronted wh-
phrase. Only the 18-month-olds showed this ability. They differentiated between
object gaps in wh-object questions, in which the verb’s requirement for a direct
object is being satisfied non-locally, and object gaps in declarative clauses, in which
the verb does not have a direct object at all. Thus, 18-month-olds’ different listening
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preferences for these sentence types demonstrated that they had acquired knowledge
of both the local and non-local predicate-argument dependencies in these sentences.
This work contributes two novel findings. First, it provides new evidence that
infants’ wh-question representations develop over the second year of life, and iden-
tifies the first age at which argument displacement is represented. Infants appear to
represent the non-local predicate-argument dependencies in wh-questions about two
months before they begin to produce these sentences in their own speech (Rowland
et al., 2003; Stromswold, 1995). Second, it provides new evidence that this ability
developmentally follows argument structure acquisition, a hypothesis that had only
indirect support from prior work (Gagliardi et al., 2016; Perkins & Lidz, under re-
view). At 15 months, infants detect local verb argument structure violations, but
not until 18 months do they appear to represent fronted wh-phrases as arguments.
However, as these results come from a new experimental paradigm, additional
converging evidence is needed to show that they reflect the developmental change
I propose. These results are consistent with prior work showing the development
of argument structure knowledge around the age of 15 months (Jin & Fisher, 2014;
Lidz et al., 2017), and the development of wh-dependency comprehension between
15 and 20 months (Gagliardi et al., 2016; Perkins & Lidz, under review; Seidl et
al., 2003). Further work will aim to reproduce the current findings with a modified
experimental task in order to better understand the differences observed across this
age range. In particular, the familiarization phase in the current task may have
introduced complications for interpreting the results. This phase may have been
processed differently by the two age groups that were tested.
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Moreover, because the wh-question test stimuli were less similar to the fa-
miliarization stimuli than were the declaratives, it is possible that these differences
between familiarization and test may have influenced what preference type— novelty
or familiarity— was displayed across conditions. These differences across conditions
were minimized as much as possible by introducing a new visual stimulus at test,
and by controlling the number of noun phrases in both sentence types. This helps
justify the inference that preferences in the same direction reflect the same underly-
ing processing of the two types of sentences, and preferences in opposite directions
reflect different types of processing. However, I cannot rule out the possibility that
these preference directions were also affected by the change from familiarization to
test in the current design. Further investigation with no familiarization phase, or
with a better control for complexity between the familiarization and test phases,
will address these issues.
These findings help illuminate how syntactic representations develop and inter-
act with infants’ comprehension abilities. The 15-month-olds in our study are able
to detect argument gaps— unexpectedly missing arguments of transitive verbs— but
do not yet appear to represent the wh-dependency between the fronted wh-phrase
and the verb in a wh-question. Nonetheless, 15-month-olds in prior comprehen-
sion studies act as if they can comprehend these questions (Gagliardi et al., 2016;
Perkins & Lidz, under review), indicating that they are bootstrapping some aspect
of sentence meaning from a partial or non-adultlike sentence representation.
The current findings do not tell us exactly how 15-month-olds represent the
wh-questions in our task. However, both these findings and prior results can be
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explained if infants represent at least the verb with one locally identified argument
and an argument gap. In the tasks in Gagliardi et al. (2016) and Perkins and Lidz
(under review), an infant who heard Which dog did the cat bump? may have been
able to identify the local subject for the verb bump, and may have further expected
an object for this verb even though it was not present in its canonical position. This
partial parse, together with an understanding of how grammatical relations link to
thematic relations, may have allowed infants to infer some aspects of the sentence
meaning: there was an event of bumping by a cat, and this also likely involved
something that was bumped, even though that relation was realized by an overt
post-verbal object. In the experimental context, an infant could guess that she was
being directed to find the image or video that best matched this partial sentence
representation. If only two choices existed— a dog who was a bumper, and a dog
who got bumped— the infant might have guessed that she was being asked to find
the animal that bore the relation of ‘thing bumped’ in the event of bumping by the
cat.
That is, infants in prior preferential looking tasks may have intuited that the
experimental task was to locate the object or event that could link in an appropriate
way to their incomplete syntactic representation, and fill in the gaps. Further work
is needed to support this hypothesis, and to specify the nature of that syntactic
representation. In particular, do 15-month-olds ignore the fronted wh-phrase in
these questions, or do they parse it in some fashion but fail to integrate it into the
rest of their sentence representation, or do they integrate it into a representation that
is not fully adult-like? This speaks to the broader question of how infants at very
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early stages of syntactic development might bootstrap aspects of sentence meaning
from partial syntactic representations, in combination with top-down information
about the discourse context.
Furthermore, the finding that argument structure knowledge is developmen-
tally prior to wh-dependency representations is consistent with the hypothesis that
non-basic clause acquisition is gap-driven. By hypothesis, 15-month-olds’ ability
to detect argument gaps drives their search for non-local predicate-argument de-
pendencies in these sentences, allowing them to eventually discover the signals of
wh-movement and other forms of argument movement in their language. However,
this developmental trajectory introduces an apparent paradox. Learners acquire
verb transitivity before they can recognize arguments in non-canonical positions,
arguably because identifying the structure of non-basic clauses depends on knowing
which verbs are transitive. But how do learners accurately identify which verbs are
transitive in order to parse non-basic clauses, if those sentences themselves provide
misleading data for learning verb transitivity? What enables learners to avoid be-
ing misled by non-basic clauses in their input, at the stage at which they do not
recognize that they are non-basic?
Thus, the empirical results in this chapter help answer the question of which
comes first, argument structure or non-basic clause syntax, but they do not show
how learners find their way out of this chicken-and-egg problem. In Chapters 4 and
5, I propose a computational account for how this learning succeeds. In Chapter
4, I focus on the first step of learning, and show that it is in principle possible for
learners to accurately identify argument structure even before they can recognize
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non-basic clauses in their input. In Chapter 5, I model how learners might use that
argument structure knowledge to identify the surface forms of non-basic clause types
in their language. These models provide an account of the learning mechanisms that
learners could recruit in order to incrementally build on their prior linguistic knowl-
edge, and draw the right grammatical generalizations from partial and immature
representations of their input.
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Chapter 4: Filtering Input for Transitivity Acquisition
4.1 Background
The experimental findings in Chapter 3 point towards the following devel-
opmental trajectory for verb argument structure and non-basic clause acquisition.
Infants as young as 15 months show emerging knowledge of the basic argument-
taking properties of verbs in their language, such as transitivity. These first steps
of verb learning appear to take place before infants recognize displaced arguments
in common non-basic clause types, such as the wh-question in (1).
(1) What did Amy fix?
This developmental trajectory is consistent with the hypothesis that verb ar-
gument structure knowledge bootstraps the acquisition of non-basic clause syntax.
It may be the case that learning to identify argument movement in non-basic clauses
depends on knowing when verbs require particular arguments: learning that what is
the object of fix in (1) may depend on knowing that fix takes a direct object. Here,
I computationally investigate the specific learning mechanisms that this hypothesis
would require. To begin, I address how the first steps of learning attested empirically
are even possible. How can learners begin acquiring the argument-taking properties
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of verbs when they do not yet recognize displaced arguments in non-basic clauses?
How do they learn the transitivity of a verb like fix when their input contains sen-
tences like (1), which they cannot yet recognize as transitive?
I propose that learners need a mechanism to avoid being misled by non-basic
clauses in their input, at the developmental stage when they are bootstrapping
into the basic argument structure and clause structure properties of their language.
In this chapter, I present a computational model that learns to filter its data in
order to infer verb transitivity, effectively ignoring misleading data from non-basic
clauses without knowing what non-basic clauses look like. The model instantiates
a learner that considers the possibility that its data contains some amount of noise,
because it does not have the grammatical knowledge to accurately represent all of
the sentences it hears. The learner infers what portion of its data is signal and
what portion is noise in order to identify the transitivity of verbs in its input. This
mechanism, in principle, provides a way for learners to cope with their own immature
representations of their input, and to draw the right grammatical generalizations
even when those representations are incomplete and inaccurate.
4.1.1 Filtering
I follow a solution that has been assumed by both syntactic and semantic
bootstrapping theories: learners have a way to bootstrap into the core argument
structure properties of their language primarily using data from basic clauses, in
which core arguments are easier to identify and correspondence relations between
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syntax and meaning will hold more reliably (Gleitman, 1990; Lidz & Gleitman,
2004a, 2004b; Pinker, 1984, 1989). Under this approach, first proposed by Pinker in
his earliest work on semantic bootstrapping (Pinker, 1984), children somehow “filter
out” non-basic clauses from their bootstrapping data. That is, they avoid learning
about verb meanings, argument structure, and clause structure from sentences with
argument displacement, because these sentences obscure the meaning-distribution
relations that bootstrapping relies on (Gleitman, 1990; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a,
2004b; Pinker, 1984, 1989).
This approach has implicitly assumed that learners know which sentences to
filter out, but the mechanism by which they identify these sentences has not yet
been established. Pinker (1984) proposes two options. Either parents might do the
filtering and avoid producing these sentences in their children’s presence, or children
might internally filter these sentences themselves. As noted in the previous chapter,
parental filtering does not seem to occur: wh-questions are prevalent in the input
to 1-year-old infants (Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2003; Newport et
al., 1977; Stromswold, 1995). The second logical solution is for children to filter
out non-basic clauses themselves. This approach implicitly assumes that children
know which sentences to filter out. But this solution risks being circular. Learners
need to filter non-basic clauses in order to learn argument structure, but argument
structure knowledge comes developmentally before infants can identify the structure
of non-basic clauses, and may even be needed for that learning to take place. How
can learners identify non-basic clauses in order to filter them, if they do not know
yet what argument displacement looks like in their language?
123
Pinker (1984, 1989) argues that this circularity can be avoided if children
can use non-syntactic cues to flag certain utterances as likely to contain non-basic
clauses, without recognizing the structure of those clauses. These cues might include
“special intonation, extra marking of the verb, presuppositions set up by the pre-
ceding discourse or the context, nonlinguistic signals of the interrogative or negative
illocutionary force of an utterance” (Pinker, 1984). The challenge with this solution
is identifying how learners know which cues to use. Attempting to define the criteria
by which children should filter their input creates its own learning problem: this
introduces a new set of categories which the learner must know to track, and which
in many cases may be far from transparent (Gleitman, 1990).
One might imagine the following solution to the circularity problem: perhaps
learners acquire non-basic clause syntax and verb argument structure by attempting
to learn both of these phenomena at the same time. This simultaneous learning
hypothesis may be possible, but I choose to model a different hypothesis instead,
one that allows learning to take place in incremental steps over development. This
solution does not require learners to know the criteria for identifying non-basic
clauses in order to learn verbs. One way of thinking about this is that it provides
learners with a way of arriving at a fruitful starting point from which a subsequent
joint learning process might proceed—an initial wedge into the system.
Here, I present computational solution for how a learner might, in principle,
filter its input to infer verb transitivity, without knowing what types of sentences
it should filter out. This solution proposes that young learners implicitly assume
that they will not accurately parse everything they hear, and expect that their data
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will contain a certain amount of noise: erroneous parses that they shouldn’t trust
for the purposes of verb learning. Children might be able to learn the right way
to filter erroneous parses out of their input in order to solve a particular learning
problem— in this case, jointly inferring verb transitivity along with how much of
their data to trust in making that inference. Crucially, this solution doesn’t require
learners to know where those errors came from, thereby sidestepping the problem
of which cues learners should track for identifying non-basic clauses. Under this
approach, children might filter non-basic clauses from the data they use for verb
learning without knowing that they are non-basic clauses. This will allow them to
use relations between syntax and meaning to bootstrap into the target grammatical
system, even though they do not yet know when those relations are masked by other
grammatical properties of the language.
4.1.2 Computational Models of Verb Learning
I adopt a Bayesian framework, in which a learner observes a data pattern and
infers the probability of some properties of the system that may have generated
that data. This framework conveniently allows us to specify the alternative systems
(verb transitivity properties vs. erroneous parses) that the learner considers for the
verb distributions it observes.
The model follows previous Bayesian approaches to argument structure acqui-
sition (Alishahi & Stevenson, 2008; Barak, Fazly, & Stevenson, 2014; Parisien &
Stevenson, 2010; Perfors, Tenenbaum, & Wonnacott, 2010), but considers a differ-
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ent problem than the one explored in that literature. The goal of the learners in
Alishahi and Stevenson (2008) and Perfors et al. (2010) is to identify which verb
classes exist in the language, and how verbs in those classes generalize across syntac-
tic frames. The acquisition phenomenon being modelled— the over-generalization
of verbs across argument structures that they do not actually participate in— is
a stage of verb learning in preschool-aged children who are older than the infant
bootstrappers discussed in the current work. This behavior is the output of at least
three logically independent steps of learning: (1) perceiving how verbs distribute in
particular syntactic frames; (2) performing an initial classification of verbs according
to their argument-taking properties, e.g., as one-, two-, or three-place predicates;
and finally (3) identifying how productively verbs in a class can generalize across
different types of argument structures, e.g., from the prepositional dative to the
double-object dative. The primary focus of prior models is the third step of learn-
ing, but I am concerned with the earlier processes involved in the first two steps.
In particular, I ask how learners are able to establish a veridical percept of verbs’
syntactic distributions, when they may not have the linguistic knowledge to reliably
identify syntactic arguments in non-basic clauses.
This question has not yet been answered in previous models of argument struc-
ture acquisition, in which a learner’s ability to veridically represent its input has been
largely assumed. Alishahi and Stevenson (2008) acknowledge that this assumption
is most likely unrealistic, and simulate noise in their learner’s syntactic representa-
tions by randomly removing some of the distributional features that it learns from.
Yet the “noise” faced by a learner in real life is not random. As the authors note,
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“A more accurate approach must be based on careful study of the types of noise
that can be observed in child-directed data, and their relative frequency” (Alishahi
& Stevenson, 2008). This invites us to consider the ways in which learners might
mis-perceive the data in their input, and how a learner can avoid being misled by
that data when identifying a verb’s basic syntactic distribution in the language.
Other previous computational models have investigated how learners might
bootstrap between syntactic and conceptual representations, using conceptual struc-
ture to identify the core grammatical rules and word order properties of the language,
and then using syntactic structure to infer the meaning of words and utterances
(Abend, Kwiatkowski, Smith, Goldwater, & Steedman, 2017; Kwiatkowski, Gold-
water, Zettlemoyer, & Steedman, 2012; Maurits, Perfors, & Navarro, 2009). While
shedding light on how semantic and syntactic bootstrapping might proceed in tan-
dem, these models still presuppose the step of learning that concerns this chapter:
how a learner gains access to either type of representation, syntactic or conceptual,
that it uses in these bootstrapping inferences. I focus on the learner’s syntactic
percept, but in doing so, do not deny that learners might simultaneously make use
of both syntactic and conceptual information. My goal is simply to ask how far a
learner can get in identifying a verb’s argument-taking properties on the basis of its
syntactic distributions, when those distributions may not be accurately perceived.
In the experiments below, I test the computational feasibility of this proposed
solution: whether a learner could, in principle, jointly infer verb transitivity along
with the parameters for filtering errorful sentence representations from the data it
uses for learning. In Simulation 1, I demonstrate that a learner can accomplish this
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joint inference on the basis of the syntactic distributions of frequent English action
verbs in child-directed speech. The learner performs this inference using only rates
of overt direct objects after verbs, and does not condition on any other utterance
features, such as wh-words, prosody, or extra-linguistic discourse context; it suc-
ceeds even though it cannot distinguish object wh-questions from basic intransitive
clauses. In Simulation 2, I ask how much the learner’s performance in Simulation
1 depended on its a priori assumption that transitive, intransitive, and alternating
verbs are equally likely. I show that the learner performs no better when it assumes
these categories will occur in the proportions in which they actually do occur in
child-directed English. However, it does not differentiate transitivity categories as
well when it is extremely biased towards the alternating class, showing that the de-
terministic categories must be weighted sufficiently in the model’s hypothesis space
in order to be identified in its input. Thus, I provide a proof of concept that a child
may be able to filter non-basic clauses from her input in order to correctly identify
verbs’ argument structure properties, without knowing in advance which clauses are
non-basic. This inference requires prior knowledge about what types of transitivity
properties a verb might display, but but does not require specific knowledge about
the frequency of those transitivity categories in the learner’s target language.
4.2 Model
I present a Bayesian model that learns how to filter its input in order to infer
verb transitivity. The learner performs this inference only on the basis of observing
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how verbs distribute with and without direct objects, and does not use any other
syntactic or non-syntactic cues to identify its filter. Instead, the learner assumes
that some of its parses are not trustworthy sources of information for learning its
language, because it does not have enough linguistic knowledge to accurately parse
every sentence in its input. The learner infers the right way to filter erroneous parses
out of the data it uses for verb learning, without knowing why those parses were
erroneous.
In this section, I first specify the generative model, which encodes the learner’s
assumptions about how its direct object observations are generated. Then, I specify
how the learner jointly infers verb transitivity along with the parameters for filtering
its input, given its data. In the following sections, I present simulations demonstrat-
ing that this joint inference is successful when tested on child-directed speech. I do
not claim that the Bayesian inference performed by our model represents the ex-
act algorithms performed by child learners. Although there is substantial literature
on young children’s statistical inference capabilities (Gómez & Gerken, 2000), this
model is intended only as a proof of concept that such joint inference is possible.
However, although this model may not provide a realistic implementation of the
inference process that children use, it provides a more realistic account than pre-
vious models of the steps of learning involved in bootstrapping: specifically, how
learners establish a veridical percept of verbs’ syntactic distributions, in order to
enable further bootstrapping inferences.
129
4.2.1 Generative Model
A generative model represents a learner’s assumptions about the processes
that generated its observed data. In our case, the observed data are counts of direct
objects with particular verbs, as the learner represents them; specifically, the learner
tracks how frequently it represents an overt direct object or no overt direct object
following the verb. It assumes that there are two reasons why it might observe direct
objects or no direct objects. On one hand, the transitivity of the verb determines
whether it always, never, or sometimes takes a direct object. This means that
the rate of direct objects following the verb gives the learner evidence for inferring
whether the verb is transitive, intransitive, or alternating. But on the other hand,
the learner might also mis-perceive whether a direct object is present, because it
lacks the grammatical knowledge to identify the full structure of some sentences in
its input. If this is the case, some of the observed data points might not reflect the
true transitivity of the verb and should be filtered from the data that the learner uses
to infer transitivity. Thus, there is some probability of error in the learner’s direct
object observations, and our learner infers two parameters for filtering this error:
how frequently mis-parses of sentences occur, and whether the learner is more likely
to miss a direct object that is underlyingly present or mistake another constituent
for a direct object.
Figure 4.1 provides the graphical model for the learner. The model’s observa-
tions of direct objects or no direct objects are formalized as the Bernoulli random
variable X. Each X(v) represents an observation from a sentence containing verb
130
Figure 4.1: Graphical Model
v in the model’s input, with a value of 1 if the sentence contains a direct object
and 0 if it does not. These observations of direct objects can be generated by two
processes: the transitivity of verb v, represented by the variables T and θ in the
upper half of the model, or an erroneous parse of the sentence, represented by the
variables e, ε, and δ in the lower half of the model. I will describe each of these
processes in turn.
In the upper half of the model, each X(v) is conditioned on the parameter
θ(v), a continuous random variable defined for values from 0 to 1 inclusive. This
parameter controls how frequently a verb v will be used with a direct object: the
learner assumes that for every observation X(v), a biased coin is flipped to deter-
mine whether the sentence contains a direct object, with probability θ(v), or does
not, with probability 1−θ(v). The parameter θ(v) is conditioned on the variable T (v),
which represents the transitivity of verb v. T is a discrete random variable that can
take on three values, corresponding to transitive, intransitive, and alternating verbs.
Each of these values determines a different distribution over θ. For the transitive
131
category of T , θ always equals 1: the verb should always occur with a direct object.
For the intransitive category, θ always equals 0: the verb should never occur with a
direct object. For the alternating category, θ takes a value between 0 and 1 inclusive.
The prior probability distribution over θ in this case is a uniform Beta(1, 1) distri-
bution. The learner begins with the simplifying assumption that all three values of
T have equal prior probability— that is, the learner assumes that any verb in the
language is equally likely a priori to be transitive, intransitive, or alternating. In
later simulations, I explore the model’s behavior when this assumption is changed.
In the lower half of the model, each X is conditioned on a Bernoulli random
variable e, which represents the input filter. If e
(v)
i = 0, the observation in X
(v)
i was
generated by θ(v) and T (v), and accurately reflects the transitivity of verb v. But if
e
(v)
i = 1, the observation in X
(v)
i was generated by an erroneous parse (henceforth
an “error”), meaning the learner did not have adequate grammatical knowledge to
parse the sentence correctly. This observation was not generated by θ(v) and T (v),
and may not accurately reflect the transitivity of verb v, so it should be ignored
for the purpose of inferring T (v). Each e(v) is conditioned on the variable ε, which
represents the probability of an erroneous parse occurring for any sentence in the
input. The model learns a single parameter value for ε across all verbs.
The second parameter of the input filter is δ, which represents the probability
of observing a direct object when an observation was generated in error. Thus,
whether a sentence contains a direct object or no direct object depends on one
of two biased coins. If e
(v)
i = 0 and the observation accurately reflects the verb’s
transitivity properties, then one biased coin is flipped and the sentence contains a
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direct object with probability θ(v). If e
(v)
i = 1 and the observation was generated
in error, then a different biased coin is flipped and the sentence contains a direct
object with probability δ. Like ε, δ is a shared parameter across all verbs. Both ε
and δ are assumed to have a uniform Beta(1, 1) prior distribution.
4.2.2 Joint Inference
The learner uses Gibbs sampling (Geman & Geman, 1984) to jointly infer
the transitivity of each verb (T ) and the two parameters of the input filter (ε and
δ). In this form of sampling, we start with randomly-initialized values for ε and
δ, and use those values to calculate the posterior probability of each transitivity
category T for each verb, given the observed data and those filter parameters. We
sample values for T from this posterior probability distribution. Then, we use the
sampled transitivity categories to sample new values for ε and δ from estimates of
their posterior probability distributions. This cycle is repeated over many iterations
until the model converges to a stable distribution over T , ε and δ, which represents
the optimal joint probability solution for these three variables. See Appendix A for
details of the sampling procedure.
4.3 Simulation 1
In Simulation 1, I ask whether inferring the parameters of an input filter will
allow a learner to accurately identify the transitivity categories of verbs in the speech
that children hear. I tested the joint inference model on a dataset containing dis-
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Corpus #Children Ages #Words #Sentences
Brown: Adam, Eve, Sarah (Brown, 1973) 3 1;6-5;1 391,848 87,473
Soderstrom (Soderstrom et al., (2008)) 2 0;6-1;0 90,608 24,130
Suppes (Suppes, 1974) 1 1;11-3;11 197,620 35,904
Valian (Valian, 1991) 21 1;9-2;8 123,112 25,551
Table 4.1: Corpora of Child-Directed Speech
tributions of the 50 most frequent transitive, intransitive, and alternating verbs in
corpora of child-directed speech. In order to determine whether this inference is suc-
cessful, I compare the model’s performance to an oracle model that already knows
appropriate parameters for filtering its input, and baseline models with inappropri-
ate filter parameters.
4.3.1 Data
A dataset was prepared from four corpora selected from the CHILDES Tree-
bank (Pearl & Sprouse, 2013). This resource provides parse trees for several corpora
of child-directed speech on CHILDES (MacWhinney, 2000), generated by the Char-
niak or Stanford parser and hand-checked by undergraduates. The selected corpora
contain 803,188 words of child-directed speech, heard by 27 children between the
ages of 6 months and 5 years. See Table 4.1 for corpus details.
The dataset was created by extracting sentences with the 50 most frequent
action verbs in these corpora that could be characterized as transitive, intransitive,
or alternating. Verbs with other argument-taking properties were excluded, such as
obligatorily ditransitive verbs or those that frequently take clausal or verbal com-
plements: mental state verbs (e.g. want), aspectual verbs (e.g. start), modals (e.g.
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should), auxiliaries (e.g. have), and light verbs (e.g. take).1 The selected 50 verbs
were then sorted into transitive, intransitive, and alternating categories according to
the English verb classes described in Levin (1993), supplemented by native speaker
intuitions for verbs not represented in that work. These classes provide a target
for learning meant to align with adult speaker intuitions, independent of the cor-
pus data that the model learns from. The transitive and intransitive categories are
conservative; any verb that could occur in a transitivity alternation was classified
as alternating, regardless of the frequency or type of alternation. So, verbs like
jump are considered alternating even though they occur infrequently in their pos-
sible transitive uses (e.g. jump the horses over the fence). These target categories
thus set a very high bar for our model to reach.
An automated search was then conducted over the Treebank trees for the total
occurrences of each verb in the corpora, in all inflections, and the total occurrences
with overt direct objects following the verb (right NP sisters of V). These direct
object counts included basic transitive clauses, but not wh-object questions or any
other sentences with object gaps. Thus, we assume a learner who uses the canonical
word order properties of English to identify direct objects when they occur after
verbs, but does not yet know how to identify arguments in non-canonical positions.
Table 4.2 lists the complete dataset provided to the learner: counts of the selected
50 verbs, along with their counts of overt post-verbal direct objects. For legibility
I also report the percentages of direct objects with each verb, although this model
1Verbs with these other argument-taking properties were excluded for the sake of simplicity, as I
am only modelling the acquisition of transitivity. Modelling the learning of other argument-taking
properties would require expanding the learner’s hypothesis space to include many more argument
structure categories and alternations, a complex problem I leave for future work.
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Verb Total # DO % DO
Transitive Verbs
feed 220 205 0.93
fix 337 305 0.91
bring 605 541 0.89
throw 312 275 0.88
hit 214 187 0.87
buy 358 299 0.84
catch 185 141 0.76
hold 579 406 0.70
wear 477 287 0.60
Alternating Verbs
pick 331 299 0.90
drop 169 149 0.88
lose 185 160 0.86
close 166 141 0.85
touch 183 153 0.84
leave 356 297 0.83
wash 195 161 0.83
pull 331 268 0.81
push 352 274 0.78
open 342 265 0.77
cut 263 198 0.75
bite 191 140 0.73
turn 485 350 0.72
build 299 215 0.72
knock 160 115 0.72
read 509 350 0.69
Verb Total # DO % DO
Alternating Verbs, cont.
break 550 347 0.63
drink 366 221 0.60
eat 1318 777 0.59
sing 306 161 0.53
blow 255 132 0.52
draw 375 193 0.51
move 238 112 0.47
ride 281 114 0.41
hang 151 53 0.35
stick 192 57 0.29
write 583 155 0.27
fit 227 49 0.22
play 1568 308 0.19
stand 294 21 0.07
run 228 13 0.06
walk 253 11 0.04
jump 197 8 0.04
swim 180 7 0.04
sit 859 11 0.01
Intransitive Verbs
wait 383 57 0.15
work 256 11 0.04
cry 275 8 0.03
sleep 451 13 0.03
stay 308 4 0.01
fall 605 3 0.00
Table 4.2: Dataset: Uses with Overt Direct Objects (DO) of 50 Verbs
learns from raw counts rather than percentages.
4.3.2 Results
Verb Transitivity Inference. The joint inference model infers a probability
distribution over transitivity categories for each verb in its dataset. These distri-
butions are displayed in Figure 4.2. Black bars represent the posterior probability
assigned to the transitive category, dark gray bars represent the probability assigned
to the intransitive category, and light gray bars represent the probability assigned
to the alternating category. The target categories for each verb are shown below the
horizontal axis.
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Figure 4.2: Posterior Distributions over Verb Categories (T ), Joint Inference Model
Accuracy was calculated by determining which transitivity category was as-
signed highest probability to each verb by our model, and comparing these category
assignments to the target categories for each verb. The percentage of verbs catego-
rized correctly by the model is reported in Table 4.3. Overall, the model infers the
correct transitivity properties for 2/3 of the verbs in our dataset. This is substan-
tially better than chance performance: a model that randomly assigned categories
to verbs would achieve 33% accuracy, because there are three possible options for
each verb. The joint inference model performs significantly better on each verb
class, and nearly twice as well overall.
The model achieves highest accuracy in categorizing the intransitive verbs: for
all but one of these verbs, the model assigns highest probability to the intransitive
Model % Transitive % Intransitive % Alternating % Total Verbs
Joint Inference 0.67 0.83 0.63 0.66
Oracle 0.78 0.83 0.51 0.60
No-Filter Baseline 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.70
Chance 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Table 4.3: Percentages of Verbs Categorized Correctly, Simulation 1
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category. The exception is the verb wait, which the model assigns highest probability
under the alternating category. This is due to prevalent uses of wait with temporal
adjuncts, as in wait a minute, that were indistinguishable from NP direct objects
in the CHILDES Treebank parse trees. Thus, a learner who cannot differentiate
these adjuncts from direct objects would infer that wait is an alternating rather
than intransitive verb.2
The model assigns 6 out of the 9 transitive verbs highest probability under the
transitive category. Three transitive verbs are assigned highest probability under
the alternating rather than the transitive category: catch, hold, and wear. This is
likely because these verbs display different behavior than the other transitive verbs
in the corpus. The verb hold occurs frequently in verb-particle constructions (e.g.
hold on), which might be treated differently than simple verbs by learners. The
verbs catch and wear appear to occur at much higher rates than other transitive
verbs in non-basic clauses: catch occurs frequently in passives (e.g. get caught), and
wear occurs frequently in wh-object questions (e.g. what are you wearing? ). I leave
for future work the question of whether children likewise mis-classify these verbs,
or whether they can accommodate their different distributional behavior by using
more sophisticated information than our modeled learner.
The model assigns highest probability for most of the alternating verbs to the
alternating verb category. There are 13 exceptions. The verbs pick, drop, lose, close,
touch, leave, and wash are assigned highest probability under the transitive category
2We can tell that a minute is not a direct object by observing that it can occur non-adjacent
to the verb, which is not generally the case for direct objects in English: compare *Fix here the
car vs. Wait here a minute. Furthermore, direct objects can generally be passivized, but a minute
resists passivization: The car was fixed vs. *A minute was waited.
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because they infrequently occur in their possible intransitive uses in child-directed
speech. The verb pull is assigned equal probability under the transitive and alter-
nating categories for the same reason. (This verb was not considered to be correctly
assigned to the alternating category in the accuracy calculation.) The verbs run,
swim, walk, jump, and sit are assigned highest probability under the intransitive cat-
egory because these verbs very infrequently occur in their possible transitive uses.3
Thus, the model over-regularizes the alternating verbs that alternate infrequently,
preferring the transitive and intransitive verb categories.
Filter Parameter Inference. Recall that the model identifies verb transitiv-
ity categories by jointly inferring parameters for filtering its input. These parameters
are ε, which represents the frequency of erroneous parses, and δ, which represents
whether those errors are likely to cause direct objects to go missing, or to spuriously
appear. Figure 4.3 displays the posterior probability distributions inferred by the
model for ε and δ. In order to evaluate the model’s inference of these parameters,
we can estimate their true value in our dataset. The proportion of transitive verbs
with missing overt post-verbal direct objects in the dataset gives us an estimate of
(1−δ)×ε, and the proportion of intransitive verbs with spurious direct objects (e.g.
wait a minute) gives us an estimate of δ × ε. Solving these two equations, we find
that δ = 0.18 and ε = 0.24. The posterior probability distribution over δ inferred by
the model has a mean of 0.25, and the probability distribution over ε has a mean of
3Note that four out of these five verbs are manner of motion verbs (run, swim, walk, jump),
and their transitive uses do not typically involve agent-patient relations (e.g., walk a mile, swim
the channel, jump the turnstile). Even when a causative meaning may be used, as in the case
of jump the horse, this implies less direct causation than a typical alternating verb such as break
or open. So, even though the conservative target categories treated these verbs as alternating, in
some ways they behave more typically like intransitives.
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Figure 4.3: Posterior Distributions over ε and δ, Simulation 1
0.19. The model thus slightly over-estimates the value of δ and under-estimates the
value of ε, but it infers values for these parameters that are close to the true values
in the corpus.
4.3.3 Model Comparisons
Oracle Model. The primary contribution of the joint inference model is
demonstrating that a learner can filter its input without knowing anything in ad-
vance about what needs to be filtered out. Therefore, it makes sense to compare
this model against an “oracle” that knows a lot about what needs to be filtered out.
I instantiated an oracle model in which δ is fixed to 0.18 and ε to 0.24 in order to
reflect their true values in the dataset, as estimated in the previous section. This
oracle model thus knows the parameters for the input filter in advance: it knows
how frequently erroneous parses are likely to occur, and how they will behave. By
comparing the joint inference model to this oracle, we can determine whether our
model’s performance is impaired by having to learn these parameters.
The posterior probability distributions over verb categories inferred by the
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Figure 4.4: Posterior Distributions over Verb Categories (T ), Oracle Model
oracle model are displayed in Figure 4.4. The posterior probabilities inferred by
the oracle are less graded than those inferred by our joint inference model; this
is unsurprising, as the oracle considers only one value each for δ and ε instead of
sampling over multiple values. But when considering which transitivity category is
assigned highest probability to each verb, the two models classify most of these verbs
in the same way. The joint inference model classifies intransitive verbs identically
to the oracle model, and performs almost as well with transitive verbs: the oracle
succeeds in identifying one more transitive verb, catch, as transitive. Our model
performs better than the oracle in categorizing alternating verbs: the oracle has
an even higher tendency to over-regularize the verbs that alternate infrequently.
Inferring the parameters of the input filter thus results in comparable, and maybe
slightly better, accuracy in categorizing verbs than knowing these parameters in
advance.
Random Filter Parameters. If the values of the filter parameters aren’t
important, then it wouldn’t be remarkable that our joint inference model performs
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Figure 4.5: % Verbs Categorized Correctly by Varying Values of ε and δ
comparably to the oracle model. To test whether the filter parameters actually
matter, I ran 500 model simulations in which ε and δ were fixed to randomly-sampled
values. Fig. 4.5 displays the model’s resulting accuracy in inferring transitivity
categories given each set of filter parameters, with ε along the x-axis and δ along
the y-axis. Lighter colors denote higher percentages of verbs categorized correctly.
The gray rectangle marks the range of filter parameter values that were considered
highest probability by our joint inference model— specifically, these are the values
within one standard deviation of the mean in the posterior probability distributions
that our model inferred.
A visual scan of these plots shows that it is not trivial to infer filter parameters
that will result in high accuracy across all three transitivity categories. Higher
values of ε yield higher accuracy on categorizing transitive and intransitive verbs,
but lower accuracy for alternating verbs. This is because the learner assumes there
is more error in its transitive and intransitive verb observations, and lowers the
threshold for assigning verbs to those categories. The learner thus assigns more
verbs in its dataset to the transitive and intransitive categories rather than the
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alternating category. On the other hand, higher values of δ yield lower accuracy
for transitive verbs, but higher accuracy for intransitive verbs. With higher values
of δ, the learner assumes that more of its errorful sentence observations contain
mistaken direct objects, rather than missing direct objects. The learner therefore
expects more error in its intransitive verb observations because there should be
more intransitive verbs appearing with spurious direct objects. This lowers the
threshold for assigning verbs to the intransitive class, resulting in higher accuracy
for intransitives. Conversely, the learner expects less error in its transitive verb
observations because there should be fewer transitive verbs appearing with missing
direct objects. This raises the threshold for assigning verbs to the transitive class,
resulting in lower accuracy for transitives.
Thus, successfully categorizing verbs in all three transitivity classes requires
inferring filter parameters that fall within a somewhat narrow range. Our model
performs comparably to the best-case oracle model not merely because it infers an
input filter, but because it infers the best parameters for such a filter given our
dataset. Note that our model is not actually optimizing for the accuracy values
plotted in the graph in Fig. 4.5, because it is not trained on the target classifica-
tions for verb transitivity. Instead, the model is optimizing for probability: it is
searching for the best joint-probability solution for verb transitivity categories and
filter parameters to explain the distributions in its data. The fact that our model
performs well with respect to our target verb classifications means that the param-
eter values that have high probability under our model also result in good accuracy
across all three verb classes.
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No-Filter Baseline. Our model accurately categorizes verbs across transi-
tivity categories by inferring appropriate parameters for a filter on its input, and
the model comparisons above show that the values of these filter parameters are
important. Models with grossly inappropriate filter parameters might have better
accuracy on some verb classes, but do not perform as well across all three transitiv-
ity categories. A special case of these models would be those where ε equals exactly
zero, representing zero probability of parsing errors: this produces models that do
not have an input filter at all. Comparing against a no-filter baseline tells us how
much having a filter matters in identifying verb transitivity.
As values of exactly zero were never randomly sampled in the simulations
reported in Fig. 4.5, I conducted an additional simulation setting ε to zero. The
value of δ in this case does not matter, because it is never used. Because every
verb in our dataset occurs some but not all of the time with overt post-verbal direct
objects, and this no-filter model assumes there are no parsing errors to filter out,
it assigns every verb to the alternating category. It thus categorizes 100% of the
alternating verbs correctly, achieving 70% overall accuracy because alternating verbs
make up 70% of our dataset. However, this accuracy comes at the cost of failing
to categorize any verbs as transitive or intransitive. The joint inference model
performs substantially better in this regard, categorizing the majority of transitive
and intransitive verbs correctly. This demonstrates that an input filter is important
for differentiating alternating from non-alternating verbs.
Threshold Comparisons. By inferring how frequently parsing errors occur
in its sentence observations and the behavior of those errors, our model is essentially
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inferring where to put thresholds for classifying verbs as transitive or intransitive
based on rates of observed direct objects. Another way of evaluating our model’s
performance is to compare it against a simple threshold model, which classifies verbs
as transitive if their percentage occurrence with overt direct objects falls above a
certain threshold, and as intransitive if their percentage occurrence with overt direct
objects falls below a certain threshold. There are several differences between this
type of threshold model and our model. Instead of setting hard thresholds that
delineate each of these categories, our model uses soft thresholds that take into
account how much data it has available for any particular verb. And the primary
advance in our model is that these soft thresholds are learned: the model does not
need to know the true distributions of transitive and intransitive verbs in advance.
If our model performs comparably to a model that knows the best thresholds for
classifying its data, this will give us another indication that it is learning successfully.
To create these comparisons, I hand-fit the thresholds for classifying verbs by
percentage overt direct objects to maximize accuracy on the model’s dataset. Table
4.4 reports the accuracy of the best-performing threshold models, compared to our
joint inference model. The thresholds that yielded the best performance overall
were 87% and 4%: this model classifies verbs as transitive if they occur with direct
objects above 87% of the time, and verbs as intransitive if they occur with direct
objects less than 4% of the time. This model was able to achieve 80% accuracy
overall. However, its performance on classifying transitive and intransitive verbs
was lower than for our joint inference model. The second threshold comparison
thus aimed to maximize overall accuracy without performing lower than our joint
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Model % Transitive % Intransitive % Alternating % Total
Joint Inference 0.67 0.83 0.63 0.66
87% & 4% Thresholds 0.56 0.66 0.89 0.80
83% & 5% Thresholds 0.67 0.83 0.71 0.72
76% & 15% Thresholds 0.78 1.00 0.54 0.64
Table 4.4: Percentages of Verbs Categorized Correctly by Threshold Models
inference model on these two verb classes. Thresholds of 83% and 5% allowed
the model to achieve 72% overall accuracy, while achieving the same accuracy as
our joint inference model on transitive and intransitive verbs. Finally, the third
threshold comparison attempted to maximize overall accuracy while achieving higher
accuracy than our joint inference model on transitive and intransitive verbs. The
best thresholds for this model were 76% and 15%. This threshold model’s higher
performance on transitive and intransitive verbs led to lower accuracy on alternating
verbs, and it only achieved 64% accuracy overall.
Although our joint model is not explicitly learning thresholds, we can use the
filter model parameters that our model inferred to estimate the soft thresholds it
is effectively using. Because ε is the inferred rate of error and δ is the inferred
proportion of error that has direct objects, ε× (1− δ) gives an estimate of the rate
of missing direct objects for transitive verbs. Therefore, 1 − ε × (1 − δ) can be
interpreted as a threshold of direct object rates above which verbs are more likely
classified as transitive. Conversely, ε×δ estimates the rate of spurious direct objects
for intransitive verbs, and thus provides an estimate for a threshold below which
verbs are more likely classified as intransitive. When we estimate thresholds based
on the means of the distributions over ε and δ that our model inferred (0.19 and
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0.25), we obtain estimated thresholds of 85% and 5%. These are very close to the
thresholds that yielded the best performance in our threshold models.
In summary, these comparisons show that it is possible for a simple threshold
model to achieve higher overall accuracy than our joint inference model, if it is al-
lowed to use thresholds that are hand-fit to maximize performance on this dataset.
However, it is not trivial to find hard thresholds that will ensure high performance
across all three verb classes. In particular, the best-performing threshold models
may have exceeded the overall accuracy of our joint inference model, but they never
exceeded our model’s accuracy on both transitive and intransitive verbs without
reducing overall accuracy. This shows us that the soft thresholds that our model
is essentially learning are appropriate to its dataset: our model performs just as
well as the best-performing threshold models on identifying these deterministic verb
categories. And this is true even though our model is not optimizing for accuracy.
Unlike the threshold models, our model does not have access to the target classi-
fications for verb transitivity in its dataset, and cannot use those classifications to
identify its thresholds. Instead, our model learns where to put these soft thresholds
by finding the best joint probability solution for verb transitivity categories and the
parameters for error in its dataset.
4.3.4 Discussion
Our model accurately categorizes 2/3 of the most frequent transitive, intran-
sitive, and alternating verbs in child-directed speech on the basis of their distribu-
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tions with and without direct objects, by learning to filter out sentences that were
likely mis-parsed. This enables the learner to avoid drawing faulty inferences about
verb transitivity from non-basic clause types that may be mistaken for intransitive
clauses. Our model performs comparably to an oracle model that knows in advance
the best parameters for a filter given its dataset, and better than many models
with inappropriate filter parameters. It performs substantially better in categoriz-
ing transitive and intransitive verbs than a baseline model that lacks an input filter
altogether, and performs twice as well overall as would be expected by chance. It
also performs just as well on categorizing transitive and intransitive verbs as the
best-performing threshold models, which categorize verbs using thresholds of direct
object rates that are hand-fit to the dataset. These results demonstrate that an
input filter both matters for verb transitivity learning, and can be learned.
The model makes two types of mistakes in inferring verb categories. First, it
is unable to correctly categorize some transitive and intransitive verbs that behave
differently than other verbs in their category, such as catch, hold, wear, and wait.
Further investigation is necessary to determine whether these verbs pose difficulties
for child learners as well. A second type of mistake is over-regularizing alternating
verbs that alternate infrequently: the model prefers to assign these verbs to the
transitive and intransitive categories. This is an example of a learner preferring a
more deterministic analysis for probabilistic input, a tendency also found in child
learners in artificial language studies (Hudson Kam & Newport, 2009). The error-
filtering mechanism I present here could thus potentially provide a way to model
other forms of over-regularization in learning.
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There are three factors that contribute to our model’s ability to regularize its
input. First, our learner only needs to infer two parameters for its input filter: it
makes the simple assumption that there is a single value for ε and δ shared across all
verbs, rather than having to infer separate values for these parameters on a verb-by-
verb basis. This allows the learner to use distributions of direct objects across verbs
to inform its estimates of how much error is present in its sentence representations,
and what that error looks like. If instead the learner expected a different ε and
δ for each verb, it would be difficult for the learner to tell whether a particular
rate of direct objects observed for a verb is due to a particular rate of transitivity
alternation (θ) or due to a particular type of error that occurs only with that verb.
Intuitively, the expectation of a single shared value for these filter parameters
corresponds to the expectation that the noise process generating the error in the
learner’s sentence representations reflects some properties that are independent of
the particular verbs in those sentences. Arguably, this expectation is not only a
helpful simplification, but also a realistic one. While our learner has no commitment
to what this noise process is, in reality it reflects the contribution of a variety of
grammatical operations that the learner has mis-parsed. These operations are due
to independent properties of the grammar, and apply to entire classes of verbs, not
on a verb-by-verb basis. A more sophisticated learner might identify that there
are several noise processes at work, corresponding to these different grammatical
properties, and use distributions of direct objects across verbs along with other
surface features of these sentences to infer a different ε and δ for each of these
properties.
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Additionally, the learner’s inference of its input filter is successful because it
encounters a wide variety of verb behavior in its data. Some verbs appear more
deterministic than others: they alternate less frequently, instead show a stronger
preference for solely transitive or intransitive frames. Just as we used the true
transitive and intransitive verbs in the dataset to arrive at our estimates of the true
values for ε and δ, our learner can anchor its estimates of these parameters by using
the distributions of direct objects with the more deterministic verbs it observes—
those that it thinks are more likely to be transitive or intransitive. If instead all
verbs alternated at exactly the same rate, the learner would have difficulty knowing
whether all verbs have exactly the same transitivity properties, or whether there
is additional error present. This raises the question of whether all languages have
enough variety in verb distributions to enable successful learning by this filtering
mechanism. Answering this question would require testing this model with cross-
linguistic corpora of child-directed speech.
Finally, our learner’s ability to successfully regularize depends on having de-
terministic categories in its hypothesis space: it expects that some verbs will only
occur in transitive or intransitive frames, and makes the simplifying assumption
that these verbs are equally likely a priori as verbs that can alternate. However,
we might ask how realistic it is for a learner to have this assumption, as in real-
ity these categories will occur in different proportions in the target language. Will
a learner perform just as well if it expects transitive, intransitive, and alternating
verbs to occur with different frequency? We can answer this question by examining
the model’s performance when it has different prior beliefs about the probability of
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these verb classes. If there is no difference in performance, then it suffices to merely
have transitive or intransitive categories in the learner’s hypothesis space, regardless
of how they are weighted. But if there is a difference in performance, this would
show that the model’s prior beliefs about the relative probabilities of transitivity
classes matter for its ability to identify these classes in its input.
4.4 Simulation 2
In Simulation 2, I ask whether our model will still accurately identify the tran-
sitivity categories of verbs in child-directed speech if it does not expect transitive,
intransitive, and alternating verbs to be equally likely a priori. Instead of setting a
uniform prior over transitivity categories (P (T (v)) in Equation 1), the model’s prior
is now biased in favor of alternating verbs. In Simulation 2a, the model’s prior was
set to match the actual frequencies of verb transitivity categories in its input: a
prior probability of 0.70 was set for alternating verbs, 0.18 for transitive verbs, and
0.12 for intransitive verbs, to match the proportion of the target verb categories
in our dataset. This allows us to determine whether our learner’s verb transitivity
inference is affected if it expects to find verb categories in the same proportions as
they will actually occur in its input. In Simulation 2b, the model’s prior was skewed
even more heavily in favor of the alternating category: a prior probability of 0.90
was set for alternating verbs and 0.05 each for transitive and intransitive verbs. By
giving the alternating category substantially greater prior probability than the two
deterministic verb categories, we can determine whether simply having transitive
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and intransitive categories in the learner’s hypothesis space, in any proportion, is
sufficient for identifying them in its input.
4.4.1 Data
I tested the skewed-prior models on the same dataset of transitive, intransitive,
and alternating verbs in child-directed speech that was prepared for Simulation 1.
4.4.2 Results
Verb Transitivity Inference. Fig. 4.6 displays the posterior probability
distribution over transitivity categories that our model inferred for each verb in
Simulation 2a, when it expected 70% alternating verbs. Fig. 4.7 displays the dis-
tribution over transitivity categories inferred in Simulation 2b, when the model
expected 90% alternating verbs. Table 4.5 reports the proportion of verbs catego-
rized correctly in each transitivity category, compared to our original joint inference
model in Simulation 1.
Figure 4.6: Posterior Distributions over Verb Categories (T ), Simulation 2a
152
Figure 4.7: Posterior Distributions over Verb Categories (T ), Simulation 2b
In Simulation 2a, the inferred distribution over transitivity categories is very
similar to the distribution inferred by our original model in Simulation 1. This
model assigns highest probability under the transitive category to the same 6 out
of 9 transitive verbs as our original model, and it assigns highest probability under
the intransitive category to the same 5 out of 6 intransitive verbs. The model
also assigns highest probability under the alternating category to 23 alternating
verbs, and considers the remaining 12 to be either transitive or intransitive, over-
regularizing at nearly the same rate as our original model. Thus, skewing the model’s
prior to expect alternating verbs 70% of the time resulted in very little difference in
verb categorization accuracy compared to our original model.
In Simulation 2b, when the model’s prior was skewed to expect alternating
verbs 90% of the time, the model inferred a different distribution over transitivity
Model % Transitive % Intransitive % Alternating % Total Verbs
Simulation 1 0.67 0.83 0.63 0.66
Simulation 2a 0.67 0.83 0.66 0.68
Simulation 2b 0.33 0.67 0.94 0.80
Table 4.5: Percentages of Verbs Categorized Correctly, Simulations 1 and 2
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categories. There are two general trends to observe in these data. First, even though
this learner was heavily biased against the transitive and intransitive categories,
there are still several verbs that it assigns high probability under these categories.
To some extent, the model was able to overcome its biased prior and identify some
deterministic verbs in its input.
On the other hand, there are fewer verbs that this model assigns highest proba-
bility under the transitive and intransitive categories, and more verbs that it assigns
highest probability under the alternating category. This results in higher accuracy
for alternating verbs: this model only over-regularizes one of these verbs (pick) as
transitive, and one of these verbs (sit) as intransitive. Because alternating verbs
are most frequent in the model’s data, the model’s higher accuracy on alternating
verbs leads to higher total accuracy as well. But the model achieves lower accuracy
for the transitive and intransitive categories. The model assigns highest probability
to the transitive category for only 3 of the 9 transitive verbs, and it assigns highest
probability to the intransitive category for only 4 of the 6 intransitive verbs. Of
the target transitive verbs, the model now considers throw, hit, and buy to be alter-
nating, along with catch, hold, and wear. Of the intransitive verbs, the model now
considers work to be alternating along with wait. The model still performs better
than chance in categorizing intransitive and alternating verbs, but it is no different
from chance in categorizing transitive verbs.
In summary, the model performed comparably to our original model when its
prior was skewed to expect transitive, intransitive, and alternating categories in the
same proportions as they actually occur in the input. However, when the model
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was biased more strongly towards the alternating category, it identified transitive
and intransitive verbs at a much lower rate. The model’s rate of regularization was
not affected by its bias against deterministic categories in Simulation 2a, but was
affected by its stronger bias in Simulation 2b.
Filter Parameter Inference. Figs. 4.8 and 4.9 display the posterior proba-
bility distributions over ε and δ inferred by the skewed-prior models. Although the
shapes of these distributions are different, they are centered around similar values as
those inferred by our original model in Simulation 1. The mean of the distribution
over ε is 0.22 in Simulation 2a and 0.19 in Simulation 2b, compared to 0.19 for our
original model. The mean of the distribution over δ is 0.23 in Simulation 2a and 0.21
in Simulation 2b, compared to 0.25 for our original model. Just as for our original
model, these values are close to the estimated true values of ε = 0.24 and δ = 0.18
in the model’s dataset, as calculated for Simulation 1.
Thus, changing the learner’s prior beliefs about how transitivity categories
distribute in its input did not substantially affect its inference about the parameters
Figure 4.8: Posterior Distributions over ε and δ, Simulation 2a
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Figure 4.9: Posterior Distributions over ε and δ, Simulation 2b
of its input filter: it still inferred appropriate values for the frequency and behavior
of error in its data. This might be because the learner is anchoring that inference
on the distributions of the verbs that it considers to be transitive and intransitive
with the highest probability. Because both models in Simulation 2 did identify some
transitive and intransitive verbs, and those verbs are a subset of the verbs that our
original model categorized as transitive and intransitive with highest probability, it
is not so surprising that all three models found similar parameters for their input
filters. Moreover, inferring these parameters is what allowed the model in Simulation
2b to still categorize some verbs as transitive and intransitive, despite its strong bias
against those categories. Without a filter, the model would perform identically to
the no-filter baseline in Simulation 1, and categorize all verbs as alternating.
4.4.3 Model Comparisons
Random Prior Parameters. Different results for the model’s verb tran-
sitivity inference were found depending on how much its prior was biased against
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transitive and intransitive verbs. This raises the question: under what circumstances
does the model’s prior substantially affect its ability to identify verb transitivity, and
under what circumstances does it not matter? That is, how much bias against deter-
ministic verb categories can our learner accommodate and still accurately identify
those categories in its input?
To answer this question, I ran 500 model simulations in which the model’s
prior probabilities over transitive, intransitive, and alternating categories were fixed
to randomly sampled values that summed to 1. Because the models in Simulations
1 and 2 inferred similar values for ε and δ, for ease of computation I set these filter
parameters to the mean values of ε = 0.20 and δ = 0.23 that were inferred in those
previous simulations. Fig. 4.10 plots the learner’s accuracy in categorizing transi-
tive, intransitive, and alternating verbs as its prior becomes more skewed towards
the alternating category. The x-axis displays varying values of the model’s prior on
alternating verbs, and the y-axis displays the average percentage of verbs in each
class categorized correctly at each of those values. A curve of best fit is plotted using
a running LOESS regression (local nonparametric regression; Cleveland & Devlin,
1988).
This plot shows that the learner’s accuracy in verb categorization remains
steady across a large range of prior parameter values. When its prior probability on
alternating verbs is less than approximately 0.75, the learner’s performance is fairly
consistent: it correctly categorizes on average 6/9 transitive verbs, 5/6 intransitive
verbs, and 22/35 alternating verbs. Performance only begins to vary when its prior
probability on alternating verbs is pushed above 0.75. Above this value, its accuracy
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Figure 4.10: Accuracy by Prior Probability on Alternating Verbs
on categorizing transitive and intransitive verbs declines and its accuracy on alter-
nating verbs increases, as it categorizes fewer verbs as transitive and intransitive.
Thus, it appears that there is a large range of bias towards or against deterministic
verb categories that our learner can accommodate without affecting its ability to
identify those verbs in its input. It only begins to lose that ability when its bias
against deterministic categories becomes extreme.
4.4.4 Discussion
While Simulation 1 shows that an appropriate input filter is important for
learning verb transitivity, Simulation 2 shows that learning is also affected to some
extent by the learner’s prior beliefs about the relative frequency of transitivity cat-
egories in its input. Skewing the model’s prior to expect verb transitivity categories
in the same proportions that it would actually encounter in its input did not affect
its performance; its accuracy in categorizing transitive, intransitive, and alternating
verbs was nearly identical to our original model. However, skewing the model’s prior
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more extremely in favor of alternating verbs resulted in different performance. With
a heavy bias against deterministic categories, the model over-regularized alternating
verbs much less, leading to higher accuracy on that verb class and higher accuracy
overall. But the model was also less successful at identifying the target transitive and
intransitive verbs, and did not perform above chance levels in categorizing transitive
verbs.
This behavior reveals two properties of the learner. First, it did not matter
whether the learner expected transitive, intransitive and alternating verbs to be
equally likely a priori, or whether it expected them to occur in the same propor-
tions as they actually do occur in child-directed English. In fact, it appears that
our model’s performance would be very similar across a large range of prior param-
eters. It is desirable that the learner can succeed at identifying verb transitivity
without prior expectations that match the proportions of transitivity categories in
the input— this will allow the learners to be somewhat flexible in learning differ-
ent target languages, even if transitivity categories distribute differently in those
languages compared to English or compared to the learners’ own priors. However,
there is a point where the learner’s prior does exert an influence on its verb cate-
gorization. When it was extremely biased to expect alternating verbs, our learner
was not able to successfully categorize transitive verbs. This means that merely
having deterministic categories in the learner’s hypothesis space, in any proportion,
does not suffice for accurately identifying those categories in the learner’s input. A
learner must give those categories sufficient prior weight in order to find them.
Second, even a learner strongly biased in favor of alternating verbs was able to
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infer appropriate parameters for filtering sentences that were likely mis-parsed. This
allowed it to identify at least some of the transitive and intransitive verbs in its input,
and to avoid drawing the mistaken inference that all verbs are alternating. This
filtering was less effective for a learner with an extreme bias against the transitive
and intransitive categories: its bias hampered its ability to detect the signals of
these deterministic categories in the data that it let through its filter. However, the
fact that the learner inferred appropriate filter parameters even in this case points
towards a promising direction for future research. A more sophisticated learner
might incrementally update its prior over transitivity categories given more evidence
about their distribution in its input, inferring the parameters of that distribution
in a hierarchical model. In this case, the learner’s correct initial estimates of its
input filter parameters could be very helpful in identifying the right distribution
over transitivity categories. Thus, even if a learner’s prior beliefs about transitivity
are grossly inaccurate, inferring an input filter might allow it to appropriately adjust
those beliefs as it learns more about its language.
4.5 General Discussion
This chapter provides a computational solution for a chicken-and-egg problem
that arises in early grammar acquisition. English learners are sensitive to verb tran-
sitivity at very young ages: infants as young as 15-16 months use verbs’ distributions
in transitive and intransitive clauses to draw inferences about their argument-taking
properties and meanings (Jin & Fisher, 2014; Lidz et al., 2017). The experiments in
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Chapter 3 show that verb transitivity knowledge emerges before infants are able to
identify displaced arguments in common non-basic clause types, such as wh-object
questions; by hypothesis, this may be because transitivity knowledge facilitates non-
basic clause structure acquisition. But accurately identifying verb transitivity is dif-
ficult if infants cannot recognize when arguments of the clause have been displaced
from their canonical positions, and therefore cannot reliably recognize clause tran-
sitivity when it is present. In this chapter I have followed a proposal that children
need to filter non-basic clauses out of the data they use for verb learning (Lidz &
Gleitman, 2004a, 2004b; Pinker, 1984, 1989), but filtering non-basic clauses by iden-
tifying them as non-basic only re-introduces our paradox. Identifying the structure
of non-basic clauses may depend on knowing some of the core argument structure
properties of the language, and yet learners need to filter non-basic clauses in order
to bootstrap their learning of those very properties.
The model proposed here offers a new solution to this paradox, which does not
require the learner to detect any direct or indirect signals to non-basicness (Pinker,
1984, 1989; Gleitman, 1990). This model instantiates a learner that considers the
possibility that it occasionally parses sentences erroneously. The learner infers how
to filter out errors from the data it uses for verb learning, without knowing where
those errors came from. It observes only verbs’ distributions with and without di-
rect objects, and does not track any additional syntactic or non-syntactic cues that
might correlate with non-basicness—to this learner, a wh-object question is indis-
tinguishable from an intransitive clause. Nonetheless, the model successfully infers
appropriate parameters for filtering its input in order to identify the transitivity of
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the majority of frequent verbs in child-directed speech. This demonstrates that it is
in principle possible for a learner to filter non-basic clauses for verb learning, without
knowing which clauses are non-basic and without needing to infer what the features
of non-basic clauses are. This provides an account for how the first attested steps of
verb argument structure learning in infancy can take place even as non-basic clause
acquisition is still developing.
More broadly, by introducing a mechanism for a learner to filter erroneous
parses of its input, this model helps answer what has remained an open question
in bootstrapping and verb learning: how learners manage to avoid drawing faulty
inferences about grammar and meaning, at stages of development when they lack
the linguistic knowledge to arrive at veridical syntactic representations of sentences
they hear. This ability has been traditionally assumed by theories of both syntac-
tic and semantic bootstrapping (Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a, 2004b; Gleitman, 1990;
Pinker, 1984, 1989), and has been presupposed by previous computational models of
verb learning (Alishahi & Stevenson, 2008; Barak et al., 2014; Parisien & Stevenson,
2010; Perfors et al., 2010; see also Siskind, 1996). These previous models assume
that learners can veridically represent the arguments in a clause, and use those syn-
tactic percepts to identify verbs’ core argument-taking properties and their ability to
productively generalize across different argument structure alternations. This model
addresses the question of how this process begins. I propose that a learner equipped
with a filtering mechanism can still identify a verb’s basic argument structure, even
before that learner can reliably identify all of the arguments in sentences she hears.
This model diverges from previous computational models of bootstrapping
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(Abend et al., 2017; Kwiatkowski et al., 2012; Maurits et al., 2009; Siskind, 1996)
by learning from a very limited type of data. The learner identifies verb transitivity
only by using rates of overt direct objects, and does not have access to any additional
syntactic or non-syntactic features of the sentences or the discourse environment. By
limiting the learner’s data in this way, I do not imply that real-life learning proceeds
only from this type of distributional information. On the contrary, it is likely that
children make simultaneous use of a much fuller set of information in inferring a
grammar, including conceptual representations of the extra-linguistic contexts of
the sentences they hear. But by investigating how much can be learned solely from
verbs’ syntactic distributions, I am testing the viability of the proposal that infants
can use syntactic information to draw helpful generalizations even if they do not
know which event in the world a particular sentence describes (Gleitman, 1990).
This issue has not been fully examined in prior bootstrapping models, which
assume that learners begin by accessing the exact meaning (or set of possible exact
meanings) of a sentence, represented under a structure that is homomorphic with
the syntactic structure (Abend et al., 2017; Kwiatkowski et al., 2012; Maurits et al.,
2009; Siskind, 1996). Given access to this full conceptual representation, or instead
to the full syntactic representation of a sentence, these models show that it is simple
to learn how to convert from one representation to the other. This is because the
learner’s meaning representation is in a form that encodes all and only the predicate-
argument relations in the syntactic representation of the sentence, and there is an
assumption built into the learner that those two representations will mirror each
other. The bootstrapping task thus reduces to the problem of identifying which
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lexical items express which predicates and arguments in the learner’s conceptual
structure. Given this information, the learner can infer the syntactic representation
of a sentence by reading off of its structured conceptual representation, and vice
versa.
But bootstrapping is not so simple if learners only have access to approxima-
tions of these representations, or if conceptual structures encode more relations than
those expressed in the sentence’s argument structure. Even if children can perceive
events and event relations in the world in the same way as adults do— and the
work discussed in Chapter 2 provides some evidence for how we might be able to
tell that this is the case (He, 2015; Knowlton et al., 2018; Perkins et al., 2018; Well-
wood et al., 2015)— it is still not straightforward to identify which event relations
a sentence expresses solely from its context of use (Gleitman, 1990). And when
we consider the wide range of syntactic relations that might be instantiated in a
particular sentence, including the various non-local dependencies found in non-basic
clauses, it seems even less straightforward for the child’s non-linguistic perception
of the world to yield a meaning in a form that is homomorphic with the syntax
of that sentence. Here, we ask whether learning can still succeed in cases where a
child might not have access to conceptual and syntactic representations that mirror
each other in their structure. If either of these representations is approximate or
incomplete, then children must use whatever partial information might be useful in
one domain— syntax or meaning— as probabilistic evidence for drawing inferences
about the other domain. I show how learners might accommodate error in their
syntactic percepts, such that those percepts are still useful as evidence for drawing
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further generalizations about their language.
Crucially, an input filtering mechanism like the one I propose can flexibly adapt
over the course of a learner’s development. As a learner gains more knowledge of the
grammar of her language, her syntactic percepts will change: she will be learning
from more complete and more accurate parses of the sentences she hears. This
means that the error in her syntactic percepts will also reduce over time, and she
will not need to filter as much of her data for learning. In the current case, our model
is learning from data that reflects the parses of an immature learner at a particular
stage of development: one who cannot identify objects when they are realized in non-
canonical positions, and who mistakes certain NP adjuncts for arguments. These
data do not veridically reflect the distributions of verbs with direct objects in the
actual input to the learner. Thus, the learner is not inferring filter parameters to fit
its actual input— instead, the learner is inferring filter parameters to fit its erroneous
representations of that input (cf. Gagliardi, 2012; Gagliardi & Lidz, 2014). A more
mature learner who has learned to identify argument displacement in English will
have access to a different dataset, one that has a lower rate of error. This more
mature learner would identify different parameters for filtering its data in order to
learn more about its grammar.
This model is merely a starting point: we have looked at only a subset of En-
glish action verbs. But having presented a proof of concept that our filtering solution
is possible, we can ask how far it could generalize. It remains to be seen how well
filtering would work if we consider a less idealized version of the learning problem:
could this mechanism still succeed if a learner is not only acquiring the transitivity
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properties of verbs in her language, but also many other complement-taking proper-
ties at the same time? Moreover, future work aims to test whether this model could
be extended to languages with freer word order or rampant argument-drop. These
linguistic properties may make it difficult for learners to identify clause transitivity
even in simple, active, declarative clauses. For example, the relatively free word
order of Japanese compared to English means that word order is less helpful for
identifying subjects and objects in a clause, and learners must use language-specific
case morphology instead; furthermore, the ability of Japanese speakers to freely
drop the subject and/or object of a clause if it is salient in the discourse means that
a learner must use discourse cues to recognize when silent arguments are present.
For these reasons, languages like Japanese are potentially problematic for syntac-
tic bootstrapping strategies that rely on learners accurately identifying transitive
verbs (Lee & Naigles, 2005, 2008), but see Fisher, Jin, and Scott (in press) and
Suzuki and Kobayashi (2017) for evidence that learners do nonetheless succeed. If
our model can learn appropriate parameters for filtering out the relatively higher
rate of potentially misleading data in languages like Japanese, this may help clarify
how syntactic bootstrapping is possible in these languages.
More broadly, we might ask whether this filtering mechanism could general-
ize beyond verb transitivity learning, to other cases in language acquisition where
learners must ignore misleading data in order to draw correct inferences about their
language. For example, prior work has proposed that some form of input filtering
is helpful in identifying vowel categories (Adriaans & Swingley, 2012), and in draw-
ing the right generalization about the constraints on the antecedent of anaphoric
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one in English (Pearl & Lidz, 2009). Filtering may also provide a mechanism for
understanding why young learners tend more strongly than adults to regularize prob-
abilistic input in artificial language studies (Hudson Kam & Newport, 2009), or how
a learner can acquire the correct generalizations about his first language from noisy
input by second-language speakers (Singleton & Newport, 2004). When our learner
expects that error might be masking regularities in its data, filtering allows it to
identify those regularities, and even to over-regularize in some cases. A combination
of determinism in children’s hypothesis spaces, along with the expectation of error
in their input representations, may help explain when children draw deterministic
generalizations about their language and how they draw the right ones.
Thus, this type of filtering mechanism might have broad utility for learners
attempting to generalize from immature representations of their input. But more
narrowly, it serves an important role in accounting for how infants begin to iden-
tify both the local and the non-local predicate-argument relations in their language.
This model provides a proof-of-concept that infants can use the local relations they
are more reliably able to perceive— subjects and objects in their canonical argu-
ment positions— to begin to identify the argument-taking properties of verbs in
their language, even if they cannot always recognize those arguments in non-local
positions. This provides a way out of the chicken-and-egg problem introduced by
non-basic clauses in early grammar learning. It is not in principle necessary for
infants to identify non-basic clauses in order to learn basic verb argument structure
properties; instead, infants may be able to acquire this knowledge first, and then use
it to identify non-basic clauses in their language. In the next chapter, I now turn to
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the question of which mechanisms enable this next step of learning: identifying the
forms that argument movement can take in the target language.
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Chapter 5: Learning the Surface Forms of Argument Movement
5.1 Background
The filtering mechanism introduced in the previous chapter provides an in-
principle solution for learners to identify the basic syntactic distributions of verbs
in their language, despite the misleading data introduced by non-basic clauses in
their input. Learners may then use those distributions to bootstrap into other
grammatical properties of their language, including the movement dependencies
that are present in those non-basic clauses. I have been considering a “gap-driven”
hypothesis for how this bootstrapping takes place in languages with overt movement.
Infants as young as 15 months may use their knowledge of verb argument structure to
notice when predicted arguments of verbs are unexpectedly missing in their canonical
positions— for example, noticing that predicted objects of fix are missing after the
verb in (1) and (2).
(1) What did Amy fix?
(2) I like the bicycle that Amy fixed.
As their parsing abilities develop, infants may then examine the rest of the
sentence to determine the cause of the missing argument, eventually identifying that
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another expression is acting as that argument non-locally. This will allow them to
learn the underlying syntactic dependencies in these sentences, and the forms that
these dependencies take in their language: i.e. that (1) and (2) both contain wh-
dependencies, which are marked in English by various surface signals, such as what,
that, do-support, and subject-auxiliary inversion.
In Chapter 3, I provided empirical evidence consistent with the Gap-Driven
Learning hypothesis: the ability to detect local verb transitivity violations is devel-
opmentally prior to the ability to recognize fronted arguments in wh-questions. In
Chapter 4, I showed that it is computationally feasible for a learner equipped with a
filtering mechanism to accurately identify verb transitivity even before being able to
parse non-basic clauses in its input, providing proof-of-concept that the first step of
learning under this hypothesis is possible. In this chapter, I investigate the remain-
der of this learning process. I propose that this follows three logically independent
steps:
(i) using knowledge of verb argument structure to detect argument gaps: pre-
dicted arguments that are unexpectedly missing in their local positions;
(ii) identifying what surface forms are correlated with these argument gaps; and
(iii) inferring what types of syntactic dependencies are responsible for those corre-
lations.
I present a computational model that instantiates the first two steps of learning
under this hypothesis. The learner builds off of the model in Chapter 4, using
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the knowledge of verb transitivity properties that the previous model identified by
filtering its input. It tracks the surface morphosyntactic properties of sentences that
violate its expectations of verb transitivity, in order to identify clusters of properties
that are correlated with those transitivity violations. These properties include the
forms that characterize movement dependencies in English. Furthermore, I show
that prior verb transitivity knowledge is necessary for this distributional learning to
be successful: assuming that learners must build incrementally on prior knowledge,
learners would do better to acquire verb transitivity knowledge before identifying
the clusters of morphosyntactic properties that characterize non-basic clauses. This
type of syntactically-informed distributional learning provides a mechanism that, in
principle, allows learners to identify the forms that mark the realization of various
types of argument movement in the target language.
5.1.1 Syntactically-Informed Distributional Learning
The learning mechanism proposed in this chapter is a form of syntactically-
informed distributional learning. Under this account, children track the statistical
distributions of morphosyntactic features present in the surface forms of sentences,
and apply their knowledge of verb argument structure in order to draw inferences
about the more abstract properties underlying those distributions. This distribu-
tional learning takes the form of categorization: learners jointly infer ‘categories’ of
sentences according to their surface feature distributions, and which sentence cat-
egories contain locally missing arguments of verbs (gaps). This allows learners to
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generalize across sentences that share similar surface features, and to identify which
of those shared features signal movement dependencies in the target language.
This distributional learning mechanism follows prior computational work that
has proposed similar mechanisms for the acquisition of phonetic categories in in-
fancy, and for category learning domain-generally (e.g. Anderson & Matessa, 1990;
Feldman, Myers, White, Griffiths, & Morgan, 2013; Maye et al., 2002; McMurray,
Aslin, & Toscano, 2009; Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010). Similar to these
previous models, the current account envisions the learning task as requiring two
simultaneous inferences: discovering the underlying system of categories that give
rise to distributions of surface features that a learner observes, and identifying which
observations belong to which category. However, it departs from previous literature
by envisioning this categorization process as merely a means to an end. Whereas the
phonetic learning literature operates under the assumption that there is a set of pho-
netic categories to be acquired, here I do not assume that adult grammars represent
‘categories’ of sentences in any meaningful sense. Instead, the categories inferred by
this learner are an intermediate step of learning: they enable further inference about
the underlying properties of sentences that share similar features. For example, a
learner who has identified that one sentence in a category contains an argument
gap may then infer that this property holds of other sentences in the category as
well, and may then posit that one of the shared features of these sentences— such
as a wh-word— is instantiating the movement that generated those gaps. Thus, the
formation of categories allows the learner to draw generalizations across sentences
that are formally similar.
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The success of this learning process hinges on which features of sentences learn-
ers are able to use for distributional learning at the relevant point in development,
and whether those feature representations provide enough signal for a learner to
accurately infer which sentences contain movement. Under most phonetic learning
accounts, learners draw inferences about the sound system of their language by pri-
marily using relevant acoustic features of sounds. Likewise, I assume that learners
draw inferences about the syntactic operations in their language by primarily using
relevant morphosyntactic features of sentences. I furthermore assume that inferences
about argument movement should be primarily driven by information relevant to
the predicate-argument structure of a sentence: morphosyntactic features pertaining
to subjects, objects, and verbs. But these features must be restricted to those that
would be identifiable by an infant at the developmental stage in question. Here, I
briefly review the empirical evidence for the relevant morphosyntactic features that
infants can represent prior to 18 months.
Local Subjects and Objects. The prior experimental findings discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3 provide evidence that English-learning infants before 18 months
can recognize subjects and objects of verbs in their canonical sentence positions.
In the right experimental settings, infants at this age can use these local predicate-
argument relations to draw inferences about sentence meanings (Jin & Fisher, 2014;
Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 1996; Seidl et al., 2003; Gagliardi et al., 2016; Perkins &
Lidz, under review). Moreover, Lidz et al. (2017) showed that 16-month-olds can
differentiate direct objects from post-verbal prepositional objects, drawing different
inferences about the meanings of nouns when they occur after a verb but follow
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prepositions like with and on. These results suggest that learners at this age are
attempting to identify subjects and objects as arguments in particular syntactic
positions, rather than merely as nominal elements before or after verbs, although
linear position may be a useful proxy for recovering the syntactic positions of these
arguments.
Auxiliaries. Additional work shows that infants before 18 months can track
functional elements with respect to subjects, verbs, and objects. Geffen and Mintz
(2015) found that infants as young as 12 months were able to use the presence of
subject-auxiliary inversion to distinguish between auditorily-presented declaratives
and polar questions, even when all prosodic information was removed. This indicates
that infants at this age are able to notice when a subject of a clause is sentence-
initial, versus when it is preceded by other lexical items, such as auxiliaries. Other
work finds that 14- to 18-month-olds are sensitive to the presence of auxiliaries
in their non-moved positions, and can use them to categorize an upcoming novel
word as a verb (Hicks, Maye, & Lidz, 2007; He & Lidz, 2017). 15- to 18-month-
olds are furthermore sensitive to the dependencies that can hold between auxiliaries
and particular verbal forms, such as the dependency between is and -ing in English
(Santelmann & Jusczyk, 1998). These results suggest that infants at this age attend
to auxiliaries, notice when they are displaced before subjects, and are aware that
they select for verbs.
Verbal Morphology. Infants at this age also show awareness of the various
affixes that verbs can take. 15-month-olds recognize that the verbal suffix -ing is a
bound morpheme of English, differentiating it from pseudo-suffixes on novel verbs
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(Mintz, 2013). 15- to 19-month-olds moreover show emerging sensitivity to the
licensing environments for this suffix, as well as for the past-tense suffix -ed and for
the 3rd-person agreement marker -s (Figueroa & Gerken, 2019; Omaki, Orita, &
Lidz, in prep; Santelmann & Jusczyk, 1998; Soderstrom, Wexler, & Jusczyk, 2002;
Soderstrom, White, Conwell, & Morgan, 2007). Similar knowledge of verbal affixes
has been found for other languages for infants in this age range, including French,
Dutch, and German (Höhle, Schmitz, Santelmann, & Weissenborn, 2006; Nazzi,
Barrire, Goyet, Kresh, & Legendre, 2011; Van Heugten & Shi, 2010). This indicates
that infants at this point in development are beginning to identify the patterns of
verbal morphology in their language, and may be taking steps to identify the tense,
aspect, and agreement dependencies that these patterns instantiate.1
Other Functional Categories. In addition to auxiliaries and verbal affixes,
a handful of other functional categories may be represented by infants younger than
18 months. Experimental findings show that 14- to 18-month-olds are aware of some
basic syntactic properties of determiners (Hicks et al., 2007; Höhle, Weissenborn,
Kiefer, Schulz, & Schmitz, 2004; Shi & Melanon, 2010; Cauvet et al., 2014; He &
Lidz, 2017), pronouns (Cauvet et al., 2014), prepositions (Lidz et al., 2017), and
negation (De Carvalho, Crimon, Barrault, Trueswell, & Christophe, under review).
Infants in these studies used these functional categories to aid recognition of co-
occurring known words, and to draw inferences about the grammatical properties
1I note that these results do not yet tell us how infants at this age represent these morphological
dependencies: whether as a dependency between two strings, or as a structural dependency between
two abstract grammatical categories, such as a subject or auxiliary and a verb. For the purposes
of the simulations below, I make the more conservative assumption that infants are able to identify
the surface forms that verbal morphology can take, but have not yet identified the function of
these morphemes.
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and meanings of co-occurring novel words. But other functional categories may
not yet be identified by this age. The results in Chapter 3 suggest that infants
prior to 18 months do not yet know which words are wh-words in English, and we
have no evidence at this age for knowledge of complementizers, quantifiers, focus
particles, or conjunctions (except for and, which may be acquired around this age
or a little older (Arunachalam et al., 2013)). However, infants may still be able to
recognize these lexical items as functional based on their acoustic and phonological
properties, as infants even within the first months of life are able to differentiate
function and content words (Monaghan, Chater, & Christiansen, 2005; Shi, Morgan,
& Allopenna, 1998; Shi, Werker, & Morgan, 1999).
In summary, the current empirical evidence indicates that infants prior to
18 months, acquiring the languages that have been studied to date, can represent
many basic morphosyntactic features of sentences they hear. These include local
subjects and objects of verbs, auxiliaries in canonical and moved positions, verbal
morphology, and a few other functional categories, such as determiners, pronouns,
prepositions, and negation. There are many open empirical questions regarding
the richness of these representations. For example, it is not known whether infants
at this age are aware that determiners not only form an equivalence class of lexi-
cal items before nouns, but also have particular syntactic and semantic properties.
And it may be that infants do not yet recognize all forms of an irregular verb or
auxiliary (e.g. be, is, was, were, am, are) as the same verb or auxiliary (see Tincoff,
Santelmann, & Jusczyk, 2000). But even if these representations are not as rich as
those of adults, these findings show that infants at this age have important scaf-
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folding in place for further syntactic learning. The proposed distributional learning
mechanism need not operate over strings; instead, it can can operate over sentence
representations that encode syntactic properties, albeit partial and rudimentary. In
other words, this account proposes that learners leverage their syntactic knowledge
in order to constrain the distributional learning they perform for drawing inferences
about syntax.
In focusing on the morphosyntactic properties of sentences that learners may
use for syntactic learning, I do not make the claim that this is the sole information
at a learner’s disposal. Indeed, it is quite plausible that infants may represent and
use information from other non-syntactic domains, such as the prosodic contour of
an utterance (Christophe, Millotte, Bernal, & Lidz, 2008) and the communicative
intent of the speaker (see e.g. Csibra, 2010; Meltzoff, 1995; Woodward, 2009 on
infants’ abilities to read and reason about the intentions of others). In particular,
interrogative force is likely to be an important signal for a learner attempting to
identify particular non-basic clause types, such as wh-questions. Although there is
little existing empirical evidence for when infants can perceive that they are being
asked a question, 15-month-olds’ ability to identify the right answer to wh-questions
in prior preferential looking tasks (Seidl et al., 2003; Gagliardi et al., 2016; Perkins
& Lidz, under review) provides suggestive support that they may be aware that
these sentences are being used to ask questions, even before they are aware that
they contain wh-dependencies.
For the purposes of the experiments below, I make the assumption that ‘ques-
tion’ is a pragmatic feature that infants at this age are able to identify, at least
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for some of the sentences they hear (cf. Carruthers, 2018 on ‘questioning attitudes’
as a basic component of human minds). However, much more work is needed to
determine how and when infants successfully identify interrogative force, and what
other pragmatic and prosodic information they may be able to use to inform their
syntactic inferences. I return to this point in the Discussion.
Finally, the current model departs from previous Bayesian models of clause
structure acquisition (Maurits et al., 2009; Kwiatkowski et al., 2012; Abend et al.,
2017) by focusing on learning primarily from formal distributional information, and
not conceptual information. As discussed in Chapter 4, these prior models assume
that learners bootstrap grammatical properties of their language using precise infor-
mation about the meaning of utterances they hear. In taking a different approach,
I am not making the claim that learners do not have access to conceptual informa-
tion in their bootstrapping inferences; indeed, it is possible that a guess about the
intended meaning of an utterance can work in concert with inferences on the basis
of formal syntactic distributions. By focusing primarily on those distributional in-
ferences, I merely ask how far that information could take a learner. That is, what
distributional information is present in the learner’s input, that could allow the
learner to identify the syntactic properties responsible for those distributions? This
will help understand how learning may be possible even in cases when the precise
meanings of utterances are difficult to identify (Gleitman, 1990).
In the experiments below, I test the computational feasibility of the proposed
distributional learning mechanism. I demonstrate that a learner can jointly catego-
rize sentences according to their surface feature similarities, and infer which sentence
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‘categories’ contain argument gaps. This allows the learner to identify forms that
characterize movement in English. The learner does this only on the basis of the rel-
evant syntactic information available to an infant at the developmental stage under
investigation: morphosyntactic features pertaining to subjects, verbs, and objects in
their canonical positions, together with known verb transitivity properties. More-
over, I show that the learner does better if it uses its verb transitivity knowledge
to guide distributional learning, rather than categorizing sentences only using their
surface features, without knowing which verbs require objects. These simulations
demonstrate that a learner can use distributional analysis to identify forms that
are characteristic of movement in English, and that doing so incrementally requires
building on prior verb transitivity knowledge, consistent with the empirically at-
tested developmental trajectory. This provides a proof of concept that Gap-Driven
Learning may be a feasible mechanism for the incremental learning of syntactic
dependencies.
5.2 Model
I present a Bayesian model that performs joint inference, categorizing sentences
based on their surface features and inferring which sentence ‘categories’ contain
locally missing arguments of verbs (gaps). To do this, the learner uses known verb
transitivity properties, as learned by the model in Chapter 4. When sentences in a
category violate the learner’s expectation that a verb has an object, it posits that
those sentences, and therefore the category, contain argument gaps. Learning such
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categories allows for further inference about which surface features signal different
types of movement dependencies.
In this section, I first specify the generative model, encoding the learner’s
assumptions about how its observations of sentence features are generated. Then, I
specify how the learner jointly infers sentence categories and argument gaps, given
its data and its knowledge of verb transitivity. In the following sections, I present
simulations demonstrating that this joint inference allows the learner to successfully
identify features that characterize movement dependencies in English, when tested
on child-directed speech.
5.2.1 Generative Model
The data that our learner observes consists of overt post-verbal direct objects
and other morphosyntactic features of sentences containing known verbs. These
are the 50 most frequent transitive, intransitive, and alternating action verbs whose
transitivity properties were learned by the model in Chapter 4. Similar to the
previous model, the current learner assumes that there are two reasons why it might
observe direct objects or no direct objects following a verb. On the one hand,
the known transitivity of that verb determines whether it should always, never,
or sometimes occur with a direct object. On the other hand, the sentence might
belong to a category of sentences with shared grammatical properties that produce
argument gaps.
The learner assumes that there is a set of underlying sentence categories that
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Figure 5.1: Graphical Model
give rise to the distributions of morphosyntactic features that it observes. Moreover,
there is a parameter for each category that governs whether it produces object gaps:
if it does, then observations of direct objects in that category may no longer reflect
the known transitivity properties of these verbs, but may instead be due to other
grammatical properties of that sentence category. Using the distributions of direct
objects and sentence features in its observed data, the learner infers what categories
of sentences are present, and which of those categories produce object gaps. This
allows the learner to identify specific morphosyntactic features that are correlated
with argument gaps for different types of sentences in its data.
Figure 5.1 provides the graphical model for the learner. Just as in the previous
model, observations of direct objects or no direct objects are formalized as the
Bernoulli random variable X, which takes a value of 1 if a sentence contains a
direct object, and 0 if it does not. The model’s observations of other relevant
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Type Features
Subject Subject of known verb is overt in canonical subject position; sentence-
initial; preceded by an auxiliary; preceded by another noun
Verb Known verb is first verb in sentence; followed by a preposition or
particle; has -ed, -en, -ing, -s, or irregular morphology
Tense & Auxiliaries Verb is preceded by to, be, have, get, or do
Other Question; unknown function word sentence-initially, sentence-
medially before verb, sentence-medially after verb, or sentence-finally
Table 5.1: Morphosyntactic Features (F )
morphosyntactic features of a sentence are represented by the vector of Bernoulli
random variables ~F , which take a value of 1 if a sentence contains that feature,
and 0 if not. These features encode the relevant properties of subjects, verbs, and
auxiliaries that are observable to an infant prior to 18 months, as supported by
the prior empirical findings discussed above. Table 5.1 lists the features that are
input to our current learner. Wh-words are coded as “unknown function words,”
a hyper-category that includes all functional elements assumed to be unknown at
this age: wh-words, complementizers, quantifiers, focus particles, and conjunctions
other than and. This assumes a learner that can identify these lexical items as
functional due to their phonological properties, but has not yet identified their
grammatical categories. The observed features in ~F also include the pragmatic
feature ‘question,’ which encodes whether an utterance has interrogative force. (In
the model’s dataset, interrogative force was identified by the presence of a question
mark in the transcription; this does not distinguish constituent questions from polar
questions.)
The upper part of the model has the same structure as for the previous model
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in Chapter 4. Each observation X(v) of a direct object for a particular verb is
conditioned on the parameter θ(v), a continuous random variable that controls the
probability that verb v will be used with a direct object. θ(v) is conditioned on the
variable T (v), a discrete random variable that can take on three values corresponding
to transitive, intransitive, or alternating verbs. Unlike the previous learner, the
current learner knows values of T for each verb: it uses the transitivity categories
that were inferred by the previous learner in Chapter 4. This means that the learner
knows some of the values of θ as well. For a verb in the transitive category of T , θ
equals 1, because the verb should always take a direct object. For an intransitive
verb, θ equals 0, because the verb should never occur with a direct object. For
the alternating category, θ takes a value between 0 and 1 inclusive. The prior
probability over θ in this case is a Beta(α, β) distribution, where the parameters
α and β are counts of direct objects and no direct objects for verb v in sentence
categories without argument gaps, excluding the current category.
In the lower part of the model, each X(v) and F (v) is conditioned on the discrete
random variable c, defined for all positive integers, which represents the category
that the sentence belongs to. Each value of c represents a different sentence category,
assumed to reflect a particular set of underlying grammatical properties that give
rise to the distributions of direct objects and other features in a sentence. For
example, one value of c might represent English wh-object questions, which gives
high probability to features like sentence-initial function words, subject-auxiliary
inversion, and the auxiliary do, as well as object gaps. Another value of c might
represent English polar questions, which also gives high probability to features like
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subject-auxiliary inversion and the auxiliary do, but does not produce sentence-
initial function words or object gaps.
For each sentence, a coin is flipped to determine which category of c that
sentence belongs to. The prior probability over sentence categories is a Dirichlet
process (Ferguson, 1973), with parameter α. In this process, a particular category
c has prior probability proportional to the number of sentence observations already
assigned to that category. This process also reserves a small non-zero probability for
new categories, allowing the model to flexibly converge on the number of sentence
categories that best explains the distribution of features and direct objects in its
data. See Appendix B for details.
Each direct object observation X(v) is also conditioned on two random vari-
ables, ec and δ
(X)
c , representing parameters of the sentence category that the ob-
servation belongs to. The Bernoulli random variable ec represents whether a given
category c produces argument gaps. If ec = 0, then the category does not produce
argument gaps, and all observations of a direct object in X(v) were generated by the
transitivity properties of verb v: T (v) and θ(v). But if ec = 1, then the category does
produce argument gaps, and observations of direct objects X(v) were generated by
a particular grammatical property of category c. In this case, these observations
may not conform to the transitivity properties of verb v. The prior probability that
ec = 1 is assumed to be 0.19, which is the mean value of ε learned by the model
in Chapter 4. This represents the probability of a transitivity violation inferred by
that model for sentences containing these same verbs.2
2The probability of observing a transitivity violation for a particular sentence, ε in the previous
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The random variable δ
(X)
c represents the probability of observing a direct ob-
ject in a category with argument gaps. Thus, whether a sentence contains a direct
object or no direct object depends on one of two biased coins. If ec = 0 and the ob-
servation was generated by the verb’s transitivity properties, then one biased coin
is flipped and the sentence contains a direct object with probability θ(v). But if
ec = 1 and the observation was generated by grammatical properties of category c,
then a different biased coin is flipped and the sentence contains a direct object with
probability δ
(X)
c . The parameter δ
(X)
c is assumed to have a uniform Beta(1, 1) prior
distribution. This means that it is equally likely a priori for a sentence category to
create argument gaps as it is for a sentence category to “add” an extra argument
that isn’t licensed by the verb. This represents a simplifying assumption for the
current learner, but one that may complicate the learner’s goal of identifying argu-
ment gaps rather than transitivity violations more broadly. We will return to this
point when discussing the simulations below.
Each feature observation F (v) is conditioned on the random variables in ~δc
(F )
,
which represent the probabilities of observing those morphosyntactic features in a
particular sentence category. Each sentence in category c contains feature F1 with
probability δ
(F1)
c , feature F2 with probability δ
(F2)
c , and so on. Each δ
(F )
c is also
assumed to have a uniform Beta(1, 1) prior distribution.
model, is not necessarily equivalent to the probability of a transitivity violation in a sentence
category, ec in the current model. These two parameters will only be equivalent if sentences are
equally distributed among sentence categories. Although this assumption may not be borne out,
it is adopted here as a simplifying assumption of the learner’s prior, which can be overridden as
the learner updates its hypotheses upon seeing data.
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5.2.2 Joint Inference
The learner uses Gibbs sampling (Geman & Geman, 1984) to jointly infer the
category of each observed sentence (c) and whether or not each category contains
argument gaps (e). We first initialize values of c for each sentence, starting with
three initial categories: one with argument gaps and two without. These values are
sampled for each sentence from the posterior probability distribution over an error
in that sentence observation, as inferred by the learner in Chapter 4. This poste-
rior probability is calculated given the transitivity of the verb (T (v)), whether the
observation contains a direct object (X(v)), and the other parsing error parameters
inferred by the previous learner.
After initialization, we use the observed data in X and F , the known verb
transitivity properties T , the argument-gap property for each category e, and the
other sentence category assignments c to calculate a posterior probability distribu-
tion over new category assignments for a given sentence. We re-sample new values of
c for each sentence sequentially from this posterior probability distribution. Then,
we use the re-sampled category values, along with X, F , and T , to sample new val-
ues for the argument-gap property of each category ec from its posterior probability
distribution. This cycle is repeated over many iterations until the model converges




In the simulations below, I ask whether a learner can identify the surface
signals of movement in English by jointly categorizing sentences according to their
surface feature distributions, and inferring which sentence categories have argument
gaps. The learner was tested on a dataset of child-directed speech containing the
same transitive, intransitive, and alternating verbs learned by the model in Chapter
4. In order to evaluate the model’s performance, I compare it to two baseline
models: one that infers argument gaps but does not categorize sentences based
on their feature distributions, and one that categorizes sentences without jointly
inferring argument gaps. I then analyze the specific features of the model’s categories
in order determine whether these categories are informative for the next step of
learning: identifying the underlying syntactic dependencies that are responsible for
these feature distributions. Results of this analysis find that the model’s categories
contain both signal and noise for this step of learning. The learner successfully
identifies the forms that characterize movement dependencies in English, but also
identifies many forms that are accidentally correlated with those dependencies.
5.3.1 Data
The dataset for this learner was prepared from the 18,503 CHILDES Treebank
sentences (Pearl & Sprouse, 2013) containing the same 50 transitive, intransitive,
and alternative verbs as in Chapter 4. Each sentence was coded for whether an
overt direct object or no direct object followed the verb of interest, using the same
187
procedure as in Chapter 4. In addition, each sentence was coded for the presence of
the morphosyntactic features in Table 5.1. Coding was conducted using automated
scripts to search over the Treebank trees. To verify the accuracy of these scripts, a
random sample of 500 sentences from the dataset was also coded by hand. Percent-
age agreement between the hand-coding and automated coding was well above 90%
for 20 out of 21 sentence features. The exception was the feature ‘verb followed by
a preposition or particle,’ which had slightly lower percentage agreement (89%) due
to inconsistent part-of-speech tagging of prepositions and particles in the Treebank.
In order to evaluate our model’s performance, the sentences in the dataset were
also coded for their underlying clause types, listed in Table 5.2. These included three
clause types with movement: wh-questions, passives, and relative clauses. A given
clause might be coded as multiple types, e.g. as both a question and a passive. For
sentences with multiple clauses, coding was conducted for the clause containing the
verb of interest. For example, if the verb of interest was contained in an embedded
clause within a matrix wh-question (e.g. What do you want to eat? ), the clause
was coded as an embedded clause and also a wh-question if it contained the base
position of movement.
Clause type coding was conducted by another set of automated scripts. Ac-
curacy was again evaluated by comparing against hand-coding for a random sample
of 500 sentences. Percentage agreement between the hand-coding and automated
coding was above 90% for 7 of 9 clause types. The two exceptions were embedded
clauses (84% agreement) and basic intransitive clauses (89% agreement), due to
parsing inconsistencies in the Treebank parse trees for some embedded clauses. Ad-
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Clause Type # Clauses Description
Basic transitive 2855 (15%) Matrix, finite, declarative clause with overt direct object
following known verb
Basic intransitive 2704 (15%) Matrix, finite, declarative clause without overt direct
object following known verb
Wh-question 2336 (13%) Clause has canonical syntactic form of a wh-question,
with wh-element in a dependency with the known verb
Polar question 3641 (20%) Clause has canonical syntactic form of a polar question
Other question 1922 (10%) Clause was transcribed with a question mark, but does
not have canonical syntactic form of a wh-question or
polar question: includes tag, fragment, and echo ques-
tions, and rising intonation declaratives
Passive 268 (1%) Known verb has been passivized, excluding forms that
are clearly adjectival
Relative clause 298 (2%) Known verb is in a full or reduced relative clause
Other embedded clause 4905 (27%) Known verb is in a finite or non-finite embedded, non-
relative clause
Imperative 2176 (12%) Clause has canonical syntactic form of an imperative
Table 5.2: Distribution of Clause Types in Dataset
ditional hand-coding was conducted for wh-questions and relative clauses in order
to annotate the gap site in these sentences, which could not be reliably identified
automatically for the entire dataset.
5.3.2 Results
Sentence Category Inference. The joint inference model inferred 35 total
sentence categories, 15 containing argument gaps and 20 without argument gaps.
For each of these categories, Figure 5.2 reports the total sentences in the category
and the proportion of the category made up of each underlying clause type, collaps-
ing across both types of basic clauses. For example, 0.83 of the 560 sentences in the
model’s Category 1 are basic transitives and intransitives, 0.08 are polar questions,
and so on. Note that these proportions do not necessarily sum to 1 because a single
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Figure 5.2: Proportions of Clause Types in Sentence Categories (c) Inferred by Joint
Inference Model
clause might be of multiple types. Categories that the model inferred to have ar-
gument gaps are represented with gray numbers, and categories without argument
gaps are in black.
Overall, the model’s categories have high purity when compared to the under-
lying clause types that are being used for evaluation. For example, we find categories
of 96% wh-questions (11), 90% passives (23), and 98% embedded clauses (28). We
can calculate the overall purity of the model’s categories by adding together the total
number of sentences that belong to the predominant clause type in each category,
and dividing by the total number of sentences in the dataset (Manning, Raghavan,
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& Schütze, 2008). When compared against a gold standard, this measure has a min-
imum value of 0 for poor clustering and a maximum value of 1 for perfect clustering.
Our model’s overall cluster purity is 0.76. This tells us that the features used by
the model were informative about the underlying clause types in the corpus, and
the model was able to use these features to track the target syntactic distinctions
in these sentences.
Of the model’s 15 argument-gap categories, 9 were primarily comprised of
clause types that were coded as having movement. Categories 11, 12, 14, 16, and
17 were predominantly wh-questions, and Categories 23-26 were predominantly pas-
sives. Wh-questions were also the primary clause type in two categories (13 and 15)
that were not identified as having argument gaps. Relative clauses made up a small
plurality of Category 27, which was also not inferred to have argument gaps.
For purposes of illustration, Table 5.3 provides a sample sentence for each of the
model’s argument-gap categories, and the three other categories whose main clause
type had movement. Appendix C provides a full description of these categories.
Focusing here on the categories whose predominant main clause type contained
movement, there are several distinctions the model appears to be making. The
model’s categories of passives (Categories 23-26) are differentiated between get-
passives (Category 23) and be-passives (Categories 24-26). These categories of be-
passives are further split by whether the verb is embedded and has overt -en vs. -ed
or irregular morphology.
The model’s wh-question categories (11-17) are differentiated along several
other dimensions. Long wh-questions (Category 12) are differentiated from short
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Category Main Clause Type Sample Sentence
3 Basic I’ll close.
9 Basic What’s that you’re writing?
11 Wh-question What are you bringing?
12 Wh-question What would you like to read?
13 Wh-question What fell down?
14 Wh-question What does he eat?
15 Wh-question Who’s playing with the balloons?
16 Wh-question Very good and what did you build?
17 Wh-question And what is he wearing?
21 Other question Open what?
23 Passive It got lost.
24 Passive That can’t be eaten.
25 Passive I don’t think that car is broken.
26 Passive It can’t be fixed.
27 Relative clause You’re the doggie who ran away?
30 Embedded They’re very easy to lose.
33 Embedded Let’s see if we have any clean pants that Thomas can wear.
35 Imperative Throw away.
Table 5.3: Sample Sentences from Model’s Argument-Gap and Other Movement
Categories
wh-questions. Progressive wh-questions (Categories 11, 15, and 17) are differenti-
ated from non-progressive wh-questions. Wh-questions with interjections or other
expressions before the wh-word (Categories 16-17) are differentiated from those in
which the wh-word is sentence-initial. Finally, subject wh-questions (Categories 13
and 15) are differentiated from object questions. The progressive/non-progressive
distinction, driven by the robust correlation between be and -ing, is one that the
model attended to in many of its other categories as well. Furthermore, because
the model only infers argument gaps on the basis of missing direct objects and not
subjects, the subject question categories were not inferred to have argument gaps.
This was also the case for the model’s category that had a small plurality of relative
clauses (Category 27), of which most were subject relatives.
Argument Gap Accuracy. The model’s accuracy was evaluated by compar-
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ing the sentences that it assigned to argument-gap categories against the sentences
that were coded as belonging to an underlying clause type with movement. These
clause types included wh-questions, relative clauses, and passives. They did not
include other rarer cases of movement such as tough-movement and movement out
of purposive clauses. Other cases of movement that were not coded separately
in the gold standard included clefting, pseudo-clefting, topicalization, comparative
movement, and raising. Thus, the model’s accuracy score reflects when it identi-
fied argument gaps for only the most frequent types of movement in its data, but
not cases when it identified argument gaps for less frequent movement types. This
means that the model is being evaluated against an incomplete gold standard, but
one that provides an estimate for the most frequent movement types in the corpus.
The accuracy of the joint inference model is summarized in Table 5.4 using
three metrics (Perry, Allen, & Berry, 1955). Precision measures the proportion of
sentences in the model’s argument-gap categories that contained movement accord-
ing to our gold standard— that is, the proportion of these categories made up of
wh-questions, relative clauses, or passives. Recall measures the proportion of wh-
questions, relative clauses, and passives in the corpus overall that were identified
as belonging to one of the model’s argument-gap categories. These metrics are not
always aligned: it would be possible to achieve perfect recall by identifying all sen-
tences as having movement, but this would result in very poor precision. The F1
score, the harmonic mean of precision and recall, reflects the model’s overall accu-
racy by taking into account both of these metrics. The model achieved an F1 score
of 0.56, with 0.51 precision and 0.62 recall. This recall measure indicates that it
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Model Precision Recall F1 Score
Joint Inference 0.51 0.62 0.56
No-Category Baseline 0.25 0.37 0.30
Distributional Baseline 0.15 1.00 0.27
Chance 0.15 0.50 0.23
Table 5.4: Accuracy on Identifying Sentences with Movement
identified 62% of sentences with movement in its data. While not perfect, this is
substantially above chance performance. A learner that randomly identified sen-
tences as having movement by flipping a fair coin would achieve an F1 score of only
0.23.
The model achieves this performance despite several factors that limit its accu-
racy. First, as previously discussed, the model does not receive credit for identifying
cases of movement other than wh-questions, passives, and relative clauses. Second,
the model only infers movement from sentences with object gaps, as its argument-
gap inference is driven by missing direct objects for verbs that it knows require
objects. This means that the current evaluation is partially measuring how well the
model was able to generalize in two ways: from object gaps with transitive verbs to
object gaps with freely alternating verbs; and from object movement to other types
of movement in sentences that look formally similar.
To evaluate these two types of generalization, Table 5.5 reports the percent-
ages of sentences with subject, object, prepositional object, or adjunct movement
that were identified as having gaps by the model, broken down by the known tran-
sitivity classes of verbs in these sentences. The model achieves high accuracy on
identifying sentences with object movement: it correctly identifies that 85% of these
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Table 5.5: % Sentences Identified as Having Gaps by Joint Inference Model, by
Movement and Verb Type
sentences have gaps, where chance performance would be only 50%. Moreover, the
model achieved this degree of accuracy even though the majority of sentences with
object movement occurred with verbs that it believed to be alternating, rather than
obligatorily transitive. Of the 1391 sentences coded as having object movement in
the corpus, only 296 contained known transitive verbs, compared to 1081 containing
known alternating verbs.3 The model’s overall high accuracy across verb classes
tells us that it was able to generalize in one way: it used the presence of object gaps
with known transitive verbs to identify the forms that object movement takes in its
data, even with verbs that do not obligatorily require objects.
On the other hand, the model showed weaker performance on identifying other
types of movement. It achieved slightly above-chance accuracy on identifying prepo-
sitional object movement; in this case, its accuracy for intransitive and alternating
3The few cases of object movement with intransitive verbs were uses of the verb in a rare or
ungrammatical transitive frame (e.g. What did you run? ).
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verbs was higher than for transitive verbs. This is likely because prepositional ob-
ject wh-questions and relative clauses are less likely to contain a direct object after
intransitive and alternating verbs. The model appeared to recognize some of the sur-
face distributional similarities between direct and prepositional object movement,
but was still looking for gaps in direct object position because it did not encode
the transitivity of specific prepositions. For adjunct movement, the model’s overall
performance was no better than chance. Its performance on subject movement was
worse than chance: it inferred that most subject wh-questions and relative clauses
did not contain gaps.
This tells us that the model did not tend to generalize across different types
of movement. It did not use the presence of object gaps to infer that there were
also gaps in subject or adjunct wh-questions and relative clauses, on the basis of the
formal similarities of these movement types, and it only drew this inference for some
cases of prepositional object movement. To some extent this lack of generalization
is desirable, because a learner would be incorrect to infer that direct object gaps
are present in these sentences. Indeed, a learner should not posit argument gaps at
all when there is adjunct movement. However, this learner misses the opportunity
to learn about the shared formal features that mark all types of wh-questions and
relative clauses in the language. A more sophisticated learner might use the absence
of other required arguments, such as subjects and prepositional objects, to condition
its inference about argument gaps and identify movement of different types.
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5.3.3 Model Comparisons
Our model achieves above-chance performance on identifying sentences with
movement, specifically those with object movement, by jointly inferring two proper-
ties: how sentences should be categorized together according to their surface feature
distributions, and which sentence categories violate the model’s expectations about
verb transitivity. To evaluate how important this joint inference is, we can compare
our model to baseline learners that only perform one step of inference at a time.
No-Category Baseline. If it didn’t matter that our learner categorized
sentences according to their surface features, then a learner should do just as well
at identifying movement on a sentence-by-sentence basis, by noting when objects
are unexpectedly missing for known transitive verbs. To test whether the model’s
categorization process matters, I compare our model against a baseline learner that
uses only the presence or absence of direct objects in individual sentences, together
with the known transitivity properties of verbs in these sentences, to infer which
sentences likely contain argument gaps. This baseline learner has the architecture
of the model in Chapter 4, but we now fix the transitivity properties of each verb (T )
and the parameters of the input filter (ε and δ) to the values inferred by that previous
model. We can sample individual error values (e) for each sentence in the corpus
from the posterior probability distribution over errors, given the observed direct
objects and known model parameters. This uses the same sampling equations that
were already derived to initialize the current learner; see Section 1 of Appendix B
for details of this sampling process. Sentences that are sampled as containing errors
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Table 5.6: % Object Movement Sentences Identified by No-Category Baseline
are those that violate the learner’s expectations of verb transitivity.
To determine how well this ‘No-Category’ baseline model identified movement,
I compared the sentences that it inferred to be errorful against the actual cases of
movement that were coded in the gold standard. The precision, recall, and F1 score
are reported in Table 5.4. The model achieved slightly better than chance accuracy
overall, but scored much lower than the joint inference model on all three metrics.
If we examine the baseline model’s identification of object movement only (Table
5.6), we find that it only identified 55% of the sentences with object movement in
the corpus, barely above chance performance. This is not entirely surprising, as
the baseline model’s only source of reliable information for object gaps comes from
the small percentage of verbs that it knows to be obligatorily transitive. Indeed,
it achieved high accuracy (76%) on identifying object movement with these verbs.
But for the much larger percentage of verbs that are alternating, it must guess
at random which sentences contain gaps, because it uses no other features in the
sentences to inform this inference. This results in overall worse performance than
the joint inference model.
These results tell us that the categories inferred by the joint inference model
were useful. The ability to categorize sentences using a wide range of surface mor-
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phosyntactic features, and to generalize across sentences in a category, results in
substantially better performance than inferring movement on a sentence-by-sentence
basis from direct object observations alone.
Distributional Baseline. Our model tests the hypothesis that it is useful for
prior verb transitivity knowledge to guide the identification of movement: specifi-
cally, that it is helpful for a learner to use verb transitivity knowledge in the process
of identifying the surface forms that signal movement dependencies. It therefore
makes sense to compare our model against a learner that performs distributional
analysis over the surface features of sentences without using verb knowledge. This
distributional baseline learner categorizes sentences only using their surface features,
without knowing which verbs require direct objects. It treats direct object obser-
vations identically to other surface features: for this learner, all direct objects are
generated by the grammatical properties of a sentence category, not by the prop-
erties of verbs in the sentences. Once these categories are formed, the model then
applies knowledge of verb transitivity in order to infer which sentence categories
contain argument gaps. If this baseline distributional learner can perform just as
well as our joint inference model in identifying sentences with movement, this will
tell us that it is not necessary for verb knowledge to guide distributional learning—
that verb knowledge can instead be acquired and applied after distributional analysis
over sentence forms has already taken place.
The first stage of this baseline learner has part of the architecture of the joint
inference model in Fig 5.1, but omits the variables T , θ, and e. When the variables
T and θ are omitted, the learner now assumes that all direct object observations X
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are generated by δ(X), grammatical properties of the sentence category, rather than
by any properties of the verbs in these sentences. When the variable e is omitted,
the learner is no longer inferring which sentence categories contain argument gaps at
this stage of learning; it is only inferring which sentence categories are present and
which sentences belong to which categories. The learner samples category values
for each sentence in the corpus from the posterior probability distribution over c
given X and F , integrating over δ(X) and δ(F ). This inference uses the subset of the
sampling equations in Appendix B that condition only on δ(X) and δ(F ).
The second stage of this learner then applies verb knowledge to identify whether
its already-formed sentence categories do or do not have argument gaps. The second
stage learner now has the architecture of the full model in Fig. 5.1, but sentence
categories are fixed to the values of c inferred by the first stage learner. The learner
samples argument-gap properties for each known sentence category from the poste-
rior probability distribution over e given X, F , c, and T , again using the sampling
equations in Appendix B.
The distributional baseline learner inferred 36 sentence categories. The pro-
portions of underlying clause types in these categories are reported in Fig. 5.3. On
the surface, these categories appear similar to those inferred by the joint inference
model. Their purity is similarly high when compared against the clause types in
the gold standard: the baseline model’s overall cluster purity is 0.77, compared to
0.76 for the joint inference model. This shows again that the morphosyntactic fea-
tures being tracked by both learners are informative for differentiating the different
underlying clause types in the corpus.
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Figure 5.3: Proportions of Clause Types in Sentence Categories (c) Inferred by
Baseline Distributional Learner
Similarly to the joint inference model, the baseline model identified 11 cate-
gories whose predominant clause type contained movement. These include 7 cate-
gories of wh-questions (Categories 12-18) and 4 categories of passives (Categories
25-28). The baseline model did not identify any category predominantly made up
of relative clauses. The model’s wh-question categories appear to mark the same di-
mensions as were marked by the joint inference model. Long wh-questions (Category
17) are differentiated from short wh-questions; progressive wh-questions (Categories
13 and 16) are differentiated from non-progressive questions; and subject questions
(Categories 14-16) are differentiated from object questions. The small plurality of
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wh-questions in Category 18 contain questions with an interjection or other expres-
sion before the wh-word. Similarly, the model differentiates between get-passives
(Category 25), and be-passives (Categories 26-28). Be-passives are further distin-
guished by whether the verb is embedded or has overt -en vs. irregular morphology.
These similarities in distributions between the baseline and joint inference
models show that a learner does not need verb knowledge to identify clusters of dif-
ferent wh-questions and passives according to their distinctive surface forms. Sub-
ject and object wh-questions differ enough in their surface feature distributions, as
do questions with and without progressive morphology and passives with get vs.
be, that a learner will differentiate between the surface forms of these sentences
regardless of whether it knows which verbs require objects.
However, despite these surface similarities, the baseline model’s categories are
different from those of the joint inference model in an important way. When the
baseline learner applied verb transitivity knowledge in its second stage of learning,
it inferred that all of its already-formed categories contained argument gaps, as indi-
cated by gray numbers in Fig. 5.3. That is, it was unable to differentiate sentences
with argument gaps from sentences without; the categories the model identified via
distributional analysis alone did not enable it to generalize effectively in its sec-
ond stage of learning. By positing argument gaps for every sentence in the corpus,
the model achieved perfect recall on identifying sentences with movement (Table
5.4). However, its precision was at chance, leading to an F1 score that was barely
above chance performance. The joint inference learner achieved substantially higher
overall accuracy. This shows that it is important for verb transitivity knowledge to
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guide distributional learning when inferring categories of sentences with and without
movement. While the distributions of these morphosyntactic surface features con-
vey a great deal of information about the distinctions among different clause types,
learning which of these distinctions signal movement and which do not requires the
use of verb knowledge during distributional analysis.
5.3.4 Interim Summary
In summary, our model identifies 62% of sentences with movement in child-
directed speech, and 85% of sentences with object movement, by tracking the surface
morphosyntactic features of sentences that violate its expectations of verb transi-
tivity. The model jointly infers how to categorize sentences according to their sur-
face feature distributions, and which of these sentence categories contain argument
gaps— missing objects of known verbs. This allows the learner to generalize across
sentences that share the same form and posit object gaps even for verbs that it
does not know to be transitive, resulting in overall accuracy twice as high as would
be expected by chance. It performs substantially better than a learner that relies
only on known verb transitivity knowledge and does not categorize sentences on
the basis of their surface feature distribution. This shows that the model’s cate-
gorization process is helpful. It also out-performs a baseline distributional learner
that categorizes sentences using their surface features alone, without knowing which
verbs require objects, and only afterwards attempts to use verb knowledge to infer
which categories had argument gaps. The baseline learner inferred categories with
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similar distributions as our model, but was unable to differentiate categories with
and without argument gaps, showing that verb knowledge is an important guide for
learning movement.
5.3.5 Features of Argument-Gap Categories
Under our hypothesis, the sentence categories inferred by the joint inference
model are an intermediate step of learning. Jointly inferring how to categorize sen-
tences according to their surface features, and which sentence categories contain
argument gaps, helps a learner identify the particular forms that characterize dif-
ferent types of movement dependencies in the target language. In the evaluations
above, I showed that our model’s categories enable it to perform well above chance
in identifying sentences with movement in its dataset, and substantially better than
two baselines that do not perform this joint inference. Here, I ask whether the
model’s categories will be useful for the next step of learning: identifying which
specific surface features are the footprints of movement.
Distinctive Features of Argument-Gap Categories. We can answer this
question by assessing which surface features are most distinctive in the categories
that the model inferred to have argument gaps. If these include the characteris-
tic forms of English movement dependencies, then the model’s sentence categories
contain helpful information for identifying the ways that movement can be realized
in English. There are many ways that feature distinctiveness may be measured.
One way is by calculating the odds ratio of each surface feature in the model’s
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argument-gap categories. This measure divides the odds of observing a feature in
a given category by the odds of observing that feature outside of that category; an
odds ratio significantly greater than 1 indicates that a feature is more likely to be
observed within than outside of the category. For the current purposes, significance
was calculated using a Fisher’s exact test with a Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons.
Note that by choosing this particular analysis, I do not make the claim that
learners perform a Fisher’s exact test on their data. There are many possible ways to
identify which features are suspiciously more likely in a given category, all of which
would likely yield similar results. The statistical analysis here merely provides an
estimate of the information that could, in principle, be available to a learner who is
sensitive to it.
Table 5.7 reports the features with odds ratios significantly greater than 1 for
each of the model’s argument-gap categories. Appendix D reports the odds ratios,
confidence intervals, and p-values for these features. The features reported in this
table include the characteristic forms of the non-basic clause types present in each
of the model’s categories. Categories 9, 30 and 33, which together contain 65% of
the relative clauses in the corpus, have greater odds of including sentence-medial
function words and nouns before the subject of the known verbs. These are the
forms that complementizers and heads of relative clauses take in English. Categories
11, 12, 14, 16, and 17 have greater odds of being questions and including subject-
auxiliary inversion, do, and function words sentence-initially or medially before the
verb, which are all distinctive forms of wh-questions in English. Category 21 has
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Category Main Clause Type Features
3 Basic Subject is overt, sentence-initial or preceded by a
noun; verb is first in sentence, has -ed or -s; function
word after verb sentence-medially or finally
9 Basic Subject is overt, preceded by a noun; verb has -ing,
preceded by be; sentence-medial function word before
verb
11 Wh-question Subject is overt, preceded by an aux; verb is first in
sentence, has -ing, preceded by be; sentence-initial
function word; question
12 Wh-question Verb is preceded by to; sentence-initial function
word; question
14 Wh-question Subject is overt, preceded by an aux; verb is first in
sentence, preceded by do; sentence-initial function
word; question
16 Wh-question Subject is overt, preceded by an aux or a noun; verb
is first in sentence, preceded by do; function word
sentence-medially before or after verb; question
17 Wh-question Subject is overt, preceded by an aux or a noun; verb
is first in sentence, has -ing, preceded by be; function
word sentence-medially before verb; question
21 Other question Verb is first in sentence; sentence-final function word,
question
23 Passive Verb has -en or irregular form, preceded by get
24 Passive Subject is overt, sentence-initial; verb is first in sen-
tence, has -en, preceded by be or have
25 Passive Subject is overt, preceded by a noun; verb has -en
or irregular form, preceded by be or have
26 Passive Subject is sentence-initial; verb is first in sentence,
has irregular form, preceded by be or have
30 Embedded Verb preceded by to or get ; sentence-medial function
word before verb
33 Embedded Subject is overt, preceded by a noun; verb has -s or
irregular form; sentence-medial function word before
verb
35 Imperative Verb is first in sentence
Table 5.7: Features with Significantly Higher Odds in Argument-Gap Categories
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greater odds of including a sentence-final function word, as occurs in English echo-
questions. Categories 23-26 have greater odds of including get, be, and -en verbal
morphology, which are the distinctive forms of English passives. Several of these
passive categories also have greater odds of including irregular verbal morphology,
as many verbs lack an overt -en morpheme when passivized (e.g. get caught).
On the other hand, the features in this table also include forms that are ir-
relevant to the movement dependencies in these categories. These include many
positional characteristics of subjects and verbs, but also some specific morphemes:
be and -ing in Categories 9, 11, and 17; to in Categories 12 and 30; -ed, -s, and
irregular verbal morphology in Categories 3 and 33; and have in Categories 24-26.
Some of these features mark the realization of non-movement dependencies. For
example, to introduces an embedded nonfinite clause, be and -ing mark the progres-
sive aspect, and the presence of have together with -en in Categories 24-26 marks
the perfect aspect. The specific verbal morphology in Categories 3 and 33 is entirely
accidental.
Thus, the model’s categories contain both signal and noise for learning which
surface features are the footprints of particular types of movement. The learner
correctly identified the forms that characterize the most frequent types of move-
ment in English, but it also identified some irrelevant features that are accidentally
correlated with these forms. This invites the question of how a learner could ef-
fectively use this information for further steps of learning— how a learner could
separate signal from noise by explaining some correlations as movement, and others
as different dependencies. For example, the learner needs to recognize that certain
207
sentence-initial function words are the moved wh-words in a wh-question, and do-
support and subject-auxiliary inversion are reflexes of English question formation,
but be and -ing mark an aspectual dependency that is orthogonal to wh-movement
or question formation, even though these forms are statistically correlated with cer-
tain wh-questions.
Distinctive Features of Non-Argument Gap Categories. One might
imagine an additional source of distributional information for solving this problem.
If a surface feature is not realizing a movement dependency, but is realizing an-
other syntactic dependency that is orthogonal to movement, then it should also
be present in some sentences without movement. Under this reasoning, our hy-
pothesized learner might not only identify which features are distinctive in sentence
categories that have argument gaps, but might also determine which of those fea-
tures are distinctive in other non-argument gap categories. This might be a signal
that such features are not present due to movement.
To test the viability of this solution, we can calculate the odds ratios for the
features of the model’s categories without argument gaps, restricting our attention to
those features that were identified as distinctive in argument-gap categories (Table
5.7). Table 5.8 lists the non-argument gap categories in which each of these features
have odds ratios significantly higher than 1. This table shows that all of the features
identified as distinctive in the model’s argument-gap categories were also identified
as distinctive in one or more of the model’s non-argument gap categories. The
few exceptions include get and -en verbal morphology, which are only found in the
model’s categories of passives and are indeed the features that indicate movement in
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Feature Non-Argument Gap Categories
Overt subject 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 18, 19, 20, 31, 32
Sentence-initial subject 1, 2, 4, 5, 10
Subject after aux 18, 19, 20
Subject after noun 6, 31, 32
Verb is first in sentence 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 13, 15, 18, 19, 22, 34
Verb has -ed
Verb has -en
Verb has -ing 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 19, 20, 22
Verb has -s 2, 13, 27, 32
Verb is irregular 4, 13, 27, 31
Verb preceded by to 28, 29
Verb preceded by be 5, 6, 7, 15, 19
Verb preceded by have
Verb preceded by get
Verb preceded by do 1, 18, 34
Sentence-initial function word 10, 13, 15, 18, 19
Sentence-medial function word before verb 6, 7, 27, 31, 32
Sentence-medial function word after verb 2, 10
Sentence-final function word 4, 22
Question 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 28
Table 5.8: Distributions of Distinctive Features from Table 5.7 in Non-Argument
Gap Categories
these categories. However, have and -ed verbal morphology are also only distinctive
features in argument-gap categories, despite the fact that their presence is irrelevant
to movement.
Thus, the distinctiveness of a feature in an argument-gap category vs. a non-
argument gap category is not by itself a strong signal for determining whether that
feature instantiates movement. If a learner were to use this information to infer
what type of dependency is instantiated by a particular feature, in some cases the
learner would draw a correct inference, but in other cases it would not. A learner
who notices that get and -en are only distinctive features in argument-gap categories
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would correctly infer that these features are marking a movement dependency. But
such a learner would also incorrectly infer that have and -ed are signals of movement.
Likewise, a learner who notices that be and -ing co-occur several non-argument
gap categories would be correct to infer that this correlation is not due to movement.
And a learner who notices that subject-auxiliary inversion and do can co-occur with
questionhood in Categories 18, 19, and 20 (polar questions) would also be correct
to infer that these features have more to do with interrogatives than with argu-
ment movement, since these categories do not have argument gaps. However, such
a learner would also draw the same incorrect inference about wh-words, because
sentence-initial function words are distinctive in many of many of the non-argument
gap categories inferred by the model. A more sophisticated learner might track the
distributions of individual unknown function words, rather than collapsing across
all unknown function words as a group. But even this learner would be misled
by the presence of wh-words in Categories 13, 15, 18, and 19, which contain large
numbers of subject and adjunct wh-questions; because the learner does not track
missing subjects in its argument-gap inference, it did not identify that these ques-
tions had argument gaps. Such a learner might infer that wh-words are only marking
interrogative force, and not movement.
In summary, the distributional learning mechanism instantiated by the current
learner can successfully identify a superset of the features that characterize different
types of movement in English. However, it cannot by itself solve the problem of
separating signal from noise in the features it has identified, in order to determine
which features are instantiating different movement dependencies, and which are
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instantiating other syntactic dependencies or are entirely accidental. It would seem
logically possible to compare the distinctive features of sentences with and without
argument gaps, in order to isolate the features that are responsible for those ar-
gument gaps. But this solution, at least as currently implemented, appears to fall
short for two reasons. First, some features that mark non-movement dependencies,
such as the perfect aspectual morphology have and -en, are so highly correlated with
movement dependencies in the learner’s data that they only occur in argument-gap
categories. Second, because the learner imperfectly identifies sentences with move-
ment, failing to recognize cases of non-object movement in e.g. wh-subject and
adjunct questions, some features occur frequently in non-argument gap categories
even though they are marking movement dependencies.
It is possible that a more sophisticated distributional learning mechanism
might be able to overcome these obstacles. Further investigation is needed to deter-
mine whether the signal-to-noise ratio in the model’s categories improves if it tracks
individual function words, or infers argument gaps using not only missing direct
objects but also other required but missing arguments (subjects and prepositional
objects). This might allow the learner to better identify non-object movement, po-
tentially making its inference about categories with argument gaps more precise.
But some accidental correlations may be pernicious to disentangle even for such a
learner. Thus, it is also possible that distributional learning, even when guided by
prior verb argument structure knowledge, can only take a learner so far. While
this process may allow a learner to make progress in identifying which sentences
have movement, additional non-distributional information may be needed in order
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to identify which movement or non-movement dependencies underlie the surface
forms in these sentences. I consider some possible options in the Discussion that
follows.
5.4 Discussion
This chapter provides a novel mechanism for the incremental learning of syn-
tactic dependencies. By hypothesis, learners use prior verb argument structure
knowledge to guide distributional learning over the surface morphosyntactic forms
that they can represent at the current stage of development. Doing so allows them to
identify forms that are characteristic of argument movement in the target language,
enabling further inference about which specific syntactic dependencies underlie these
surface forms. The current model instantiates the first steps of learning proposed
under this account:
(i) using knowledge of verb argument structure to detect argument gaps;
(ii) identifying what surface forms are correlated with these argument gaps; and
(iii) inferring what types of syntactic dependencies are responsible for those corre-
lations.
The experiments in this chapter demonstrate the computational feasibility of
steps (i) and (ii). The model jointly categorizes sentences according to similarities in
their surface forms, and infers which of these sentence categories contain argument
gaps. It does so by combining prior knowledge of verb transitivity, as learned by the
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model in Chapter 4, with new observations of the relevant morphosyntactic features
pertaining to subjects, verbs, and objects that are available to a child prior to 18
months. On the basis of this partial and rudimentary syntactic information, the
model accurately identifies a large majority of object movement in child-directed
speech.
This process requires building on prior verb transitivity knowledge. A baseline
model that first performs distributional analysis over the surface forms of sentences,
without knowing which verbs require objects, is unable to later use verb knowledge
to determine which clusters of surface properties correlate with argument gaps and
which do not. This shows that it is helpful for verb transitivity knowledge to serve
as an early guide for distributional learning. Acquiring and applying verb knowledge
later— after distributional learning over these surface forms is already underway—
leads the learner to miss generalizations about how these surface distributions cor-
respond to argument movement. Thus, a learner who builds incrementally on prior
knowledge would do better to identify the basic argument-taking properties of some
frequent verbs before attempting to learn the forms that movement can take in a
language like English.
This finding is consistent with the empirically attested developmental acqui-
sition for non-basic clause syntax in English. As shown in Chapter 3 and suggested
by prior work (Lidz et al., 2017; Jin & Fisher, 2014; Gagliardi et al., 2016; Perkins
& Lidz, under review), English-learning infants show sensitivity to verb transitivity
by the age of 15 months, but do not yet represent fronted objects in wh-questions
as objects until several months later, around the age of 18 months. By showing
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that verb transitivity knowledge is needed to guide the current model’s learning
mechanism, I provide an account for this developmental trajectory. This account
proposes that the observed developmental timecourse is not accidental: verb tran-
sitivity knowledge is developmentally prior to the acquisition of wh-movement in
English because it is needed to facilitate that acquisition.
Importantly, the learning mechanism in this chapter is incremental. The
learner does not jointly infer verb transitivity properties, surface feature distribu-
tions, and gaps of movement all at once. Rather, in order to model development, I
assume that the learner must build on prior syntactic knowledge one step at a time.
The joint inference that the learner performs is limited to two specific clause-level
properties— how features and argument gaps distribute in sentences— with verb
properties having already been acquired. The baseline distributional learner is simi-
larly incremental, but applies its syntactic knowledge in a different order, with verb
knowledge applied after rather than before distributional analysis.
However, this means that the findings reported in this chapter do not tell us
what would happen if learning does not take place incrementally. It is possible
that a non-incremental learner could out-perform this baseline, and perform just as
well as our model, by jointly inferring all of these phenomena in tandem. Such a
non-incremental approach would be more similar to that taken by prior computa-
tional approaches to clause structure acquisition. In the models in Maurits et al.
(2009), Kwiatkowski et al. (2012), and Abend et al. (2017), learners jointly infer
the language’s word order properties together with the argument-taking properties
and meanings of verbs and other lexical items. But by modeling the acquisition
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of lexical properties separately from the acquisition of clause-level properties, the
current approach allows us to assess the independent contribution of each of these
learning processes, and how they interact in a particular order. This brings us closer
to understanding how learning unfolds over time in a child’s development. A model
that jointly infers as much as possible about its grammar at once may succeed in dif-
ferent ways than the current model, but would be at a farther remove from learning
in development.
Prior models of clause structure acquisition (Maurits et al., 2009; Kwiatkowski
et al., 2012; Abend et al., 2017) differ from the current model in another way, by
assuming that learners bootstrap grammatical properties of their language using
detailed conceptual information. As discussed in Chapter 4, these prior learners
have access to meaning representations that specify all and only the predicate-
argument relations in a sentence, in a structural format that mirrors the syntax
of the sentence. This makes it simple to convert between conceptual to syntactic
structure in order to infer both word meanings and clause structure properties.
In taking a different approach, I do not deny that learners perceive the world
under particular conceptual descriptions (cf. Chapter 2), and may be able to infer
aspects of a speaker’s message using non-linguistic contextual cues. The question
is how reliably detailed and accurate we can assume these non-linguistic concep-
tual representations to be. Other work has shown that it is not so easy even for
adults to identify what specific meaning is conveyed by a particular linguistic utter-
ance, without access to the form of that utterance (Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman,
& Lederer, 1999; Gleitman, 1990). Thus, the goal of this model is to ask how much
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syntactic structure learners might be able to identify by using their representations
of the formal features of sentences, even when they do not have access to sentence
meaning represented under exactly the right conceptual structure. This bears on
the broader question of how learning proceeds even if the information that learners
use— linguistic or conceptual— is represented under a less complete or less accurate
structural format than prior work has assumed.
In focusing on formal distributional learning, the current work is closer to the
approach assumed in Stabler’s (1998) learnability analysis of grammars with move-
ment. Stabler identified that movement operations introduce challenges for a learner
attempting to draw inferences from string distributions. Even with constraints on
the forms that grammars can take, when movement is permitted, many different
grammars can generate the same set of strings. Stabler considers two solutions to
this problem. First, he shows that it helps to use structured representations rather
than strings. A learner can succeed with access to representations of the syntactic
“skeleton” of a sentence, which encodes all of the hierarchical branching structure
but leaves the nodes unlabelled. These syntactic skeletons include phonologically
null terminals (what we have been calling gaps) that make it possible to identify
where movement has occurred. Second, Stabler shows that even using string repre-
sentations only, a learner with a bias towards smaller, simpler grammars will prefer
grammars with movement in order to account for the distributions of lexical items
across sentences. This is because a learner can use movement to avoid positing dif-
ferent lexical entries for a lexical item that occurs in different structural positions
across sentences.
216
The approach I posit here combines both of these learning strategies: distribu-
tional learning across sentences, and learning based on (limited) structural evidence,
rather than merely strings. Stabler expresses concern that the skeletal syntactic rep-
resentations he proposes make very unrealistic assumptions about the data available
to learners at the onset of grammar acquisition. However, this concern may be miti-
gated if we consider grammar learning as taking place incrementally, rather than all
at once. Because the current account assumes that some verb argument structure
acquisition can take place independently, the proposed learner can infer some of
the most important features of Stabler’s structural representations: argument gaps,
which allow for inference about where movement has occurred. Our learner uses the
partial syntactic information that a young infant has access to, resulting in much
less detailed representations than the syntactic skeletons proposed by Stabler. Yet
the simulations above show that it is possible for a distributional learning mech-
anism, operating over these partial representations, to identify the surface signals
of movement dependencies in English. This learner does not yet perform the final
step of inference to identify the underlying dependencies in these sentences. But
by identifying when particular surface forms are correlated with empty argument
positions, the learner brings us one step closer to a solution for Stabler’s problem.
5.4.1 Which Syntactic Dependencies?
A major challenge remains in the current account: how to perform the last
step of learning, and infer which underlying syntactic dependencies are responsible
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for the correlations between surface forms and argument gaps that the learner has
identified. The results of the simulations in this chapter show that distributional
analysis alone cannot solve this problem. Our learner may have identified most cases
of object movement in its data, but does not know which features are instantiating
that movement, or even that movement per se is responsible for the argument gaps
it has inferred. Its distributional learning mechanism has yielded both signal and
noise: the distinctive features of its argument-gap categories include forms that
characterize movement dependencies in English, such as sentence-initial function
words and -en verbal morphology, but also include forms that are instantiating other
non-movement dependencies, such as have, be, and -ing. Comparing the distinctive
features of argument-gap and non-argument gap categories does not resolve this
issue. Moreover, the learner does not know that some forms of its argument-gap
categories are instantiating wh-movement, others are instantiating A-movement,
and others are not instantiating movement at all, but are marking argument-drop in
special pragmatic contexts. How, then, does the learner identify whether a particular
formal property is a footprint of movement, and what type of movement?
The problem becomes even thornier when we consider whether this learning
mechanism could generalize to languages beyond English. There are several proper-
ties of English that make gap-driven learning possible in principle. First, English’s
relatively fixed word order gives learners a reason to expect that subjects and ob-
jects will appear in particular positions relative to the verb. As previously discussed,
prior experimental work indicates that English learners are aware of these word or-
der properties at an early age— as young as 15-17 months (Gagliardi et al., 2016;
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Perkins & Lidz, under review; Lidz et al., 2017; Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 1996).
This makes it possible for a learner to detect gaps when arguments are missing in
their expected positions. But in many languages, word order will not be a reliable
cue to argument relations. It is possible that other information, such as case mor-
phology, will aid learners in these cases; see Fisher et al. (in press) and Suzuki and
Kobayashi (2017) for evidence that Korean- and Japanese-learning 2-year-olds are
sensitive to this information in verb learning. The proposed learning mechanism
hinges on the assumption that learners at this stage of development have already
acquired some knowledge of how their language marks local predicate-argument re-
lations, but whether this is the case cross-linguistically is an open empirical question.
Moreover, English also differs from languages like Korean and Japanese in
not allowing syntactic null arguments. The omitted objects for transitive verbs
that occasionally occur in the current dataset are licensed only under very spe-
cific discourse contexts, if they are grammatically licensed at all. In the general
case, English omitted objects do not appear to have the properties of syntactic null
arguments in other languages, and many analysis have treated them as implicit ar-
guments represented outside of the syntax (Bresnan, 1978; Fillmore, 1986; Fodor
& Frazier, 1980; Koenig & Mauner, 1999; Rizzi, 1986). This means that English
learners need to somehow rule out a syntactic null argument analysis of the argu-
ment gaps they observe, whereas Korean and Japanese learners need to rule this in.
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, it is possible that languages with free and
prevalent argument-drop may make it even more difficult for a learner to acquire the
verb transitivity knowledge needed to detect argument gaps when they are present.
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It remains to be seen whether the filtering mechanism proposed in Chapter 4 can
withstand the additional noise that syntactic argument-drop introduces, in order to
identify the argument-taking properties of verbs in languages with this property.
Finally, English primarily fronts wh-phrases in wh-questions, but fronting is
optional in languages like French, and is very rare in primarily wh-in-situ lan-
guages like Mandarin. Yet French and Mandarin learners still need to identify
wh-dependencies even when there has been no overt movement (Aoun et al., 1981;
Huang, 1982); see Gotowski and Becker (2016) and Gotowski (2017) for evidence
that French learners by the age of 3 have acquired the ability to produce both fronted
and in-situ wh-questions. The current hypothesis does not account for how a learner
could identify a movement dependency when no argument gap is observable.
Thus, it is possible that the proposed learning mechanism will only be useful
for learners facing certain kinds of data, and other mechanisms will be needed for
a learner whose data looks vastly different. In Chapter 6, I discuss the broader
theoretical implications for proposing a learning strategy that needs to be sensitive
to the shape of the data a learner is exposed to. But in the remainder of this chap-
ter, I would like to consider possibilities for how learning succeeds even in English
under the current hypothesis: how learners even in this case can move beyond the
noisy signal that is yielded by distributional analysis, and infer the syntactic de-
pendencies that give rise to the surface form distributions they have identified. I
propose that this inference requires simultaneous use of these formal distributions,
along with additional information about the likely dependencies in a given sentence
and the ways that those dependencies might be realized. In particular, prosody and
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pragmatics may be two sources of information available to a learner at this stage of
development, at least at a certain grain size. Together with a prior over the types of
dependencies that grammars make available, these additional sources of information
may help constrain the learner’s inference about when movement has occurred in a
given sentence, and what is moving.
Prosodic Information. Infants are sensitive to patterns of prosodic promi-
nence and prosodic breaks from their first weeks of life (e.g. Christophe, Dupoux,
Bertoncini, & Mehler, 1994; Christophe, Mehler, & Sebastin-Galls, 2001; Christophe,
Gout, Peperkamp, & Morgan, 2003; Gerken, Jusczyk, & Mandel, 1994; Jusczyk et
al., 1992; Nazzi, Bertoncini, & Mehler, 1998). While languages vary in whether or
how they use prosodic cues to particular syntactic transformations, prosody may
serve as a more cross-linguistically robust signal for constituency structure, because
prosodic breaks tend to fall at the edges of syntactic phrases (see Büring, 2013 for a
review). For this reason, a large literature proposes that infants can use prosody to
bootstrap some basic syntactic properties of their language: using prosodic breaks
to help identify some of the constituent boundaries in an utterance, and using ad-
ditional information, such as stress patterns, to draw further inferences about the
syntactic properties of those constituents (Christophe et al., 2008; De Carvalho et
al., 2016; Gleitman, Gleitman, Landau, & Wanner, 1988; Gout, Christophe, & Mor-
gan, 2004; Gutman, Dautriche, Crabb, & Christophe, 2015; Morgan, 1986; Morgan
& Demuth, 1996; Morgan, Meier, & Newport, 1987; Morgan & Newport, 1981;
Wanner & Gleitman, 1982). Recent experimental work shows that infants as young
as 18 months can use the presence of prosodic breaks to infer constituent boundaries
221
and disambiguate the syntactic parse of a string-ambiguous utterance (De Carvalho,
He, Lidz, & Christophe, 2019).
Prosody might therefore be a valuable source of information to help learners
identify some syntactic properties of the non-basic clauses that they cannot yet
parse completely. In particular, learners may be able to use prosodic information to
identify some of the constituency structure of the sentential material that they do
not yet know how to integrate into a complete parse. For example, if a fronted wh-
phrase receives focal stress or is eventually followed by a prosodic break before the
subject, a learner may use that information to infer that the fronted wh-phrase is in
a different syntactic constituent from the subject and verbal complex. A learner’s
initial parse of a wh-question, as in (3), might then gain some additional structural
detail, as in (4).4
(3) What is the dog [VP eating ] ?
(4) [XP What is] [[NP the dog] [VP eating ]]?
Recall that from the perspective of the learner we are considering, the fronted
wh-word is represented as an unknown function word. A learner who has a prior
over the various grammatical categories that are possible for functional elements, and
how those grammatical categories distribute, would gain information from knowing
that this unknown function word is in a different constituent from the subject.
4Note that it is also possible that a learner could choose a different bracketing here, with the
auxiliary in the same constituent as the subject. Given that infants at this age seem to treat
fronted auxiliaries differently from determiners within a subject NP (Geffen & Mintz, 2015), this
may be less likely at this stage of development. For the purposes of the current discussion I will
set aside this possibility for now.
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For example, what is now much less likely to be a morpheme that marks case or
agreement within the subject NP. Instead, its category must be that of a functional
element that can occur in a separate phrase on the left edge of a clause.
However, this still does not necessitate that what is an argument wh-word.
Even though a learner can identify that this sentence contains an argument gap,
there are other formal properties of the sentence that might be responsible for the
missing argument. Our model identified that this sentence belongs to an argument-
gap category with several distinctive features in addition to the unknown function
word: the auxiliary has moved before the subject, it is a form of be, and the verb
has -ing morphology. Here is a possible non-English analysis of this sentence that
accounts for these features. Perhaps what is a particle that occurs in various types of
questions, like la in Tz’utujil Mayan or est-ce que in French; auxiliary fronting also
occurs in questions; and the co-occurence of be and -ing verbal morphology together
mark object demotion, as would be found in an antipassive (see Polinsky, 2017).
Under this analysis, this sentence would be parsed as a polar question meaning ‘Did
the dog eat (the thing previously discussed)?’
One could imagine even more possibilities, many of which would be attested
cross-linguistically and therefore need to be available hypotheses for a learner. Thus,
prosodic information may help constrain the structural analysis that learners assign
to the distributional patterns they observe. But it still leaves many options open,
even when combined with prior knowledge about the types of parses that grammars
make available.
Pragmatic Information. Another useful source of information may come
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from pragmatics. Our model tracks whether or not a sentence has interrogative form,
and this is a feature that it identified as distinctive in several of its argument-gap
categories. As the discussion above acknowledged, it is still an empirical question
whether infants at this stage of development can reliably identify the force of an
utterance. This would need to be possible independently of knowing the canonical
syntactic forms that assertions, questions, and commands take in the language, as
the learner is attempting to bootstrap those very syntactic properties. But if learners
could use their understanding of the discourse context and other non-syntactic cues
to intuit the intended speech act, then this might provide top-down information to
constrain the parse that they are attempting to generate.
Here is one example of how this information might be applied in the case
of wh-questions. Suppose a learner has managed to use prosodic, syntactic, and
distributional information to identify a partial parse of a wh-object question that
looks something like (4), repeated here as (5). The learner has further identified
that what, be, -ing, and auxiliary inversion are suspiciously present in argument-gap
sentences that take this shape.
(5) [XP What is] [[NP the dog] [VP eating ]]?
Suppose further that in this context, the learner is able to identify not only that
the sentence has interrogative form but that it is a particular type of interrogative:
a content question. Setting aside the question of how the learner would intuit this
speech act, if she could manage to do so, it would constrain the possible meanings
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that this sentence might express. That is, suppose that the learner knows that the
logical form for content questions has a two-part format in which an operator is
taking scope over a proposition with an unvalued variable; informally, this might
follow the template ‘What is the value of x such that P(x) is true?’ (e.g. Karttunen,
1977). The learner’s task would then be to align this template to a possible syntactic
parse of the sentence, by picking one of the possibilities that she has generated
bottom-up.
In this case, the two-part template for the logical form aligns well with the
syntactic constituent structure in (5). There is a constituent containing a subject NP
and a VP with an argument gap, which looks like a complete sentence with an empty
slot for a variable. The leftmost constituent containing what could then be inferred
to be the operator. This provides much stronger constraints on the grammatical
category of what : wh-words are operators binding empty variable slots, whereas
question particles are not. A learner who chooses to parse this sentence as a wh-
question, with what as a wh-word, would arrive at an interpretation that accords
with the understood speech act. A learner who chooses to parse this sentence as a
polar question, with what as a question particle, would not. And having selected
the correct parse in this case, the learner would then be able to generalize to other
sentences that have the same form— identifying that these sentences all contain
wh-movement, and that what and other sentence-initial functional elements realize
the moved wh-element.
Thus, if learners have access to the right sort of discourse information, it is
possible that they could bootstrap simultaneously from syntax and pragmatics. Un-
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der this hypothesis, syntactically-informed distributional analysis gets the process
started. Syntactic knowledge allows learners to parse part of a sentence, iden-
tify when argument gaps are present, and generate a space of possibilities for the
structures that could explain both those gaps and the distributions of other formal
features. The ability to intuit the intended speech act, at least at the grain size of
“question” or “content question,” gives learners access to a template for a logical
form. Aligning these two structures involves picking a parse that could fit that tem-
plate, thereby making a hypothesis about which forms are instantiating movement
vs. other dependencies. This hypothesis will be supported if it allows the learner
to generate interpretations that are sensible in context and match the perceived
communicative intent of the speaker.
Although similar in its use of simultaneous top-down and bottom-up infor-
mation, this proposal differs from the semantic bootstrapping accounts proposed in
prior computational work (Maurits et al., 2009; Kwiatkowski et al., 2012; Abend
et al., 2017). The current account does not assume that learners have access to a
complete meaning representation for a sentence, specifying all predicate-argument
relations. Instead, pragmatic information provides only a template for a possible
logical form, with details like predicate-argument relations unspecified. Inference is
required to align this format for a meaning representation with the learner’s partial
syntactic representation. And this inference is only possible if the learner has the
syntactic knowledge to represent the sentence under a partial structure that could
align in the right way.
Further investigation is needed to determine whether this bootstrapping strat-
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egy could be feasible. I have sketched out a possible story for how pragmatic in-
formation could inform one type of argument movement— wh-movement in wh-
questions— but it remains to be shown that this account could generalize to other
types of movement dependencies. And even if this strategy is possible in princi-
ple, much more empirical work is needed to determine whether infants can access
the pragmatic information it requires, by tracking the speech acts of their parents
and other speakers around them. One major challenge that this strategy faces is
indirectness. The direct speech act, which is closely tied to the syntactic form of
the sentence, may be difficult to disentangle from the indirect speech acts that a
speaker is performing in using that sentence (Hacquard & Lidz, 2018). For example,
a parent might use the sentence What are you eating? in order to communicate that
a child should spit out the object that she is ingesting. Or, a parent might use the
sentence Where are your shoes? in order to communicate that a child should put
on shoes and leave the house. If a learner were to try to use these utterances as
data for bootstrapping, she would need to identify that the direct speech acts are
still content questions, even though the sentences are being used to issue indirect
commands. For this form of bootstrapping to be viable, an important question
for future work is whether infants can guess the direct speech act of an utterance
reliably enough for learning to succeed.
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5.4.2 Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter contributes two main findings. First, I show that
it is in principle possible for a learner to build incrementally on prior verb argu-
ment structure knowledge in order to identify the surface forms that characterize
movement in English. The learner does so by performing syntactically-informed
distributional analysis over the relevant formal properties of sentences that can be
represented at this developmental stage. This is consistent with the empirically
observed developmental trajectory for verb transitivity and non-basic clause struc-
ture acquisition, and supports the Gap-Driven Learning hypothesis for the learning
mechanisms that underlie that development. More broadly, this shows how prior
grammatical knowledge can guide statistical learning, allowing learners to incre-
mentally make more precise generalizations about their grammar from incomplete
representations of their input.
Second, I show that formal distributional analysis has its limits. The learn-
ing mechanism as currently implemented succeeds at identifying various surface
forms that might instantiate movement in the target language, but stops there.
The learner’s distributional analysis does not allow it to identify what syntactic
dependencies— movement or non-movement— underlie these surface forms. I pro-
pose that this step of inference requires syntactic knowledge working in concert with
cross-domain information, potentially from prosody and pragmatics. But this infor-
mation can only be applied when a learner has a formal syntactic representation for
which it could be useful. More work is needed to show whether this proposal is log-
228
ically and empirically feasible. But if it is, it would point towards a way to combine
two sources of knowledge— knowledge of the linguistic structures that grammars
make available, and knowledge of how those structures relate to the communicative




This dissertation examines the acquisition of argument structure as a window
into the role of development in grammar learning. The way that children repre-
sent the data for language acquisition depends on the grammatical knowledge they
have at any given point in development. Children use their immature grammatical
knowledge, together with other non-linguistic conceptual, pragmatic, and cognitive
abilities, to parse and interpret their input. But until children have fully acquired
the target grammar, these input representations will be incomplete and potentially
inaccurate. Our learning theory must take into account how learning can operate
over input representations that change over the course of development. What allows
learners to acquire new knowledge from partial and noisy representations of their
data, one step at a time, and still converge on the right grammar?
The case study in this dissertation points towards one way in which a theory
of language acquisition can account for the role of development. I ask how we
can enrich the traditional model that previous linguistic theories have assumed, in
which learning is idealized as observing a corpus of primary linguistic data, applying
general cognitive abilities and knowledge of the properties that grammars can have,
and inferring the grammatical properties of the target language (Chomsky, 1965;
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Figure 6.1: Developmental Model of Language Acquisition
Wexler & Culicover, 1980); (see also Yang, 2002; Perfors et al., 2006). I propose
a move towards a developmental model that contains the same ingredients, but
combines them one step at a time (Fig. 6.1). In this model, learners must use their
developing grammar at the current point in time to represent their primary linguistic
data in whatever format this immature grammar makes available. They then apply
their cognitive abilities and knowledge of the properties that grammars can have in
order to gain new knowledge of their language. This process then iterates: their
updated developing grammar is now used to represent their input in a richer way,
allowing them to draw new generalizations about their grammar and incrementally
move closer to the target state.
This developmental model requires specifying in a more fine-grained way the
resources that children bring with them to the language learning task. I consider
two types of resources. The first is representational: learners need resources for
representing their input in useful ways, even early in development. For example, a
representation that encodes some amount of linguistic structure, even if that struc-
ture is incomplete or inaccurate, will be more useful for a learner acquiring syntax
than a representation that only encodes string properties (e.g. Stabler, 1998). The
second resource includes mechanisms for learning from these input representations
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even if they are incomplete or inaccurate. Learners need tools for identifying the
underlying grammatical dependencies in their immature input representations—
identifying signal in data that will contain a great deal of noise early in the learning
process.
In the experiments in the previous chapters, I examine these two types of
resources in the domain of argument structure. With respect to the first repre-
sentational question, I ask what resources infants use to represent their input for
argument structure acquisition: whether they differentiate the core arguments of a
clause by their grammatical relations, and when they recognize that clause argu-
ments are present or missing in their canonical positions. With respect to the second
learning question, I ask what resources infants use to learn about verb meanings,
argument structure, and argument movement on the basis of these input repre-
sentations. I investigate how learners could use a combination of domain-specific
linguistic knowledge and domain-general cognition— statistical learning combined
with conceptual and pragmatic abilities— in order to draw inferences about verb
meanings and their argument-taking properties, and eventually identify not only
local predicate-argument dependencies but also non-local ones. In the discussion
that follows, I summarize the main findings in the dissertation and consider their
broader implications.
232
6.1 Summary of Findings
I begin in Chapter 2 by asking how infants at early stages of verb learning
represent and use clause transitivity to draw inferences about verb meanings. I
contrast two families of hypotheses in the literature. One hypothesis proposes that
infants primarily rely on the number of arguments in a clause and expect these to
match one-to-one the number of participants that they view in an event (Fisher et
al., 2010; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004a; Naigles, 1990, 1990). An alternative hypothesis
proposes that infants primarily rely on the grammatical relations of clause arguments
and link these in principled ways to the thematic relations that they view in an event
(Pinker, 1984; Williams, 2015; Lidz et al., 2017). In two experiments, I pit these two
bootstrapping strategies against each other, and ask which one infants will use when
the two strategies would lead to different inferences about verb meanings. I show
that infants at the age previously tested (19 to 22 months) do not primarily rely on
a number-matching strategy. Infants allow a transitive description of an event that
they view under a 3-participant concept, showing that they do not expect arguments
to match participants in number. But they do not allow an unaccusative intransitive
description of this same event concept, showing that they differentiate the arguments
of transitive and intransitive clauses and are sensitive to the different meanings that
those clause types can express. This result suggests that infants from very early
in grammatical development privilege the grammatical and thematic relations of
clause arguments above argument number in the representations that they use for
bootstrapping verb meanings, and invites further questions into how richly these
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relations are represented.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the question of how infants recognize these clause
arguments not only when they are in local dependencies with the verb, but also
when those dependencies are non-local. I argue that so-called “non-basic” clauses,
in which arguments have been moved from their canonical positions, introduce a
chicken-and-egg problem in early grammar acquisition. Learners use the subjects
and objects of clauses to bootstrap verb meanings and the core argument structure
properties of their language. If they could identify when these arguments have been
moved, then they could use those moved arguments to draw accurate bootstrapping
inferences. Or, if they could identify the argument-taking properties of some fre-
quent verbs in their language, then they could use this information to identify when
argument movement has taken place, and learn the ways that various movement
dependencies are realized in their language. Which comes first, argument structure
or non-basic syntax?
The two experiments in Chapter 3 find that the answer to this chicken-and-
egg question is argument structure. I show that 15-month-old English learners
are sensitive to the transitivity properties of some frequent verbs, differentiating
sentences in which a direct object was present after the verb from sentences in
which it was missing in that position. However, only 18-month-olds show awareness
that a fronted wh-phrase acts as that locally missing object in a wh-object question.
18-month-olds responded differently to object gaps in wh-object questions compared
to object gaps in simple declarative clauses, showing that they recognized both the
local and non-local dependencies in these sentences. This result provides evidence
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that English learners acquire the ability to represent non-local predicate-argument
dependencies in wh-questions in their second year of life, about 2 months before
they begin producing them in their own speech (Rowland et al., 2003; Stromswold,
1995). Furthermore, this ability comes developmentally after infants have acquired
knowledge of verb transitivity, supporting the hypothesis in Gagliardi et al. (2016)
and Perkins and Lidz (under review).
In Chapters 4 and 5, I ask which learning mechanisms might enable this devel-
opment. I propose that the developmental trajectory observed in Chapter 3 is not
accidental, but follows from a mechanism that allows infants to use knowledge of the
argument-taking properties of some frequent verbs to bootstrap their acquisition of
argument movement. I consider a “Gap-Driven” Learning hypothesis that involves
the following steps of learning:
(i) using knowledge of verb argument structure to detect argument gaps: pre-
dicted arguments that are unexpectedly missing in their local positions;
(ii) identifying what surface forms are correlated with these argument gaps; and
(iii) inferring what types of syntactic dependencies are responsible for those corre-
lations.
Chapter 4 investigates how the first step of learning required under this hy-
pothesis is even in principle possible. How might a learner identify verbs’ argument-
taking properties at the developmental stage before she can recognize displaced
arguments in non-basic clauses? I follow a solution proposed in prior literature
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(Pinker, 1984, 1989; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004b): learners need to “filter” their input
in such a way as to learn verb argument structure and clause structure properties
only from basic clauses, and ignore the potentially misleading data contributed by
non-basic clauses that they cannot yet parse completely. This solution risks being
circular if learners need to identify particular sentences as non-basic in order to filter
them. However, I show that this circularity can be avoided if learners do not filter
non-basic clauses per se, but instead merely filter their data in a way that allows
them to separate signal from noise.
The model in Chapter 4 implicitly assumes that some of its representations
of its data will be erroneous, and it infers how to filter its data in order to learn
verb transitivity, without knowing ahead of time where that error comes from or
how much error is present. Instead, it infers the right way to filter by using very
specific distributions in its data: it tracks observations of post-verbal direct objects
within and across verbs, and uses no other information in a sentence. The model is
nonetheless able to effectively ignore the non-basic clauses in its data, and accurately
categorize the majority of frequent transitive, intransitive, and alternating verbs in
a corpus of child-directed speech. And it does so without knowing which sentences
are non-basic clauses, or even what the features of non-basic clauses are. This
mechanism provides a flexible and potentially powerful way for learners to avoid
being misled by the messy data that comes from immature parses of their input:
learners may be able to use a form of filtering to maximize the signal in their data,
and ignore the noise.
This model provides proof of concept that a learner could, in principle, learn
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the argument-taking properties of frequent verbs before being able to identify non-
basic clauses. In Chapter 5, I turn to the question of how this verb argument
structure knowledge could be used to bootstrap the acquisition of non-basic syntax.
I instantiate a model that builds off the learner in Chapter 4 in order to imple-
ment steps (i) and and (ii) in the Gap-Driven Learning hypothesis. The model in
Chapter 5 jointly clusters together sentences according to similarities in their sur-
face forms, and infers which of those sentence clusters contain argument gaps. It
does this by conducting distributional analysis over the relevant morphosyntactic
features of sentences that are observable to a child prior to 18 months, guided by
the verb transitivity knowledge acquired by the model in Chapter 4. On the basis of
these immature sentence representations and partial syntactic knowledge, the model
accurately identifies the majority of object movement in a corpus of child-directed
speech, and identifies many of the surface forms that characterize movement in
English.
However, the mechanism modelled in Chapter 5 stops short of the final step of
learning under the Gap-Driven Learning hypothesis: inferring which underlying syn-
tactic dependencies are responsible for the observed correlations between argument
gaps and particular surface forms in these sentences. Many spurious correlations ex-
ist in the learner’s data, and the distributional learning mechanism cannot by itself
determine which of these correlations are due to movement vs. other non-movement
dependencies. This shows where the limits of distributional learning lie. In order to
perform the final step of inference to identify particular movement dependencies in
the language, I propose that learners need to make use of not only the formal dis-
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tributions they observe, but also additional information— potentially from prosody
and pragmatics— about the likely dependencies in a given sentence and the ways
those dependencies might be realized. This invites further investigation into how
the learning mechanisms for grammar acquisition might be fed by informed statis-
tical learning working in concert with knowledge of the syntactic dependencies that
grammars make use of, and knowledge of how those dependencies relate to speakers’
goals in discourse.
6.2 Future Directions and Broader Implications
In summary, this work shows one case in which we can characterize the role of
development in grammar acquisition by probing more deeply into the resources that
learners bring to their learning task. The finding that infants privilege the gram-
matical and thematic content of clause arguments in verb learning has implications
for what resources infants use to represent their input for syntax acquisition. Infants
may be biased to look for asymmetrical relations between subjects and objects in a
clause, enabling more sophisticated inferences about the types of meanings that a
clause can express. The finding that English learners identify the local argument-
taking properties of verbs before identifying non-local predicate-argument relations
has implications for the mechanisms that they use to learn from immature represen-
tations of their input. I show that it is in principle possible for learners to acquire
knowledge of verb argument structure by being strategic about how they learn from
messy data; learners may then identify non-local dependencies in the language by
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using this argument structure knowledge to guide formal distributional learning.
This case study thus illuminates how learners may incrementally apply their cur-
rent linguistic knowledge to their partial and changing input representations in order
to infer a grammar.
This dissertation models only one narrow corner of grammatical development:
the acquisition of argument structure and argument movement in English. We might
now ask how far this model could generalize. The hypothesis I pursue requires that
learners identify the core argument structure profile of their language: that they
have some way to recognize subjects and objects in their canonical clause positions.
It is still an open empirical question how richly these grammatical relations are rep-
resented, whether qua subjects and objects or in some other format. But given that
these relations need to be differentiated in some manner, this raises the question
of how learners know what information to use. The relatively fixed word order of
English makes the linear position of a noun phrase relative to the verb a strong cue
to its grammatical relation. But learners of languages with freer word order or free
argument-drop will need other ways to identify when arguments are present even in
local dependencies with the verb, and which arguments these are. It is an open em-
pirical question whether other sources of information, such as case morphology, are
available and used by learners of such languages at the relevant stage of development
(e.g. Fisher et al., in press; Suzuki & Kobayashi, 2017).
Furthermore, the mechanisms proposed above will be unhelpful for identifying
movement dependencies in which no argument gap is observable. Yet learners of
wh-in-situ languages still need to recognize that a wh-dependency is present even
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when the wh-element has not overtly moved to the clause position where it takes
scope (Aoun et al., 1981; Huang, 1982). Identifying the underlying covert movement
dependencies in these languages would seem to require a different learning process,
one in which argument structure knowledge might be used in a different way. It is
possible that learners of these languages can more readily recognize when an in-situ
wh-element bears a particular grammatical relation, but would need to use other
formal, prosodic, or pragmatic information to recognize that this element is in a
non-local dependency with a higher node in the clause, corresponding to the scope
of the interrogative. How this type of learning proceeds is another topic for future
work.
This cross-linguistic comparison raises the possibility that the mechanisms
specified at the current grain size may only be helpful for learners facing certain
kinds of data, and other mechanisms may be needed for learners whose data have
different properties. This raises an important theoretical question. How does lan-
guage learning converge, and look so remarkably uniform across languages, if the
underlying learning mechanisms need to be sensitive to the shape of the data a
learner is exposed to— and the shape of the data varies widely from language to
language? Or, put another way, what possible resources could allow a learner to
identify the right strategy for learning incrementally from the data she has available,
when some strategies might work better than others for her language?
I suggest that the analysis of English argument structure acquisition proposed
in this dissertation is merely one instance of a more general learning mechanism that
might be flexibly tailored to fit the evidence provided by a learner’s data. Infants
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may approach the task of syntax acquisition with a bias to attend first to the core
predicate-argument structure of a clause. This structural representation is crucial
for constructing an interpretation of an utterance beyond the single word level; how-
ever incomplete this representation may be, identifying some of the core argument
relations in a clause will allow at least a partial understanding of who did what to
whom. An English learner may identify that word order provides a decent initial
signal for identifying these argument relations, and then use other information— for-
mal, prosodic, and pragmatic— to identify the types of non-local dependencies that
may disrupt the expected canonical word order. A Japanese learner may identify
that case morphology is a better signal for these argument relations, and use that
information together with other formal, prosodic, and pragmatic cues to identify
both the local and non-local dependencies that are present in a sentence.
Considered at this grain size, these two learning strategies are not so different
from each other. A learner’s initial knowledge of the types of predicate-argument
dependencies that grammars make available, and how these dependencies relate to
sentence meanings and their uses in discourse, guides the learner to the relevant
evidence that her language provides for detecting these dependencies. This may
allow her to arrive at a learning strategy that is in part guided by general principles
of grammar, and in part constructed ad-hoc on the basis of her data. Thus, taking an
incremental approach to language acquisition requires enriching our understanding
of the abstract prior knowledge that learners bring with them to the learning task,
and how that abstract knowledge can be applied to enable learning from the specific
data a learner has available, as she represents it at any given point in development.
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We may also wonder how the mechanisms presented in this work will general-
ize in other ways. The mechanisms I propose may help a learner out of a particular
chicken-and-egg problem: acquiring verb argument structure and non-basic clause
syntax in tandem in a language like English. But learners must also acquire many
other syntactic properties of their language. How well would these mechanisms gen-
eralize if the chicken-and-egg problem becomes multi-dimensional— when learners
also need to identify whether their language has e.g. argument-drop, verb raising,
and subject-auxiliary inversion? The toy model in this dissertation provides a start-
ing place for understanding one corner of grammar acquisition, but it remains to be
seen how it might scale up in order to understand how other aspects of grammar
develop incrementally over time.
More broadly, this work illuminates the complex interplay of linguistic, cog-
nitive, and conceptual development in the very first steps of acquiring a grammar.
Infants may be able to infer aspects of verb meanings by mapping between the struc-
ture of a sentence and a conceptual representation of the world around them. But
these inferences rely on the particular representations that infants have available in
any given instance, and may involve a sophisticated understanding of the principled
relations between linguistic and conceptual structure. Domain-general statistical
learning may help a learner extract signal from noise in her own input representa-
tions, and identify formal regularities that are present. But statistical learning may
need to be guided by prior grammatical knowledge in order for learners to draw the
right generalizations to explain those regularities. Understanding a speaker’s com-
municative intent in using a particular sentence may help constrain the structure
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and interpretation that a learner assigns to that sentence. But this pragmatic infor-
mation is not by itself constraining enough to provide a complete parse; a learner
must also have available a partial syntactic representation for which this top-down
information could be useful. Thus, studying grammatical development provides a
window into how linguistic knowledge interacts with the rest of cognition in order
to enable learning from input.
Finally, this work has novel implications not only for theories of language ac-
quisition, but also for learning in general. This work proposes novel mechanisms
by which a language learner might draw the right generalizations from partial and
immature input representations, offering a new perspective on the use of data in
learning. Under this approach, learners infer the regularities underlying a partic-
ular phenomenon in their input by jointly inferring what data to use in order to
best identify those regularities. Learning succeeds through a combination of spe-
cific hypotheses that guide the learner to the relevant evidence in her data, and
the assumption of a noisy relationship between her data and the hypotheses she is
evaluating. The flexibility in this approach invites further investigation into how
broadly these mechanisms might generalize beyond language learning. Understand-
ing when learners choose to learn from their input, and when they choose not to
learn, may help illuminate how learning succeeds in many other domains in which
learners must generalize from incomplete or unreliable representations of data.
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Appendix A: Details of Gibbs Sampling for Verb Transitivity Learner
The learner in Chapter 4 uses Gibbs sampling (Geman & Geman, 1984) to
jointly infer T , ε, and δ, integrating over θ and summing over e, with Metropolis-
Hastings (Hastings, 1970) proposals for ε and δ.
To begin, values of ε and δ are randomly initialized, and values of T for each
verb are then sampled given values for those input filter parameters. From observa-
tions of a verb with and without direct objects, the model determines which value
of T was most likely to have generated those observations. For k(v) direct objects in
n(v) sentences containing verb v, we can use Bayes’ Rule to compute the posterior
probability of each value for T (v),
p(T (v)|k(v), ε, δ) = pk
(v)|T (v), ε, δ)p(T (v))∑
T ′(v)
p(k(v)|T ′(v), ε, δ)p(T ′(v))
(1)
Bayes’ Rule tells us that the posterior probability of a particular value of T
given k(v) and the other model parameters is proportional to the likelihood, the
probability of k(v) given that value of T and those parameters, and the prior, the
probability of T before seeing any data. T is assumed to be independent of ε and
δ. Simulation 1 uses a uniform prior over T , which is adjusted to reflect different
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biases about the proportions of transitivity categories in Simulation 2.
To calculate the likelihood, we must sum over e. This sum is intractable, but
because all of the values of e for the same verb and the same direct object status are
exchangeable, we can make the computation more tractable by simply considering
how many errors were generated for sentences with and without direct objects for
a particular verb. We can divide the k(v) observed direct objects for a verb into
k
(v)
1 direct objects that were observed accurately and k
(v)
0 direct objects that were
observed in error. The total n(v) observations for verb v are likewise divided into
n
(v)
1 accurate observations and n
(v)
0 errorful observations. We then calculate the




1 , again assuming independence among
T , ε, and δ,

















 p(n(v)1 |ε) (2)




0 , δ), assuming we
know n(v), the total number of observations for a particular verb. This is the proba-
bility of observing k
(v)
0 errorful direct objects out of n
(v)
0 errorful observations, which
follows a binomial distribution with parameter δ,
p(k(v)|k(v)1 , n
(v)




























accurate direct objects out of n
(v)
1 accurate observations, which follows a binomial


























Recall that θ(v) = 1 for the transitive category of T , and θ(v) = 0 for the
intransitive category of T . For the alternating verb category, θ(v) is unknown, so we





The last term in (2) is the probability of observing n
(v)
1 accurate observations
out of the total n(v) observations for verb v, which follows a binomial distribution














After sampling values for T for each verb in the dataset, we then sample
values for ε and δ. If T denotes the set of values T (1), T (2), ..., T (V ), and k denotes
the full set of observations of direct objects k(1), k(2), ..., k(V ) for all V verbs in the
input, we can define functions proportional to the posterior distributions on ε and
δ, f(ε) ∝ p(ε|T, k, δ) and g(δ) ∝ p(δ|T, k, ε), as
f(ε) = p(k|T, ε, δ)p(ε) (6)
g(δ) = p(k|T, ε, δ)p(δ) (7)
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where the likelihood p(k|T, ε, δ) is the product over all verbs v of p(k(v)|T (v), ε, δ), as
calculated in (2).
Within the Gibbs sampler, ε is resampled using 10 iterations of a Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm. After randomly initializing ε, at each iteration, a new value ε′
is proposed, sampled from the proposal distribution Q(ε′|ε) = N(ε, 0.25). Because








If the new value ε′ has higher probability given T , k and δ under equation (6), it
is accepted. If it has lower probability under equation (6), it is accepted at a rate
corresponding to the ratio of its probability and the probability of the old value of
ε. After sampling ε, δ is resampled with 10 iterations of Metropolis-Hastings. The
proposal and acceptance functions are analogous to those for ε.
Multiple chains from different starting points were run to test convergence of
T , ε, and δ. The simulations reported here used 1,000 iterations of Gibbs sam-
pling. Every tenth value from the last 500 iterations were taken as samples from
the posterior distribution over T , ε, and δ.
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Appendix B: Details of Gibbs Sampling for Argument Gap Learner
The learner in Chapter 5 uses Gibbs sampling (Geman & Geman, 1984) to
jointly infer c and e, integrating over θ, δ(X), and δ(F ). The learner is initialized
using the input filter parameters and transitivity categories inferred by the model
in Chapter 4.
B.1 Initialization
To begin, values of c for each sentence are initialized to one of three initial
sentence categories: one category with argument gaps and two without. These
initial categories are sampled from the posterior probability distribution that a given
sentence contains an error— the variable e in the model in Chapter 4— given the
values of T , ε, and δ inferred by that model. If a sentence is sampled as containing
an error under that model, it is initialized to the argument-gap category; if not, it
is randomly initialized to one of the two non-argument gap categories. We can use
Bayes’ Rule to compute the posterior predictive probability for the error value ei of
a particular sentence observation Xi, given all other error values e, other sentence
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observations X, and other model parameters:
p(ei|X(v)i , T (v), ε, δ, e,X) =
p(X
(v)




i |e′i, T (v), ε, δ, e,X)p(e′i|ε)
(1)
The posterior predictive probability of a particular value of ei given X
(v)
i , all
other observations, and other model parameters, is proportional to the likelihood,
the probability of X
(v)
i given that value of ei and the other observations and pa-
rameters, and the prior, the probability of ei before seeing any data. The prior
probability of ei only depends on ε: ei takes a value of 1 with probability ε, and 0
with probability 1− ε.
For the errorful value ei = 1, the likelihood term p(X
(v)
i |ei = 1, T (v), ε, δ, e,X)
depends only on the inferred value for δ, the probability that an errorful observation
contains a direct object. X
(v)
i takes a value of 1 with probability δ, and 0 with
probability 1− δ.
For the non-errorful value e1 = 0, the likelihood term depends on the proba-
bility that verb v occurs with a direct object, given by θ(v) for the verb’s inferred
transitivity category T (v). If the verb is inferred to be transitive or intransitive, θ(v)
is known. In these cases, X
(v)
i takes a value of 1 with probability θ, and 0 with
probability 1−θ. If the verb is inferred to be alternating, we must integrate over all

















The first term inside the integral is equal to θ(v) if X
(v)
i = 1, or 1 − θ(v) if
X
(v)
i = 0. We can use Bayes’ Rule to compute the second term inside the integral,
the probability of θ(v) given all other non-errorful observations X
(v)
1 ,
p(θ(v)|T (v),X(v)1 ) =
p(X
(v)
1 |θ(v), T (v))p(θ(v)|T (v))∫
p(X
(v)
1 |θ(v), T (v))p(θ(v)|T (v))dθ(v)
(3)
The prior probability p(θ(v)|T (v)) is assumed to follow a uniform Beta(1, 1)




1 direct object observations for this verb
out of n
(v)
1 total non-errorful observations. The likelihood term, p(X
(v)
1 |θ(v), T (v)),
is the probability of observing k
(v)
1 direct objects in n
(v)
1 total observations. This
follows a binomial distribution with parameter θ(v),
p(X
(v)






















Solving the integrals in equations (2) and (3), we calculate that X
(v)
i takes a

















Values of e = 1 and e = 0 were randomly initialized for every sentence in the
dataset. These values were then re-sampled for each sentence sequentially from the
posterior predictive probability distribution defined in Equation 1, using the values
for T and the means of the distribution over ε and δ (0.19 and 0.25 respectively) that
were inferred by the model in Chapter 4, Simulation 1. This process was repeated
over 1,000 iterations of Gibbs sampling. The final sample was used to initialize the
simulations in Chapter 5 in the following way: all sentences sampled as being errorful
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were initialized to an argument-gap sentence category, and all sentences sampled as
being non-errorful were randomly divided among two sentence categories without
argument gaps.
B.2 Sampling c
After initializing c, new values of c for each sentence are re-sampled sequen-
tially. From observations of direct objects and other features in a sentence, and
across other sentences in the model’s data, the model determines which previously
seen or new value of c was most likely to have generated those observations. For
direct object observation X
(v)




together with all other direct object observations X, feature observations ~F, and
sentence category assignments c for other sentences in the dataset, we can use
Bayes’ Rule to compute the posterior predictive probability of each value for c,
p(ci|X(v)i , ~Fi
(v)













|c′i, ec, T (v),X, ~F, c)p(c′i|c)
(5)
The posterior predictive probability of a particular value of c given the ob-
served data, known transitivity categories, and other sentence category values is






of c, other observed data and category values, and the prior probability of c. We
assume that c is independent of all other model parameters. The prior probability
of c is a Dirichlet process (Ferguson, 1973) with parameter α. In this process, each
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category value ci has prior probability proportional to the number of sentence ob-
servations already assigned to that category, nci . This process also reserves a small
non-zero probability for new categories of c, with half of this probability reserved for
new argument-gap categories and half reserved for new categories without argument
gaps. This probability is determined by the parameter α, which we set equal to 1.





for previously seen values of c
0.5α
n+ α
for new values where ec = 1
0.5α
n+ α
for new values where ec = 0
(6)
Assuming independence between X and F , we calculate the likelihood as the












|ci, ec, T (v),X, ~F, c) = p(X(v)i |ci, ec, T (v),X, c)p(~Fi
(v)
|ci, ec, ~F, c) (7)
The first term in this likelihood function is calculated differently depending on
the value of ec for the current category ci. If ci is an argument-gap category, then
direct objects are generated by the grammatical property of that category δ
(X)
ci . We




ci , conditioning on other observations of sentences in this category,
p(X
(v)








This equation takes the same form as in equation (2). Let nci be the total
observations in category ci and kci be the total direct object observations in this
category. Following equations analogous to (2)-(4), we calculate that X
(v)
i takes a
value of 1 with probability
kci+1
nci+2




If ci is not an argument-gap category, then direct objects in this category
are generated by the transitivity properties of each verb. The first term in the
likelihood function in (7) thus depends on the known transitivity category T (v). If
verb v is transitive or intransitive, then θ is known, and X
(v)
i takes a value of 1
with probability θ, and 0 with probability 1 − θ. If verb v is alternating, we again
integrate over all possible values of θ(v), conditioning on observations of this verb
in other categories without argument gaps. This is the same integral as in equation
(2). Here, let n
(v)
1 be the total observations for verb v in categories where ec = 0, and
k
(v)
1 be the total direct object observations for verb v in these categories. Following
equations (2)-(4), we calculate that X
(v)


















The second term in (7) is the probability of the other observed features occur-
ring in the given category. Assuming independence among features, this is equivalent
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to the product over the probabilities of observing each feature in this category,
p(~Fi
(v)







i |ci, ec,F, c) (9)
The probability of observing a particular feature F in a category ci is given by
δ
(F )
ci for that feature and that category. We integrate over all possible values of δ
(F )
ci ,
conditioning on other observations of feature F . Let nci be the total observations
in category ci and k
F
ci
be the total observations of feature F in this category. Again
following equations analogous to (2)-(4), we calculate that F
(v)












After sampling values for c for each sentence in the dataset, we then sample
new values of e for each category. Bayes’ Rule allows us to calculate the poste-
rior probability of each value of ec for a category c given all of the direct object
observations in that category Xc and known verb transitivity properties T ,
p(ec|c,Xc, T ) =
p(Xc|ec, c, T )p(ec)∑
e′c
p(Xc|e′c, c, T )p(e′c)
(10)
We assume that ec is independent of T and c, and that the prior probability
p(ec) = 1 is set to 0.19, the mean value of ε inferred by the model in Chapter
4. In other words, the learner assumes that the prior probability of a transitivity-
violating category is equivalent to the probability that any single sentence contains
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a transitivity violation, as inferred by the previous learner. This will only be the
case if sentences are equally distributed among categories, a simplifying assumption
of the learner’s prior that may be overridden if not supported by the data.
The likelihood term, p(Xc|ec, c, T ), is the probability of seeing particular obser-
vations of direct objects for verbs in this category. If ec = 1 and ci is an argument-gap
category, this probability is determined by δ
(X)
ci . We calculate the joint probability of
the direct object observations for each verb in that category given δ
(X)
ci , integrating
across all possible values of δ
(X)
ci ,












The first term inside the integral is the product across all verbs of probability
of the direct observations for that verb X(v)c in the category, given δ
(X)
ci . For each
verb v, we can re-write X(v)c as k
v
c direct object observations out of n
v
c total observa-
tions for that verb in the category. The probability p(X(v)c |δ
(X)
ci ) follows a binomial
distribution with parameter δ
(X)
ci ,
p(X(v)c |δ(X)ci ) = p(k
(v)




















We assume that the prior probability p(δ
(X)
ci |ci) follows a uniform Beta(1, 1)
distribution. Let nc be the total observations in a particular category and kc be the
total direct object observations in that category. Solving the integral in equation
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(11), we find that
p(Xc|ec = 1, c, T ) =
















If ec = 0 and ci is not an argument-gap category, the likelihood term in equa-
tion (10) is determined by the known transitivity T (v) of each verb in the category.
The probability of the particular direct object observations Xc in the category is
the joint probability of seeing those direct object observations for each verb, given
the transitivity of that verb,










We can again re-write X(v)c as k
v
c direct object observations out of n
v
c total
observations for a given verb in a given category. The probability of observing kvc
direct objects out of nvc total observations of a verb follows a binomial distribution
with parameter θ(v),
















Recall that θ(v) = 1 for transitive verbs and θ(v) = 0 for intransitive verbs. For
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alternating verbs, we must integrate across all possible values of θ(v),
p(k(v)c |n(v)c , T (v)) =
∫
p(k(v)c |n(v)c , θ(v))p(θ(v)|T (v))dθ(v) (16)
We assume that p(θ(v)|T (v)) follows a Beta(α, β) distribution, where the pa-
rameters α and β are counts of direct object observations and no direct object
observations for verb v in other categories without argument gaps. Solving the
integral in equation (16), we find that





c − k(v)c + 1
)( Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
)(Γ(k(v)c + α)Γ(n(v)c − k(v)c + β)
Γ(n
(v)
c + α + β)
)
(17)
B.4 Sampling with Annealing
Multiple chains from different starting points were run to test convergence of c
and e. The simulations reported here used 5,000 total iterations of Gibbs sampling.
To aid in the model’s search process, simulated annealing was used during the
first 1,000 iterations (e.g. Goldwater Griffiths 2007). In this process, we raise the
posterior probabilities of c and e to the power of an annealing constant defined as 1/t,
where t is the current ‘temperature.’ Then, we slowly lower the temperature (reduce
t) until the annealing constant reaches 1. While the temperature is warm, the
posterior probability distributions are flattened so the learner is able to explore more
of its hypothesis space. After 1,000 iterations of Gibbs sampling with annealing,
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another 4,000 iterations were run without annealing. The final interation was taken
as a sample from the posterior distribution over c and e.
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Appendix C: Description of Argument-Gap and Other Movement
Categories
The learner in Chapter 5 identified 15 categories that it inferred to have argu-
ment gaps, and 3 additional non-argument gap categories whose predominant clause
type contained movement. I provide a description of these categories below.
Categories 3 & 9 are categories whose predominant clause type is basic,
but with properties that led the model to identify transitivity violations. Setting
aside Category 3 for the moment, the clauses in Category 9 tended to start with
conjunctions or other unknown function words, and were grouped together with a
non-negligible number of relative clauses and wh-questions (example provided in
Table 5.3). For this reason, the model inferred that Category 9 had argument gaps.
Category 9 is also characterized by the presence of progressive morphology.
This is a distinction that was also made in several of the model’s other categories.
For example, the model differentiated progressive wh-questions (Categories 11, 15,
and 17) from non-progressive wh-questions (Categories 12, 13, 14, and 16). It also
differentiated progressive relative and other embedded clauses (Category 33) from
non-progressive relative clauses (Category 27). It seems that correlation between the
features be and -ing was sufficiently robust in the corpus that the model considered
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it important to explain in its categorization of several sentence types.
The progressive/non-progressive distinction is one of several dimensions that
the model differentiated in its categories of wh-questions (Categories 11-17 ). The
model differentiated long wh-questions with movement out of an embedded clause,
in Category 12, from short wh-questions in the remaining categories. It also dif-
ferentiated wh-questions that started with a wh-forms (Categories 11-15) from wh-
questions with a conjunction, interjection, or other expression before the wh-word
(Categories 16-17). Finally, it differentiated subject wh-questions, in Categories 13
and 15, from object questions in the remaining categories. Subject questions ap-
pear to have sufficiently different formal properties, such as lack of subject-auxiliary
inversion and do-support, that the model categorized them separately from other
wh-questions. Because the model only attended to missing objects and not subjects
in its argument-gap inference, the subject question categories were not inferred to
have argument gaps. Adjunct questions did not make up the majority of any single
wh-question category, but were distributed among the model’s two object question
categories and Categories 18-19, which are categories of predominantly polar ques-
tions.
Category 21 contains many questions that fell into the ‘other’ category—
i.e., those that did not have the canonical syntactic form of an English wh-question
or a polar question. Because of the prevalence of fragment and echo questions
in this category, many transitive verbs in these sentences were missing nominal
direct objects, which led the model to infer that this sentence category also contains
argument gaps.
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Categories 23-26 are categories of passives. The model differentiated be-
tween get-passives, in Category 23, and be-passives, in Categories 24-26. Category
25 contains primarily embedded passives. The two categories of matrix be-passives
differ by their verbal morphology: overt -en morphology is consistently present in
Category 24, whereas the passivized verbs in Category 26 have -ed or an irregular
form rather than an an overt -en morpheme. Some of the passives in these categories
may be adjectival passives, as the learner does not have a way to identify these.
Categories 27, 30 & 33 contain various embedded clauses. Category 27
is a fairly mixed category whose most common clause type, by a small plurality, is
relative clauses. These are mostly subject relatives, and because they do not have
object gaps, the model inferred that this was not an argument-gap category. Most
of the object relative clauses in the corpus appear in argument-gap Category 33,
where they were categorized with other embedded clauses. The relevant distribu-
tional difference for the learner between subject and object relatives appeared to
be the presence or absence of an overt subject for the verb of interest, in canonical
subject position before the verb. Category 30 is predominantly made up of nonfi-
nite embedded clauses. Many of these sentences contain embedded passives or rarer
types of movement that were not coded as a separate underlying clause type, such
as tough-movement (e.g. They’re very easy to lose) and movement out of nonfinite
purposive clauses (e.g. It’s not a ball to throw). For this reason, this category was
also inferred to have argument gaps. It appears that the model was sensitive to
some less frequent cases of object movement that were not included in the target
coding scheme.
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Finally, Category 35 is a category whose primary clause type is imperatives,
but also includes many basic clauses. This category, along with Category 3, shows
the interesting property of not actually having much movement. Instead, these two
categories appear to have a large proportion of fragments and object-drop that might
be ungrammatical, or licensed only under special discourse contexts (e.g. I’ll open).
These categories also have a small proportion of known intransitive verbs occurring
with direct objects (8% of Category 3 and 3% of Category 35). Some of these extra
direct objects occur in grammatical but infrequent uses of a verb that is normally
intransitive (e.g. I’ll sit you up). Others are temporal adjuncts that the learner
could not tell apart from direct objects (e.g. We went swimming nearly every day).
Due to the presence of both missing direct objects for transitive verbs and extra
direct objects for intransitive verbs, the learner inferred that the direct objects in
these categories likely came from the grammatical property of the category rather
than the transitivity of the verbs in these sentences.
This means that the term ‘argument-gap category’ is a misnomer in some
cases; more accurately, the model inferred that some categories contained transi-
tivity violations, which in some cases produced argument gaps and in some cases
produced unexpected extra objects. Because these extra objects are rare, I will con-
tinue to treat these categories as primarily argument-gap categories in the analyses
that follow, with the caveat that in some cases these contain different types of tran-
sitivity violations. A more sophisticated learner might draw difference inferences on
the basis of these different types of violations, a possibility that I leave for future
work.
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Appendix D: Odds Ratios for Features of Argument Gap Categories
The learner in Chapter 5 identified 15 sentence categories that it inferred to
have argument gaps. To evaluate which surface morphosyntactic features were the
most distinctive of these categories, I calculated the odds ratios for each feature in
each of these categories. The odds of observing a feature in a particular category
were divided by the odds of observing the feature outside of that category. An odds
ratio greater than 1 indicates that a feature has higher-than-usual odds inside a
category; an odds ratio less than 1 indicates that a feature has lower-than-usual
odds inside a category. An odds ratio of infinity can occur if a feature is always
present inside a category, and an odds ratio of 0 can occur if a feature is never
present.
A Fisher’s exact test was conducted to determine which odds ratios were signif-
icantly different from 1. A Bonferroni correction was applied to correct for multiple
comparisons: because 21 odds ratios were conducted for each category, the critical
value for each comparison was established by setting α equal to 0.05/21 = 0.002.
Tables D.1-D.15 list the odds ratios (OR), along with their 95% confidence intervals
(CI) and p-values, for features whose odds ratios were significantly greater than 1
in each of the model’s argument-gap categories.
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Feature OR CI p-value
Overt subject 47.01 (18.15, 173.90) < 0.001
Sentence-initial subject 9.37 (7.12, 12.47) < 0.001
Noun before subject 1.77 (1.29, 2.40) < 0.001
Verb is first in sentence 10.22 (5.75, 20.03) < 0.001
Verb has -ed 2.68 (1.62, 4.19) < 0.001
Verb has -s 3.10 (1.89, 4.86) < 0.001
Sentence-medial function word after verb 4.23 (2.73, 6.35) < 0.001
Sentence-final function word 2.69 (1.50, 4.51) < 0.001
Table D.1: Distinctive Features of Category 3 (Basic)
Feature OR CI p-value
Overt subject 139.89 (24.90, 5391.99) < 0.001
Noun before subject 11.59 (8.70, 15.48) < 0.001
Verb has -ing ∞ (289.35, ∞) < 0.001
Verb preceded by be 36.94 (25.31, 55.49) < 0.001
Sentence-medial function word before verb 6.49 (4.85, 8.66) < 0.001
Table D.2: Distinctive Features of Category 9 (Basic)
Feature OR CI p-value
Overt subject ∞ (82.40, ∞) < 0.001
Aux before subject 2401.00 (0.00, > 10, 000) < 0.001
Verb is first in sentence 203.69 (36.40, 7672.94) < 0.001
Verb has -ing ∞ (671.79, ∞) < 0.001
Verb preceded by be 3370.99 (614.42, < 10, 000) < 0.001
Sentence-initial function word 208.56 (124.72, 375.14) < 0.001
Question 329.80 (91.31, 2830.29) < 0.001
Table D.3: Distinctive Features of Category 11 (Wh-Questions)
Feature OR CI p-value
Verb preceded by to 186.15 (89.26, 475.39) < 0.001
Sentence-initial function word 1053.39 (283.62, 8192.00) < 0.001
Question ∞ (120.52, ∞) < 0.001
Table D.4: Distinctive Features of Category 12 (Wh-Questions)
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Feature OR CI p-value
Overt subject ∞ (95.48, ∞) < 0.001
Aux before subject 474.41 (216.39, 1339.56) < 0.001
Verb is first in sentence 21.05 (11.65, 42.47) < 0.001
Verb preceded by do 31.85 (25.42, 40.19) < 0.001
Sentence-initial function word 61.33 (46.13, 83.04) < 0.001
Question 13.59 (10.14, 18.56) < 0.001
Table D.5: Distinctive Features of Category 14 (Wh-Questions)
Feature OR CI p-value
Overt subject ∞ (19.32, ∞) < 0.001
Aux before subject 101.98 (42.31, 320.98) < 0.001
Noun before subject 7.38 (4.97, 10.95) < 0.001
Verb is first in sentence 1.87 (1.15, 3.18) 0.009
Verb preceded by do 17.19 (11.18, 27.02) < 0.001
Sentence-medial function word before verb 47.85 (28.89, 83.45) < 0.001
Sentence-medial function word after verb 6.50 (3.54, 11.23) < 0.001
Question 7.25 (4.34, 12.79) < 0.001
Table D.6: Distinctive Features of Category 16 (Wh-Questions)
Feature OR CI p-value
Overt subject ∞ (15.90, ∞) < 0.001
Aux before subject 83.03 (34.20, 262.06) < 0.001
Noun before subject 2.86 (1.72, 4.60) < 0.001
Verb is first in sentence 13.00 (4.30, 64.35) < 0.001
Verb has -ing 216.25 (58.25, 1800.69) < 0.001
Verb preceded by be 142.79 (53.65, 543.38) < 0.001
Sentence-medial function word before verb 29.14 (17.88, 49.19) < 0.001
Question ∞ (34.34, ∞) < 0.001
Table D.7: Distinctive Features of Category 17 (Wh-Questions)
Feature OR CI p-value
Verb is first in sentence 61.91 (10.92, 2432.58) < 0.001
Sentence-final function word 37.34 (25.80, 53.74) < 0.001
Question 5.68 (3.73, 8.95) < 0.001
Table D.8: Distinctive Features of Category 21 (Other Questions)
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Feature OR CI p-value
Verb has -en 43.75 (22.31, 81.23) < 0.001
Verb has irregular form 18.00 (10.97, 29.78) < 0.001
Verb preceded by get ∞ (8402.05, ∞) < 0.001
Table D.9: Distinctive Features of Category 23 (Passives)
Feature OR CI p-value
Overt subject 3.02 (1.64, 6.01) < 0.001
Sentence-initial subject 8.56 (4.99, 15.31) < 0.001
Verb is first in sentence 31.89 (5.54, 1269.77) < 0.001
Verb has -en 15443.69 (3062.43, > 10, 000) < 0.001
Verb preceded by be 23.07 (13.05, 43.15) < 0.001
Verb preceded by have 761.15 (393.03, 1600.00) < 0.001
Table D.10: Distinctive Features of Category 24 (Passives)
Feature OR CI p-value
Overt subject 6.76 (2.11, 34.55) < 0.001
Noun before subject 29.22 (12.40, 79.44) < 0.001
Verb has -en 191.83 (89.79, 412.45) < 0.001
Verb has irregular form 5.54 (2.36, 12.04) < 0.001
Verb preceded by be 10.32 (4.92, 22.46) < 0.001
Verb preceded by have 4541.88 (664.29, > 10, 000) < 0.001
Table D.11: Distinctive Features of Category 25 (Passives)
Feature OR CI p-value
Sentence-initial subject 5.32 (3.59, 7.98) < 0.001
Verb is first in sentence 12.43 (4.72, 46.44) < 0.001
Verb has irregular form 23.68 (15.96, 35.54) < 0.001
Verb preceded by be 8.57 (5.83, 12.67) < 0.001
Verb preceded by have 214.41 (139.30, 333.63) < 0.001
Table D.12: Distinctive Features of Category 26 (Passives)
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Feature OR CI p-value
Verb preceded by to 121.74 (75.20, 210.26) < 0.001
Verb preceded by get 5.19 (2.38, 10.17) < 0.001
Sentence-medial function word before verb 4.91 (3.99, 6.01) < 0.001
Table D.13: Distinctive Features of Category 30 (Embedded Clauses)
Feature OR CI p-value
Overt subject ∞ (47.65, ∞) < 0.001
Noun before subject 93.00 (59.80, 151.43) < 0.001
Verb has -s 3.36 (2.05, 5.27) < 0.001
Verb has irregular form 4.95 (3.69, 6.59) < 0.001
Sentence-medial function word before verb 17.17 (13.24, 22.37) < 0.001
Table D.14: Distinctive Features of Category 33 (Embedded Clauses)
Feature OR CI p-value
Verb is first in sentence 2.94 (2.12, 4.16) < 0.001
Table D.15: Distinctive Features of Category 35 (Imperatives)
267
References
Abend, O., Kwiatkowski, T., Smith, N. J., Goldwater, S., & Steedman, M. (2017).
Bootstrapping language acquisition. Cognition, 164 , 116–143.
Adriaans, F., & Swingley, D. (2012). Distributional learning of vowel categories is
supported by prosody in infant-directed speech. In Proceedings of the Annual
Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Vol. 34).
Alishahi, A., & Stevenson, S. (2008). A computational model of early argument
structure acquisition. Cognitive science, 32 (5), 789–834.
Anderson, J. R., & Matessa, M. (1990). A rational analysis of categorization. In
Machine Learning Proceedings 1990 (pp. 76–84). Elsevier.
Aoshima, S., Phillips, C., & Weinberg, A. (2004). Processing filler-gap dependencies
in a head-final language. Journal of memory and language, 51 (1), 23–54.
Aoun, J., Hornstein, N., & Sportiche, D. (1981). Some aspects of wide scope
quantification. Journal of Linguistic Research, 1 (3), 69–95.
Arunachalam, S., Escovar, E., Hansen, M. A., & Waxman, S. R. (2013). Out of
sight, but not out of mind: 21-month-olds use syntactic information to learn
verbs even in the absence of a corresponding event. Language and cognitive
processes , 28 (4), 417–425.
Arunachalam, S., Syrett, K., & Chen, Y. (2016). Lexical disambiguation in verb
learning: evidence from the conjoined-subject intransitive frame in English
and Mandarin Chinese. Frontiers in psychology , 7 , 138.
Arunachalam, S., & Waxman, S. R. (2010). Meaning from syntax: Evidence from
2-year-olds. Cognition, 114 (3), 442–446.
Arunachalam, S., & Waxman, S. R. (2011). Grammatical form and semantic context
in verb learning. Language Learning and Development , 7 (1), 169–184.
Arunachalam, S., & Waxman, S. R. (2015). Let’s see a boy and a balloon: Argument
labels and syntactic frame in verb learning. Language Acquisition, 22 (2), 117–
131.
Baker, M. C. (1988). Incorporation: A theory of grammatical function changing.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Barak, L., Fazly, A., & Stevenson, S. (2014). Learning verb classes in an incremen-
tal model. In Proceedings of the Fifth Workshop on Cognitive Modeling and
Computational Linguistics (pp. 37–45).
Becker, M. (2015). Animacy and the acquisition of tough adjectives. Language
Acquisition, 22 (1), 68–103.
Becker, M., Estigarribia, B., & Gylfadottir, D. (2012). Tough-adjectives are easy to
learn. Supplemental Proceedings of BUCLD , 36 , 1–12.
268
Bloom, L. (1970). Language development: Form and function in emerging gram-
mars. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brandone, A., Addy, D. A., Pulverman, R., Golinkoff, R. M., & Hirsh-Pasek,
K. (2006). One-for-one and two-for-two: anticipating parallel structure be-
tween events and language. In Proceedings of the 30th Annual Boston Uni-
versity Conference on Language Development (pp. 36–47). Cascadilla Press
Somerville, MA.
Bresnan, J. (1978). A realistic transformational grammar. In M. Halle & G. A. Miller
(Eds.), Linguistic Theory and Psychological Reality (pp. 1–59). Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Brown, R. (1973). A First Language: The Early Stages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Bunger, A., & Lidz, J. (2004). Syntactic bootstrapping and the internal structure
of causative events. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual Boston University
Conference on Language Development (p. 74). Cascadilla Press.
Bunger, A., & Lidz, J. (2008). Thematic relations as a cue to verb class: 2-year-
olds distinguish unaccusatives from unergatives. University of Pennsylvania
Working Papers in Linguistics , 14 (1), 4.
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